1 Objection 1: It would seem that a divine person cannot be properly sent. For one who is sent is less than the sender. But one divine person is not less than another. Therefore one person is not sent by another.
1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod personae divinae non conveniat mitti. Missus enim minor est mittente. Sed una persona divina non est minor alia. Ergo una persona non mittitur ab alia.
2 Objection 2: Further, what is sent is separated from the sender; hence Jerome says, commenting on Ezech. 16, 53: What is joined and tied in one body cannot be sent. But in the divine persons there is nothing that is separable, as Hilary says De Trin. vii). Therefore one person is not sent by another.
2 Praeterea, omne quod mittitur, separatur a mittente, unde Hieronymus dicit, super Ezechiel., quod coniunctum est, et in corpore uno copulatum, mitti non potest. Sed in divinis personis nihil est separabile, ut Hilarius dicit. Ergo una persona non mittitur ab alia.
3 Objection 3: Further, whoever is sent, departs from one place and comes anew into another. But this does not apply to a divine person, Who is everywhere. Therefore it is not suitable for a divine person to be sent.
3 Praeterea, quicumque mittitur, ab aliquo loco discedit, et ad aliquem locum de novo vadit. Hoc autem divinae personae non convenit, cum ubique sit. Ergo divinae personae non convenit mitti.
4 On the contrary, It is said Jn. 8, 16): I am not alone, but I and the Father that sent Me.
4 Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. VIII, non sum ego solus, sed ego et qui misit me, pater.
5 I answer that, the notion of mission includes two things: the habitude of the one sent to the sender; and that of the one sent to the end whereto he is sent. Anyone being sent implies a certain kind of procession of the one sent from the sender: either according to command, as the master sends the servant; or according to counsel, as an adviser may be said to send the king to battle; or according to origin, as a tree sends forth its flowers. The habitude to the term to which he is sent is also shown, so that in some way he begins to be present there: either because in no way was he present before in the place whereto he is sent, or because he begins to be there in some way in which he was not there hitherto. Thus the mission of a divine person is a fitting thing, as meaning in one way the procession of origin from the sender, and as meaning a new way of existing in another; thus the Son is said to be sent by the Father into the world, inasmuch as He began to exist visibly in the world by taking our nature; whereas He was previously in the world Jn. 1, 1).
5 Respondeo dicendum quod in ratione missionis duo importantur, quorum unum est habitudo missi ad eum a quo mittitur; aliud est habitudo missi ad terminum ad quem mittitur. Per hoc autem quod aliquis mittitur, ostenditur processio quaedam missi a mittente; vel secundum imperium, sicut dominus mittit servum; vel secundum consilium, ut si consiliarius mittere dicatur regem ad bellandum; vel secundum originem, ut si dicatur quod flos emittitur ab arbore. Ostenditur etiam habitudo ad terminum ad quem mittitur, ut aliquo modo ibi esse incipiat; vel quia prius ibi omnino non erat quo mittitur; vel quia incipit ibi aliquo modo esse, quo prius non erat. Missio igitur divinae personae convenire potest, secundum quod importat ex una parte processionem originis a mittente; et secundum quod importat ex alia parte novum modum existendi in aliquo. Sicut filius dicitur esse missus a patre in mundum, secundum quod incoepit esse in mundo visibiliter per carnem assumptam, et tamen ante in mundo erat, ut dicitur Ioan. I.
6 Reply to Objection 1: Mission implies inferiority in the one sent, when it means procession from the sender as principle, by command or counsel; forasmuch as the one commanding is the greater, and the counsellor is the wiser. In God, however, it means only procession of origin, which is according to equality, as explained above Question 42, Articles 4, 6).
6 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod missio importat minorationem in eo qui mittitur, secundum quod importat processionem a principio mittente aut secundum imperium, aut secundum consilium, quia imperans est maior, et consilians est sapientior. Sed in divinis non importat nisi processionem originis; quae est secundum aequalitatem, ut supra dictum est.
7 Reply to Objection 2: What is so sent as to begin to exist where previously it did not exist, is locally moved by being sent; hence it is necessarily separated locally from the sender. This, however, has no place in the mission of a divine person; for the divine person sent neither begins to exist where he did not previously exist, nor ceases to exist where He was. Hence such a mission takes place without a separation, having only distinction of origin.
7 Ad secundum dicendum quod illud quod sic mittitur ut incipiat esse ubi prius nullo modo erat, sua missione localiter movetur, unde oportet quod loco separetur a mittente. Sed hoc non accidit in missione divinae personae, quia persona divina missa, sicut non incipit esse ubi prius non fuerat, ita nec desinit esse ubi fuerat. Unde talis missio est sine separatione; sed habet solam distinctionem originis.
8 Reply to Objection 3: This objection rests on the idea of mission according to local motion, which is not in God.
8 Ad tertium dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de missione quae fit secundum motum localem; quae non habet locum in divinis.