1 Objection 1: It seems that the true and being are not convertible terms. For the true resides properly in the intellect, as stated Article 1); but being is properly in things. Therefore they are not convertible.
1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod verum et ens non convertantur. Verum enim est proprie in intellectu, ut dictum est. Ens autem proprie est in rebus. Ergo non convertuntur.
2 Objection 2: Further, that which extends to being and not-being is not convertible with being. But the true extends to being and not-being; for it is true that what is, is; and that what is not, is not. Therefore the true and being are not convertible.
2 Praeterea, id quod se extendit ad ens et non ens, non convertitur cum ente. Sed verum se extendit ad ens et non ens, nam verum est quod est esse, et quod non est non esse. Ergo verum et ens non convertuntur.
3 Objection 3: Further, things which stand to each other in order of priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true appears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except under the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are not convertible.
3 Praeterea, quae se habent secundum prius et posterius, non videntur converti. Sed verum videtur prius esse quam ens, nam ens non intelligitur nisi sub ratione veri. Ergo videtur quod non sint convertibilia.
4 On the contrary, the Philosopher says Metaph. ii) that there is the same disposition of things in being and in truth.
4 Sed contra est quod dicit philosophus, II Metaphys., quod eadem est dispositio rerum in esse et veritate.
5 I answer that, As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth is related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being, so far is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in De Anima iii that the soul is in some manner all things, through the senses and the intellect. And therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the true. But as good adds to being the notion of desirable, so the true adds relation to the intellect.
5 Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut bonum habet rationem appetibilis, ita verum habet ordinem ad cognitionem. Unumquodque autem inquantum habet de esse, intantum est cognoscibile. Et propter hoc dicitur in III de anima, quod anima est quodammodo omnia secundum sensum et intellectum. Et ideo, sicut bonum convertitur cum ente, ita et verum. Sed tamen, sicut bonum addit rationem appetibilis supra ens, ita et verum comparationem ad intellectum.
6 Reply to Objection 1: The true resides in things and in the intellect, as said before Article 1). But the true that is in things is convertible with being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect is convertible with being, as the manifestation with the manifested; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already Article 1). It may, however, be said that being also is in the things and in the intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in things; and this is so because truth and being differ in idea.
6 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verum est in rebus et in intellectu, ut dictum est. Verum autem quod est in rebus, convertitur cum ente secundum substantiam. Sed verum quod est in intellectu, convertitur cum ente, ut manifestativum cum manifestato. Hoc enim est de ratione veri, ut dictum est. Quamvis posset dici quod etiam ens est in rebus et in intellectu, sicut et verum; licet verum principaliter in intellectu, ens vero principaliter in rebus. Et hoc accidit propter hoc, quod verum et ens differunt ratione.
7 Reply to Objection 2: Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be known; yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it knowable. Hence the true is based on being, inasmuch as not-being is a kind of logical being, apprehended, that is, by reason.
7 Ad secundum dicendum quod non ens non habet in se unde cognoscatur, sed cognoscitur inquantum intellectus facit illud cognoscibile. Unde verum fundatur in ente, inquantum non ens est quoddam ens rationis, apprehensum scilicet a ratione.
8 Reply to Objection 3: When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways. In the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and this is true. In the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of the true be apprehended also; and this is false. But the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be apprehended also; since being is included in the idea of the true. The case is the same if we compare the intelligible object with being. For being cannot be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its intelligibility is not understood. Similarly, being when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by understanding being.
8 Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum dicitur quod ens non potest apprehendi sine ratione veri, hoc potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo, ita quod non apprehendatur ens, nisi ratio veri assequatur apprehensionem entis. Et sic locutio habet veritatem. Alio modo posset sic intelligi, quod ens non posset apprehendi, nisi apprehenderetur ratio veri. Et hoc falsum est. Sed verum non potest apprehendi, nisi apprehendatur ratio entis, quia ens cadit in ratione veri. Et est simile sicut si comparemus intelligibile ad ens. Non enim potest intelligi ens, quin ens sit intelligibile, sed tamen potest intelligi ens, ita quod non intelligatur eius intelligibilitas. Et similiter ens intellectum est verum, non tamen intelligendo ens, intelligitur verum.