1 Objection 1: It would seem that among the divine persons there does not exist an order of nature. For whatever exists in God is the essence, or a person, or a notion. But the order of nature does not signify the essence, nor any of the persons, or notions. Therefore there is no order of nature in God.
1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in divinis personis non sit ordo naturae. Quidquid enim in divinis est, vel est essentia vel persona vel notio. Sed ordo naturae non significat essentiam, neque est aliqua personarum aut notionum. Ergo ordo naturae non est in divinis.
2 Objection 2: Further, wherever order of nature exists, there one comes before another, at least, according to nature and intellect. But in the divine persons there exists neither priority nor posteriority, as declared by Athanasius. Therefore, in the divine persons there is no order of nature.
2 Praeterea, in quibuscumque est ordo naturae, unum est prius altero, saltem secundum naturam et intellectum. Sed in divinis personis nihil est prius et posterius, ut Athanasius dicit. Ergo in divinis personis non est ordo naturae.
3 Objection 3: Further, wherever order exists, distinction also exists. But there is no distinction in the divine nature. Therefore it is not subject to order; and order of nature does not exist in it.
3 Praeterea, quidquid ordinatur, distinguitur. Sed natura in divinis non distinguitur. Ergo non ordinatur. Ergo non est ibi ordo naturae.
4 Objection 4: Further, the divine nature is the divine essence. But there is no order of essence in God. Therefore neither is there of nature.
4 Praeterea, natura divina est eius essentia. Sed non dicitur in divinis ordo essentiae. Ergo neque ordo naturae.
5 On the contrary, Where plurality exists without order, confusion exists. But in the divine persons there is no confusion, as Athanasius says. Therefore in God order exists.
5 Sed contra, ubicumque est pluralitas sine ordine, ibi est confusio. Sed in divinis personis non est confusio, ut Athanasius dicit. Ergo est ibi ordo.
6 I answer that, Order always has reference to some principle. Wherefore since there are many kinds of principle, namely, according to site, as a point; according to intellect, as the principle of demonstration; and according to each individual cause, so are there many kinds of order. Now principle, according to origin, without priority, exists in God as we have stated Question 33, Article 1): so there must likewise be order according to origin, without priority; and this is called the order of nature': in the words of Augustine Contra Maxim. iv): Not whereby one is prior to another, but whereby one is from another.
6 Respondeo dicendum quod ordo semper dicitur per comparationem ad aliquod principium. Unde sicut dicitur principium multipliciter, scilicet secundum situm, ut punctus, secundum intellectum, ut principium demonstrationis, et secundum causas singulas; ita etiam dicitur ordo. In divinis autem dicitur principium secundum originem, absque prioritate, ut supra dictum est. Unde oportet ibi esse ordinem secundum originem, absque prioritate. Et hic vocatur ordo naturae, secundum Augustinum, non quo alter sit prius altero, sed quo alter est ex altero.
7 Reply to Objection 1: The order of nature signifies the notion of origin in general, not a special kind of origin.
7 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ordo naturae significat notionem originis in communi, non autem in speciali.
8 Reply to Objection 2: In things created, even when what is derived from a principle is co-equal in duration with its principle, the principle still comes first in the order of nature and reason, if formally considered as principle. If, however, we consider the relations of cause and effect, or of the principle and the thing proceeding therefrom, it is clear that the things so related are simultaneous in the order of nature and reason, inasmuch as the one enters the definition of the other. But in God the relations themselves are the persons subsisting in one nature. So, neither on the part of the nature, nor on the part the relations, can one person be prior to another, not even in the order of nature and reason.
8 Ad secundum dicendum quod in rebus creatis, etiam cum id quod est a principio sit suo principio coaevum secundum durationem, tamen principium est prius secundum naturam et intellectum, si consideretur id quod est principium. Sed si considerentur ipsae relationes causae et causati, et principii et principiati, manifestum est quod relativa sunt simul natura et intellectu, inquantum unum est in definitione alterius. Sed in divinis ipsae relationes sunt subsistentes personae in una natura. Unde neque ex parte naturae, neque ex parte relationum, una persona potest esse prior alia, neque etiam secundum naturam et intellectum.
9 Reply to Objection 3: The order of nature means not the ordering of nature itself, but the existence of order in the divine Persons according to natural origin.
9 Ad tertium dicendum quod ordo naturae dicitur, non quod ipsa natura ordinetur, sed quod ordo in divinis personis attenditur secundum naturalem originem.
10 Reply to Objection 4: Nature in a certain way implies the idea of a principle, but essence does not; and so the order of origin is more correctly called the order of nature than the order of essence.
10 Ad quartum dicendum quod natura quodammodo importat rationem principii, non autem essentia. Et ideo ordo originis melius nominatur ordo naturae, quam ordo essentiae.