1 Objection 1: It would seem that the power of begetting, or of spirating, signifies the relation and not the essence. For power signifies a principle, as appears from its definition: for active power is the principle of action, as we find in Metaph. v, text 17. But in God principle in regard to Person is said notionally. Therefore, in God, power does not signify essence but relation.
1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod potentia generandi vel spirandi significet relationem, et non essentiam. Potentia enim significat principium, ut ex eius definitione patet, dicitur enim potentia activa esse principium agendi, ut patet in V Metaphys. Sed principium in divinis respectu personae dicitur notionaliter. Ergo potentia in divinis non significat essentiam, sed relationem.
2 Objection 2: Further, in God, the power to act posse) and to act' are not distinct. But in God, begetting signifies relation. Therefore, the same applies to the power of begetting.
2 Praeterea, in divinis non differt posse et agere. Sed generatio in divinis significat relationem. Ergo et potentia generandi.
3 Objection 3: Further, terms signifying the essence in God, are common to the three persons. But the power of begetting is not common to the three persons, but proper to the Father. Therefore it does not signify the essence.
3 Praeterea, ea quae significant essentiam in divinis, communia sunt tribus personis. Sed potentia generandi non est communis tribus personis, sed propria patri. Ergo non significat essentiam.
4 On the contrary, As God has the power to beget the Son, so also He wills to beget Him. But the will to beget signifies the essence. Therefore, also, the power to beget.
4 Sed contra est quod, sicut Deus potest generare filium, ita et vult. Sed voluntas generandi significat essentiam. Ergo et potentia generandi.
5 I answer that, Some have said that the power to beget signifies relation in God. But this is not possible. For in every agent, that is properly called power, by which the agent acts. Now, everything that produces something by its action, produces something like itself, as to the form by which it acts; just as man begotten is like his begetter in his human nature, in virtue of which the father has the power to beget a man. In every begetter, therefore, that is the power of begetting in which the begotten is like the begetter.
Now the Son of God is like the Father, who begets Him, in the divine nature. Wherefore the divine nature in the Father is in Him the power of begetting. And so Hilary says De Trin. v): The birth of God cannot but contain that nature from which it proceeded; for He cannot subsist other than God, Who subsists from no other source than God. We must therefore conclude that the power of begetting signifies principally the divine essence as the Master says Sent.
i, D, vii), and not the relation only. Nor does it signify the essence as identified with the relation, so as to signify both equally. For although paternity is signified as the form of the Father, nevertheless it is a personal property, being in respect to the person of the Father, what the individual form is to the individual creature. Now the individual form in things created constitutes the person begetting, but is not that by which the begetter begets, otherwise Socrates would beget Socrates.
So neither can paternity be understood as that by which the Father begets, but as constituting the person of the Father, otherwise the Father would beget the Father. But that by which the Father begets is the divine nature, in which the Son is like to Him. And in this sense Damascene says De Fide Orth. i, 18) that generation is the work of nature, not of nature generating, but of nature, as being that by which the generator generates. And therefore the power of begetting signifies the divine nature directly, but the relation indirectly.
5 Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod potentia generandi significat relationem in divinis. Sed hoc esse non potest. Nam illud proprie dicitur potentia in quocumque agente, quo agens agit. Omne autem producens aliquid per suam actionem, producit sibi simile quantum ad formam qua agit sicut homo genitus est similis generanti in natura humana, cuius virtute pater potest generare hominem. Illud ergo est potentia generativa in aliquo generante, in quo genitum similatur generanti. Filius autem Dei similatur patri gignenti in natura divina.
Unde natura divina in patre, est potentia generandi in ipso. Unde et Hilarius dicit, in V de Trin., nativitas Dei non potest eam ex qua profecta est, non tenere naturam; nec enim aliud quam Deus subsistit, quod non aliunde quam de Deo subsistit. Sic igitur dicendum est quod potentia generandi principaliter significat divinam essentiam, ut Magister dicit, VII dist. I Sent.; non autem tantum relationem. Nec etiam essentiam inquantum est idem relationi, ut significet ex aequo utrumque. Licet enim paternitas ut forma patris significetur, est tamen proprietas personalis, habens se ad personam patris, ut forma individualis ad aliquod individuum creatum.
Forma autem individualis, in rebus creatis, constituit personam generantem, non autem est quo generans generat, alioquin Socrates generaret Socratem. Unde neque paternitas potest intelligi ut quo pater generat, sed ut constituens personam generantis, alioquin pater generaret patrem. Sed id quo pater generat, est natura divina, in qua sibi filius assimilatur. Et secundum hoc Damascenus dicit quod generatio est opus naturae, non sicut generantis, sed sicut eius quo generans generat. Et ideo potentia generandi significat in recto naturam divinam, sed in obliquo relationem.
6 Reply to Objection 1: Power does not signify the relation itself of a principle, for thus it would be in the genus of relation; but it signifies that which is a principle; not, indeed, in the sense in which we call the agent a principle, but in the sense of being that by which the agent acts. Now the agent is distinct from that which it makes, and the generator from that which it generates: but that by which the generator generates is common to generated and generator, and so much more perfectly, as the generation is more perfect. Since, therefore, the divine generation is most perfect, that by which the Begetter begets, is common to Begotten and Begetter by a community of identity, and not only of species, as in things created. Therefore, from the fact that we say that the divine essence is the principle by which the Begetter begets, it does not follow that the divine essence is distinct from the Begotten): which would follow if we were to say that the divine essence begets.
6 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod potentia non significat ipsam relationem principii, alioquin esset in genere relationis, sed significat id quod est principium; non quidem sicut agens dicitur principium, sed sicut id quo agens agit, dicitur principium agens autem distinguitur a facto, et generans a generato, sed id quo generans generat, est commune genito et generanti; et tanto perfectius, quanto perfectior fuerit generatio. Unde, cum divina generatio sit perfectissima, id quo generans generat, est commune genito et generanti, et idem numero, non solum specie, sicut in rebus creatis. Per hoc ergo quod dicimus quod essentia divina est principium quo generans generat, non sequitur quod essentia divina distinguatur; sicut sequeretur, si diceretur quod essentia divina generat.
7 Reply to Objection 2: As in God, the power of begetting is the same as the act of begetting, so the divine essence is the same in reality as the act of begetting or paternity; although there is a distinction of reason.
7 Ad secundum dicendum quod sic est idem in divinis potentia generandi cum generatione, sicut essentia divina cum generatione et paternitate est idem re, sed non ratione.
8 Reply to Objection 3: When I speak of the power of begetting, power is signified directly, generation indirectly: just as if I were to say, the essence of the Father. Wherefore in respect of the essence, which is signified, the power of begetting is common to the three persons: but in respect of the notion that is connoted, it is proper to the person of the Father.
8 Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum dico potentiam generandi, potentia significatur in recto, et generatio in obliquo; sicut si dicerem essentiam patris. Unde quantum ad essentiam quae significatur, potentia generandi communis est tribus personis, sed quantum ad notionem quae connotatur, propria est personae patris.