1 Objection 1: It seems that God has not free-will. For Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son; God alone is He who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having free-will, can be inclined to either side.
1 Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non habeat liberum arbitrium. Dicit enim Hieronymus, in homilia de filio prodigo, solus Deus est, in quem peccatum non cadit, nec cadere potest; cetera, cum sint liberi arbitrii, in utramque partem flecti possunt.
2 Objection 2: Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil, as has been said Article 9). Therefore there is not free-will in God.
2 Praeterea, liberum arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis, qua bonum et malum eligitur. Sed Deus non vult malum, ut dictum est. Ergo liberum arbitrium non est in Deo.
3 On the contrary, Ambrose says De Fide ii, 3): The Holy Spirit divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice of the will, not in obedience to necessity.
3 Sed contra est quod dicit Ambrosius, in libro de fide, spiritus sanctus dividit singulis prout vult, idest pro liberae voluntatis arbitrio, non necessitatis obsequio.
4 I answer that, We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above Article 3), He has free will with respect to what He does not necessarily will.
4 Respondeo dicendum quod liberum arbitrium habemus respectu eorum quae non necessario volumus, vel naturali instinctu. Non enim ad liberum arbitrium pertinet quod volumus esse felices, sed ad naturalem instinctum. Unde et alia animalia, quae naturali instinctu moventur ad aliquid, non dicuntur libero arbitrio moveri. Cum igitur Deus ex necessitate suam bonitatem velit, alia vero non ex necessitate, ut supra ostensum est; respectu illorum quae non ex necessitate vult, liberum arbitrium habet.
5 Reply to Objection 1: Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply, but only as regards the inclination to sin.
5 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Hieronymus videtur excludere a Deo liberum arbitrium, non simpliciter, sed solum quantum ad hoc quod est deflecti in peccatum.
6 Reply to Objection 2: Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the divine goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown De Fide ii, 3), it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He can will a thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without sin, can will to sit down, and not will to sit down.
6 Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum malum culpae dicatur per aversionem a bonitate divina, per quam Deus omnia vult, ut supra ostensum est, manifestum est quod impossibile est eum malum culpae velle. Et tamen ad opposita se habet, inquantum velle potest hoc esse vel non esse. Sicut et nos, non peccando, possumus velle sedere, et non velle sedere.