1 Objection 1: It seems that beatitude does not belong to God. For beatitude according to Boethius De Consol. iv) is a state made perfect by the aggregation of all good things. But the aggregation of goods has no place in God; nor has composition. Therefore beatitude does not belong to God.
1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo Deo non conveniat. Beatitudo enim, secundum Boetium, in III de Consol., est status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus. Sed aggregatio bonorum non habet locum in Deo, sicut nec compositio. Ergo Deo non convenit beatitudo.
2 Objection 2: Further, beatitude or happiness is the reward of virtue, according to the Philosopher Ethic. i, 9). But reward does not apply to God; as neither does merit. Therefore neither does beatitude.
2 Praeterea, beatitudo, sive felicitas, est praemium virtutis, secundum philosophum, in I Ethic. Sed Deo non convenit praemium, sicut nec meritum. Ergo nec beatitudo.
3 On the contrary, The Apostle says: Which in His times He shall show, who is the Blessed and only Almighty, the King of Kings and Lord of Lords. 1 Tim. 6, 15).
3 Sed contra est quod dicit apostolus, I ad Tim. ultimo, quem suis temporibus ostendet Deus beatus et solus potens, rex regum et dominus dominantium.
4 I answer that, Beatitude belongs to God in a very special manner. For nothing else is understood to be meant by the term beatitude than the perfect good of an intellectual nature; which is capable of knowing that it has a sufficiency of the good which it possesses, to which it is competent that good or ill may befall, and which can control its own actions. All of these things belong in a most excellent manner to God, namely, to be perfect, and to possess intelligence. Whence beatitude belongs to God in the highest degree.
4 Respondeo dicendum quod beatitudo maxime Deo competit. Nihil enim aliud sub nomine beatitudinis intelligitur, nisi bonum perfectum intellectualis naturae; cuius est suam sufficientiam cognoscere in bono quod habet; et cui competit ut ei contingat aliquid vel bene vel male, et sit suarum operationum domina. Utrumque autem istorum excellentissime Deo convenit, scilicet perfectum esse, et intelligentem. Unde beatitudo maxime convenit Deo.
5 Reply to Objection 1: Aggregation of good is in God, after the manner not of composition, but of simplicity; for those things which in creatures is manifold, pre-exist in God, as was said above Question 4, Article 2; Question 13, Article 4), in simplicity and unity.
5 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aggregatio bonorum est in Deo non per modum compositionis, sed per modum simplicitatis, quia quae in creaturis multiplicia sunt, in Deo praeexistunt simpliciter et unite, ut supra dictum est.
6 Reply to Objection 2: It belongs as an accident to beatitude or happiness to be the reward of virtue, so far as anyone attains to beatitude; even as to be the term of generation belongs accidentally to a being, so far as it passes from potentiality to act. As, then, God has being, though not begotten; so He has beatitude, although not acquired by merit.
6 Ad secundum dicendum quod esse praemium virtutis accidit beatitudini vel felicitati, inquantum aliquis beatitudinem acquirit, sicut esse terminum generationis accidit enti, inquantum exit de potentia in actum. Sicut igitur Deus habet esse, quamvis non generetur; ita habet beatitudinem, quamvis non mereatur.