1 Objection 1: It would seem that there are not five notions. For the notions proper to the persons are the relations whereby they are distinguished from each other. But the relations in God are only four Question 28, Article 4). Therefore the notions are only four in number.
1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint quinque notiones. Propriae enim notiones personarum sunt relationes quibus distinguuntur. Sed relationes in divinis non sunt nisi quatuor, ut supra dictum est. Ergo et notiones sunt tantum quatuor.
2 Objection 2: Further, as there is only one essence in God, He is called one God, and because in Him there are three persons, He is called the Trine God. Therefore, if in God there are five notions, He may be called quinary; which cannot be allowed.
2 Praeterea, propter hoc quod in divinis est una essentia, dicitur Deus unus, propter hoc autem quod sunt tres personae, dicitur Deus trinus. Si ergo in divinis sunt quinque notiones, dicetur quinus, quod est inconveniens.
3 Objection 3: Further, if there are five notions for the three persons in God, there must be in some one person two or more notions, as in the person of the Father there is innascibility and paternity, and common spiration. Either these three notions really differ, or not. If they really differ, it follows that the person of the Father is composed of several things. But if they differ only logically, it follows that one of them can be predicated of another, so that we can say that as the divine goodness is the same as the divine wisdom by reason of the common reality, so common spiration is paternity; which is not to be admitted. Therefore there are not five notions.
3 Praeterea, si, tribus personis existentibus in divinis, sunt quinque notiones, oportet quod in aliqua personarum sint aliquae notiones duae vel plures; sicut in persona patris ponitur innascibilitas et paternitas et communis spiratio. Aut igitur istae tres notiones differunt re, aut non. Si differunt re, sequitur quod persona patris sit composita ex pluribus rebus. Si autem differunt ratione tantum, sequitur quod una earum possit de alia praedicari, ut dicamus quod, sicut bonitas divina est eius sapientia propter indifferentiam rei, ita communis spiratio sit paternitas, quod non conceditur. Igitur non sunt quinque notiones.
4 Objection 4: On the contrary, It seems that there are more; because as the Father is from no one, and therefrom is derived the notion of innascibility; so from the Holy Ghost no other person proceeds. And in this respect there ought to be a sixth notion. Objection 5: Further, as the Father and the Son are the common origin of the Holy Ghost, so it is common to the Son and the Holy Ghost to proceed from the Father. Therefore, as one notion is common to the Father and the Son, so there ought to be one notion common to the Son and to the Holy Ghost.
4 Sed contra, videtur quod sint plures. Quia sicut pater a nullo est, et secundum hoc accipitur notio quae dicitur innascibilitas, ita a spiritu sancto non est alia persona. Et secundum hoc oportebit accipere sextam notionem. Praeterea, sicut patri et filio commune est quod ab eis procedat spiritus sanctus, ita commune est filio et spiritui sancto quod procedant a patre. Ergo, sicut una notio ponitur communis patri et filio, ita debet poni una notio communis filio et spiritui sancto.
5 I answer that, A notion is the proper idea whereby we know a divine Person. Now the divine persons are multiplied by reason of their origin: and origin includes the idea of someone from whom another comes, and of someone that comes from another, and by these two modes a person can be known. Therefore the Person of the Father cannot be known by the fact that He is from another; but by the fact that He is from no one; and thus the notion that belongs to Him is called innascibility.
As the source of another, He can be known in two ways, because as the Son is from Him, the Father is known by the notion of paternity; and as the Holy Ghost is from Him, He is known by the notion of common spiration. The Son can be known as begotten by another, and thus He is known by filiation; and also by another person proceeding from Him, the Holy Ghost, and thus He is known in the same way as the Father is known, by common spiration.
The Holy Ghost can be known by the fact that He is from another, or from others; thus He is known by procession; but not by the fact that another is from Him, as no divine person proceeds from Him. Therefore, there are Five notions in God: innascibility, paternity, filiation, and procession. Of these only four are relations, for innascibility is not a relation, except by reduction, as will appear later Question 33, Article 4, ad 3). Four only are properties.
For common spiration is not a property; because it belongs to two persons. Three are personal notions, that is, constituting persons, paternity, filiation, and procession. Common spiration and innascibility are called notions of Persons, but not personal notions, as we shall explain further on Question 40, Article 1, ad 1).
