1 Objection 1: It seems that essence and existence are not the same in God. For if it be so, then the divine being has nothing added to it. Now being to which no addition is made is universal being which is predicated of all things. Therefore it follows that God is being in general which can be predicated of everything. But this is false: For men gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood Wis. 14, 21). Therefore God's existence is not His essence.
1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sit idem essentia et esse. Si enim hoc sit, tunc ad esse divinum nihil additur. Sed esse cui nulla fit additio, est esse commune quod de omnibus praedicatur, sequitur ergo quod Deus sit ens commune praedicabile de omnibus. Hoc autem est falsum, secundum illud Sap. XIV, incommunicabile nomen lignis et lapidibus imposuerunt. Ergo esse Dei non est eius essentia.
2 Objection 2: Further, we can know whether God exists as said above Question 2, Article 2); but we cannot know what He is. Therefore God's existence is not the same as His essence, that is, as His quiddity or nature.
2 Praeterea, de Deo scire possumus an sit, ut supra dictum est. Non autem possumus scire quid sit. Ergo non est idem esse Dei, et quod quid est eius, sive quidditas vel natura.
3 On the contrary, Hilary says Trin. vii): In God existence is not an accidental quality, but subsisting truth. Therefore what subsists in God is His existence.
3 Sed contra est quod Hilarius dicit in VII de Trin., esse non est accidens in Deo, sed subsistens veritas. Id ergo quod subsistit in Deo, est suum esse.
4 I answer that, God is not only His own essence, as shown in the preceding article, but also His own existence. This may be shown in several ways. First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be caused either by the constituent principles of that essence like a property that necessarily accompanies the species, as the faculty of laughing is proper to a man, and is caused by the constituent principles of the species), or by some exterior agent, as heat is caused in water by fire.
Therefore, if the existence of a thing differs from its essence, this existence must be caused either by some exterior agent or by its essential principles. Now it is impossible for a thing's existence to be caused by its essential constituent principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence, if its existence is caused. Therefore that thing, whose existence differs from its essence, must have its existence caused by another. But this cannot be true of God; because we call God the first efficient cause.
Therefore it is impossible that in God His existence should differ from His essence. Secondly, existence is that which makes every form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are spoken of as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing. Therefore existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is a distinct reality, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in God there is no potentiality, as shown above Article 1), it follows that in Him essence does not differ from existence.
Therefore His essence is His existence. Thirdly, because, just as that which has fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by participation; so that which has existence but is not existence, is a being by participation. But God is His own essence, as shown above Article 3) if, therefore, He is not His own existence He will be not essential, but participated being. He will not therefore be the first being, which is absurd. Therefore God is His own existence, and not merely His own essence.
4 Respondeo dicendum quod Deus non solum est sua essentia, ut ostensum est, sed etiam suum esse. Quod quidem multipliciter ostendi potest. Primo quidem, quia quidquid est in aliquo quod est praeter essentiam eius, oportet esse causatum vel a principiis essentiae, sicut accidentia propria consequentia speciem, ut risibile consequitur hominem et causatur ex principiis essentialibus speciei; vel ab aliquo exteriori, sicut calor in aqua causatur ab igne. Si igitur ipsum esse rei sit aliud ab eius essentia, necesse est quod esse illius rei vel sit causatum ab aliquo exteriori, vel a principiis essentialibus eiusdem rei.
Impossibile est autem quod esse sit causatum tantum ex principiis essentialibus rei, quia nulla res sufficit quod sit sibi causa essendi, si habeat esse causatum. Oportet ergo quod illud cuius esse est aliud ab essentia sua, habeat esse causatum ab alio. Hoc autem non potest dici de Deo, quia Deum dicimus esse primam causam efficientem. Impossibile est ergo quod in Deo sit aliud esse, et aliud eius essentia. Secundo, quia esse est actualitas omnis formae vel naturae, non enim bonitas vel humanitas significatur in actu, nisi prout significamus eam esse.
Oportet igitur quod ipsum esse comparetur ad essentiam quae est aliud ab ipso, sicut actus ad potentiam. Cum igitur in Deo nihil sit potentiale, ut ostensum est supra, sequitur quod non sit aliud in eo essentia quam suum esse. Sua igitur essentia est suum esse. Tertio, quia sicut illud quod habet ignem et non est ignis, est ignitum per participationem, ita illud quod habet esse et non est esse, est ens per participationem. Deus autem est sua essentia, ut ostensum est.
Si igitur non sit suum esse, erit ens per participationem, et non per essentiam. Non ergo erit primum ens, quod absurdum est dicere. Est igitur Deus suum esse, et non solum sua essentia.
5 Reply to Objection 1: A thing that has nothing added to it can be of two kinds. Either its essence precludes any addition; thus, for example, it is of the essence of an irrational animal to be without reason. Or we may understand a thing to have nothing added to it, inasmuch as its essence does not require that anything should be added to it; thus the genus animal is without reason, because it is not of the essence of animal in general to have reason; but neither is it to lack reason. And so the divine being has nothing added to it in the first sense; whereas universal being has nothing added to it in the second sense.
5 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliquid cui non fit additio potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, ut de ratione eius sit quod non fiat ei additio; sicut de ratione animalis irrationalis est, ut sit sine ratione. Alio modo intelligitur aliquid cui non fit additio, quia non est de ratione eius quod sibi fiat additio, sicut animal commune est sine ratione, quia non est de ratione animalis communis ut habeat rationem; sed nec de ratione eius est ut careat ratione. Primo igitur modo, esse sine additione, est esse divinum, secundo modo, esse sine additione, est esse commune.
6 Reply to Objection 2: To be can mean either of two things. It may mean the act of essence, or it may mean the composition of a proposition effected by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject. Taking to be in the first sense, we cannot understand God's existence nor His essence; but only in the second sense. We know that this proposition which we form about God when we say God is, is true; and this we know from His effects Question 2, Article 2).
6 Ad secundum dicendum quod esse dupliciter dicitur, uno modo, significat actum essendi; alio modo, significat compositionem propositionis, quam anima adinvenit coniungens praedicatum subiecto. Primo igitur modo accipiendo esse, non possumus scire esse Dei, sicut nec eius essentiam, sed solum secundo modo. Scimus enim quod haec propositio quam formamus de Deo, cum dicimus Deus est, vera est. Et hoc scimus ex eius effectibus, ut supra dictum est.