1 Objection 1: It seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine says De Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) Nothing is more eternal than the nature of a circle, and that two added to three make five. But the truth of these is a created truth. Therefore created truth is eternal.
1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod veritas creata sit aeterna. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de libero arbitrio, quod nihil est magis aeternum quam ratio circuli, et duo et tria esse quinque. Sed horum veritas est veritas creata. Ergo veritas creata est aeterna.
2 Objection 2: Further, that which is always, is eternal. But universals are always and everywhere; therefore they are eternal. So therefore is truth, which is the most universal.
2 Praeterea, omne quod est semper, est aeternum. Sed universalia sunt ubique et semper. Ergo sunt aeterna. Ergo et verum, quod est maxime universale.
3 Objection 3: Further, it was always true that what is true in the present was to be in the future. But as the truth of a proposition regarding the present is a created truth, so is that of a proposition regarding the future. Therefore some created truth is eternal.
3 Praeterea, id quod est verum in praesenti, semper fuit verum esse futurum. Sed sicut veritas propositionis de praesenti est veritas creata, ita veritas propositionis de futuro. Ergo aliqua veritas creata est aeterna.
4 Objection 4: Further, all that is without beginning and end is eternal. But the truth of enunciables is without beginning and end; for if their truth had a beginning, since it was not before, it was true that truth was not, and true, of course, by reason of truth; so that truth was before it began to be. Similarly, if it be asserted that truth has an end, it follows that it is after it has ceased to be, for it will still be true that truth is not. Therefore truth is eternal.
4 Praeterea, omne quod caret principio et fine, est aeternum. Sed veritas enuntiabilium caret principio et fine. Quia, si veritas incoepit cum ante non esset, verum erat veritatem non esse, et utique aliqua veritate verum erat, et sic veritas erat antequam inciperet. Et similiter si ponatur veritatem habere finem, sequitur quod sit postquam desierit, verum enim erit veritatem non esse. Ergo veritas est aeterna.
5 On the contrary, God alone is eternal, as laid down before Question 10, Article 3).
5 Sed contra est quod solus Deus est aeternus, ut supra habitum est.
6 I answer that, The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in speech. Now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of itself: but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciable truth, according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on account of any truth residing in the enunciation, as though in a subject. Thus urine is called healthy, not from any health within it but from the health of an animal which it indicates. In like manner it has been already said that things are called true from the truth of the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be eternal. Now because only the divine intellect is eternal, in it alone truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else but God is eternal; since the truth of the divine intellect is God Himself, as shown already Article 5).
6 Respondeo dicendum quod veritas enuntiabilium non est aliud quam veritas intellectus. Enuntiabile enim et est in intellectu, et est in voce. Secundum autem quod est in intellectu, habet per se veritatem. Sed secundum quod est in voce, dicitur verum enuntiabile, secundum quod significat aliquam veritatem intellectus; non propter aliquam veritatem in enuntiabili existentem sicut in subiecto. Sicut urina dicitur sana, non a sanitate quae in ipsa sit, sed a sanitate animalis, quam significat. Similiter etiam supra dictum est quod res denominantur verae a veritate intellectus. Unde si nullus intellectus esset aeternus, nulla veritas esset aeterna. Sed quia solus intellectus divinus est aeternus, in ipso solo veritas aeternitatem habet. Nec propter hoc sequitur quod aliquid aliud sit aeternum quam Deus, quia veritas intellectus divini est ipse Deus, ut supra ostensum est.
7 Reply to Objection 1: The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and three make five, have eternity in the mind of God.
7 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio circuli, et duo et tria esse quinque, habent aeternitatem in mente divina.
8 Reply to Objection 2: That something is always and everywhere, can be understood in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power of extension to all time and to all places, as it belongs to God to be everywhere and always. In the other way as not having in itself determination to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be one, not because it has one form, but by the absence of all distinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said to be everywhere and always, in so far as universals are independent of place and time. It does not, however, follow from this that they are eternal, except in an intellect, if one exists that is eternal.
8 Ad secundum dicendum quod aliquid esse semper et ubique, potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, quia habet in se unde se extendat ad omne tempus et ad omnem locum, sicut Deo competit esse ubique et semper. Alio modo, quia non habet in se quo determinetur ad aliquem locum vel tempus, sicut materia prima dicitur esse una, non quia habet unam formam, sicut homo est unus ab unitate unius formae, sed per remotionem omnium formarum distinguentium. Et per hunc modum, quodlibet universale dicitur esse ubique et semper, inquantum universalia abstrahunt ab hic et nunc. Sed ex hoc non sequitur ea esse aeterna, nisi in intellectu, si quis sit aeternus.
9 Reply to Objection 3: That which now is, was future, before it actually) was; because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if the cause were removed, that thing's coming to be was not future. But the first cause is alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that it was always true that what now is would be, except in so far as its future being was in the sempiternal cause; and God alone is such a cause.
9 Ad tertium dicendum quod illud quod nunc est, ex eo futurum fuit antequam esset, quia in causa sua erat ut fieret. Unde, sublata causa, non esset futurum illud fieri. Sola autem causa prima est aeterna. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod ea quae sunt, semper fuerit verum ea esse futura, nisi quatenus in causa sempiterna fuit ut essent futura. Quae quidem causa solus Deus est.
10 Reply to Objection 4: Because our intellect is not eternal, neither is the truth of enunciable propositions which are formed by us, eternal, but it had a beginning in time. Now before such truth existed, it was not true to say that such a truth did exist, except by reason of the divine intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal. But it is true now to say that that truth did not then exist: and this is true only by reason of the truth that is now in our intellect; and not by reason of any truth in the things. For this is truth concerning not-being; and not-being has not truth of itself, but only so far as our intellect apprehends it. Hence it is true to say that truth did not exist, in so far as we apprehend its not-being as preceding its being.
10 Ad quartum dicendum quod, quia intellectus noster non est aeternus, nec veritas enuntiabilium quae a nobis formantur, est aeterna, sed quandoque incoepit. Et antequam huiusmodi veritas esset, non erat verum dicere veritatem talem non esse, nisi ab intellectu divino, in quo solum veritas est aeterna. Sed nunc verum est dicere veritatem tunc non fuisse. Quod quidem non est verum nisi veritate quae nunc est in intellectu nostro, non autem per aliquam veritatem ex parte rei. Quia ista est veritas de non ente; non ens autem non habet ex se ut sit verum, sed solummodo ex intellectu apprehendente ipsum. Unde intantum est verum dicere veritatem non fuisse, inquantum apprehendimus non esse ipsius ut praecedens esse eius.