5 Respondeo dicendum quod notio dicitur id quod est propria ratio cognoscendi divinam personam. Divinae autem personae multiplicantur secundum originem. Ad originem autem pertinet a quo alius, et qui ab alio, et secundum hos duos modos potest innotescere persona. Igitur persona patris non potest innotescere per hoc quod sit ab alio, sed per hoc quod a nullo est, et sic ex hac parte eius notio est innascibilitas. Sed inquantum aliquis est ab eo, innotescit dupliciter. Quia inquantum filius est ab eo, innotescit notione paternitatis, inquantum autem spiritus sanctus est ab eo, innotescit notione communis spirationis. Filius autem potest innotescere per hoc quod est ab alio nascendo, et sic innotescit per filiationem. Et per hoc quod est alius ab eo, scilicet spiritus sanctus, et per hoc innotescit eodem modo sicut et pater, scilicet communi spiratione. Spiritus sanctus autem innotescere potest per hoc quod est ab alio vel ab aliis, et sic innotescit processione. Non autem per hoc quod alius sit ab eo, quia nulla divina persona procedit ab eo. Sunt igitur quinque notiones in divinis, scilicet innascibilitas, paternitas, filiatio, communis spiratio et processio. Harum autem tantum quatuor sunt relationes, nam innascibilitas non est relatio nisi per reductionem, ut infra dicetur. Quatuor autem tantum proprietates sunt, nam communis spiratio non est proprietas, quia convenit duabus personis. Tres autem sunt notiones personales, idest constituentes personas, scilicet paternitas, filiatio et processio, nam communis spiratio et innascibilitas dicuntur notiones personarum, non autem personales, ut infra magis patebit.
6 Reply to Objection 1: Besides the four relations, another notion must be admitted, as above explained.
6 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod praeter quatuor relationes oportet ponere aliam notionem, ut dictum est.
7 Reply to Objection 2: The divine essence is signified as a reality; and likewise the persons are signified as realities; whereas the notions are signified as ideas notifying the persons. Therefore, although God is one by unity of essence, and trine by trinity of persons, nevertheless He is not quinary by the five notions.
7 Ad secundum dicendum quod essentia in divinis significatur ut res quaedam; et similiter personae significantur ut res quaedam sed notiones significantur ut rationes notificantes personas. Et ideo, licet dicatur Deus unus propter unitatem essentiae, et trinus propter Trinitatem personarum; non tamen dicitur quinus propter quinque notiones.
8 Reply to Objection 3: Since the real plurality in God is founded only on relative opposition, the several properties of one Person, as they are not relatively opposed to each other, do not really differ. Nor again are they predicated of each other, because they are different ideas of the persons; as we do not say that the attribute of power is the attribute of knowledge, although we do say that knowledge is power.
8 Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum sola oppositio relativa faciat pluralitatem realem in divinis, plures proprietates unius personae, cum non opponantur ad invicem relative, non differunt realiter. Nec tamen de invicem praedicantur, quia significantur ut diversae rationes personarum. Sicut etiam non dicimus quod attributum potentiae sit attributum scientiae, licet dicamus quod scientia sit potentia.
9 Reply to Objection 4: Since Person implies dignity, as stated above Question 19, Article 3) we cannot derive a notion of the Holy Spirit from the fact that no person is from Him. For this does not belong to His dignity, as it belongs to the authority of the Father that He is from no one.
9 Ad quartum dicendum quod, cum persona importet dignitatem, ut supra dictum est, non potest accipi notio aliqua spiritus sancti ex hoc quod nulla persona est ab ipso. Hoc enim non pertinet ad dignitatem ipsius; sicut pertinet ad auctoritatem patris quod sit a nullo.
10 Reply to Objection 5: The Son and the Holy Ghost do not agree in one special mode of existence derived from the Father; as the Father and the Son agree in one special mode of producing the Holy Ghost. But the principle on which a notion is based must be something special; thus no parity of reasoning exists.
10 Ad quintum dicendum quod filius et spiritus sanctus non conveniunt in uno speciali modo existendi a patre; sicut pater et filius conveniunt in uno speciali modo producendi spiritum sanctum. Id autem quod est principium innotescendi, oportet esse aliquid speciale. Et ideo non est simile.