1 Objection 1: It seems that mercy cannot be attributed to God. For mercy is a kind of sorrow, as Damascene says De Fide Orth. ii, 14). But there is no sorrow in God; and therefore there is no mercy in Him.
1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod misericordia Deo non competat. Misericordia enim est species tristitiae, ut dicit Damascenus. Sed tristitia non est in Deo. Ergo nec misericordia.
2 Objection 2: Further, mercy is a relaxation of justice. But God cannot remit what appertains to His justice. For it is said 2 Tim. 2, 13): If we believe not, He continueth faithful: He cannot deny Himself. But He would deny Himself, as a gloss says, if He should deny His words. Therefore mercy is not becoming to God.
2 Praeterea, misericordia est relaxatio iustitiae. Sed Deus non potest praetermittere id quod ad iustitiam suam pertinet. Dicitur enim II ad Tim. II, si non credimus, ille fidelis permanet, seipsum negare non potest, negaret autem seipsum, ut dicit Glossa ibidem, si dicta sua negaret. Ergo misericordia Deo non competit.
3 On the contrary, it is said Ps. 110, 4): He is a merciful and gracious Lord.
3 Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo CX, miserator et misericors dominus.
4 I answer that, Mercy is especially to be attributed to God, as seen in its effect, but not as an affection of passion. In proof of which it must be considered that a person is said to be merciful misericors), as being, so to speak, sorrowful at heart miserum cor); being affected with sorrow at the misery of another as though it were his own. Hence it follows that he endeavors to dispel the misery of this other, as if it were his; and this is the effect of mercy.
To sorrow, therefore, over the misery of others belongs not to God; but it does most properly belong to Him to dispel that misery, whatever be the defect we call by that name. Now defects are not removed, except by the perfection of some kind of goodness; and the primary source of goodness is God, as shown above Question 6, Article 4). It must, however, be considered that to bestow perfections appertains not only to the divine goodness, but also to His justice, liberality, and mercy; yet under different aspects.
The communicating of perfections, absolutely considered, appertains to goodness, as shown above Question 6, Articles 1, 4); in so far as perfections are given to things in proportion, the bestowal of them belongs to justice, as has been already said Article 1); in so far as God does not bestow them for His own use, but only on account of His goodness, it belongs to liberality; in so far as perfections given to things by God expel defects, it belongs to mercy.
4 Respondeo dicendum quod misericordia est Deo maxime attribuenda, tamen secundum effectum, non secundum passionis affectum. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod misericors dicitur aliquis quasi habens miserum cor, quia scilicet afficitur ex miseria alterius per tristitiam, ac si esset eius propria miseria. Et ex hoc sequitur quod operetur ad depellendam miseriam alterius, sicut miseriam propriam, et hic est misericordiae effectus. Tristari ergo de miseria alterius non competit Deo, sed repellere miseriam alterius, hoc maxime ei competit, ut per miseriam quemcumque defectum intelligamus. Defectus autem non tolluntur, nisi per alicuius bonitatis perfectionem, prima autem origo bonitatis Deus est, ut supra ostensum est. Sed considerandum est quod elargiri perfectiones rebus, pertinet quidem et ad bonitatem divinam, et ad iustitiam, et ad liberalitatem, et misericordiam, tamen secundum aliam et aliam rationem. Communicatio enim perfectionum, absolute considerata, pertinet ad bonitatem, ut supra ostensum est. Sed inquantum perfectiones rebus a Deo dantur secundum earum proportionem, pertinet ad iustitiam, ut dictum est supra. Inquantum vero non attribuit rebus perfectiones propter utilitatem suam, sed solum propter suam bonitatem, pertinet ad liberalitatem. Inquantum vero perfectiones datae rebus a Deo, omnem defectum expellunt, pertinet ad misericordiam.
5 Reply to Objection 1: This argument is based on mercy, regarded as an affection of passion.
5 Ad primum igitur dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de misericordia, quantum ad passionis affectum.
6 Reply to Objection 2: God acts mercifully, not indeed by going against His justice, but by doing something more than justice; thus a man who pays another two hundred pieces of money, though owing him only one hundred, does nothing against justice, but acts liberally or mercifully. The case is the same with one who pardons an offence committed against him, for in remitting it he may be said to bestow a gift. Hence the Apostle calls remission a forgiving: Forgive one another, as Christ has forgiven you Eph. 4, 32). Hence it is clear that mercy does not destroy justice, but in a sense is the fulness thereof. And thus it is said: Mercy exalteth itself above judgement James 2, 13).
6 Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus misericorditer agit, non quidem contra iustitiam suam faciendo, sed aliquid supra iustitiam operando, sicut si alicui cui debentur centum denarii, aliquis ducentos det de suo, tamen non contra iustitiam facit, sed liberaliter vel misericorditer operatur. Et similiter si aliquis offensam in se commissam remittat. Qui enim aliquid remittit, quodammodo donat illud, unde apostolus remissionem donationem vocat, Ephes. V, donate invicem, sicut et Christus vobis donavit. Ex quo patet quod misericordia non tollit iustitiam, sed est quaedam iustitiae plenitudo. Unde dicitur Iac. II, quod misericordia superexaltat iudicium.