1 Objection 1: It would seem that it is not an article of faith but a demonstrable conclusion that the world began. For everything that is made has a beginning of its duration. But it can be proved demonstratively that God is the effective cause of the world; indeed this is asserted by the more approved philosophers. Therefore it can be demonstratively proved that the world began.
1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mundum incoepisse non sit articulus fidei, sed conclusio demonstrabilis. Omne enim factum habet principium suae durationis. Sed demonstrative probari potest quod Deus sit causa effectiva mundi, et hoc etiam probabiliores philosophi posuerunt. Ergo demonstrative probari potest quod mundus incoeperit.
2 Objection 2: Further, if it is necessary to say that the world was made by God, it must therefore have been made from nothing or from something. But it was not made from something; otherwise the matter of the world would have preceded the world; against which are the arguments of Aristotle De Coelo i), who held that heaven was ungenerated. Therefore it must be said that the world was made from nothing; and thus it has being after not being. Therefore it must have begun.
2 Praeterea, si necesse est dicere quod mundus factus est a Deo, aut ergo ex nihilo, aut ex aliquo. Sed non ex aliquo, quia sic materia mundi praecessisset mundum; contra quod procedunt rationes Aristotelis ponentis caelum ingenitum. Ergo oportet dicere quod mundus sit factus ex nihilo. Et sic habet esse post non esse. Ergo oportet quod esse incoeperit.
3 Objection 3: Further, everything which works by intellect works from some principle, as appears in all kinds of craftsmen. But God acts by intellect: therefore His work has a principle. The world, therefore, which is His effect, did not always exist.
3 Praeterea, omne quod operatur per intellectum, a quodam principio operatur, ut patet in omnibus artificibus. Sed Deus est agens per intellectum. Ergo a quodam principio operatur mundus igitur, qui est eius effectus, non fuit semper.
4 Objection 4: Further, it appears manifestly that certain arts have developed, and certain countries have begun to be inhabited at some fixed time. But this would not be the case if the world had been always. Therefore it is manifest that the world did not always exist.
4 Praeterea, manifeste apparet artes aliquas, et habitationes regionum, ex determinatis temporibus incoepisse. Sed hoc non esset, si mundus semper fuisset. Mundum igitur non semper fuisse manifestum est.
5 Objection 5: Further, it is certain that nothing can be equal to God. But if the world had always been, it would be equal to God in duration. Therefore it is certain that the world did not always exist.
5 Praeterea, certum est nihil Deo aequari posse. Sed si mundus semper fuisset, aequipararetur Deo in duratione. Ergo certum est non semper mundum fuisse.
6 Objection 6: Further, if the world always was, the consequence is that infinite days preceded this present day. But it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium. Therefore we should never have arrived at this present day; which is manifestly false.
6 Praeterea, si mundus semper fuit, infiniti dies praecesserunt diem istum. Sed infinita non est pertransire. Ergo nunquam fuisset perventum ad hunc diem, quod est manifeste falsum.
7 Objection 7: Further, if the world was eternal, generation also was eternal. Therefore one man was begotten of another in an infinite series. But the father is the efficient cause of the son Phys. ii, text 5). Therefore in efficient causes there could be an infinite series, which is disproved Metaph. ii, text 5).
7 Praeterea, si mundus fuit aeternus, et generatio fuit ab aeterno. Ergo unus homo genitus est ab alio in infinitum. Sed pater est causa efficiens filii, ut dicitur in II Physic. Ergo in causis efficientibus est procedere in infinitum, quod improbatur in II Metaphys.
8 Objection 8: Further, if the world and generation always were, there have been an infinite number of men. But man's soul is immortal: therefore an infinite number of human souls would actually now exist, which is impossible. Therefore it can be known with certainty that the world began, and not only is it known by faith.
8 Praeterea, si mundus et generatio semper fuit, infiniti homines praecesserunt. Sed anima hominis est immortalis. Ergo infinitae animae humanae nunc essent actu, quod est impossibile. Ergo ex necessitate sciri potest quod mundus incoeperit; et non sola fide tenetur.
9 On the contrary, The articles of faith cannot be proved demonstratively, because faith is of things that appear not Heb. 11, 1). But that God is the Creator of the world: hence that the world began, is an article of faith; for we say, I believe in one God, etc. And again, Gregory says Hom. i in Ezech.), that Moses prophesied of the past, saying, In the beginning God created heaven and earth: in which words the newness of the world is stated. Therefore the newness of the world is known only by revelation; and therefore it cannot be proved demonstratively.
9 Sed contra, fidei articuli demonstrative probari non possunt, quia fides de non apparentibus est, ut dicitur ad Hebr. XI. Sed Deum esse creatorem mundi, sic quod mundus incoeperit esse, est articulus fidei, dicimus enim, credo in unum Deum et cetera. Et iterum, Gregorius dicit, in Homil. I in Ezech., quod Moyses prophetizavit de praeterito, dicens in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram; in quo novitas mundi traditur. Ergo novitas mundi habetur tantum per revelationem. Et ideo non potest probari demonstrative.
10 I answer that, By faith alone do we hold, and by no demonstration can it be proved, that the world did not always exist, as was said above of the mystery of the Trinity Question 32, Article 1). The reason of this is that the newness of the world cannot be demonstrated on the part of the world itself. For the principle of demonstration is the essence of a thing. Now everything according to its species is abstracted from here and now; whence it is said that universals are everywhere and always. Hence it cannot be demonstrated that man, or heaven, or a stone were not always. Likewise neither can it be demonstrated on the part of the efficient cause, which acts by will. For the will of God cannot be investigated by reason, except as regards those things which God must will of necessity; and what He wills about creatures is not among these, as was said above Question 19, Article 3). But the divine will can be manifested by revelation, on which faith rests. Hence that the world began to exist is an object of faith, but not of demonstration or science. And it is useful to consider this, lest anyone, presuming to demonstrate what is of faith, should bring forward reasons that are not cogent, so as to give occasion to unbelievers to laugh, thinking that on such grounds we believe things that are of faith.
10 Respondeo dicendum quod mundum non semper fuisse, sola fide tenetur, et demonstrative probari non potest, sicut et supra de mysterio Trinitatis dictum est. Et huius ratio est, quia novitas mundi non potest demonstrationem recipere ex parte ipsius mundi. Demonstrationis enim principium est quod quid est. Unumquodque autem, secundum rationem suae speciei, abstrahit ab hic et nunc, propter quod dicitur quod universalia sunt ubique et semper. Unde demonstrari non potest quod homo, aut caelum, aut lapis non semper fuit. Similiter etiam neque ex parte causae agentis, quae agit per voluntatem. Voluntas enim Dei ratione investigari non potest, nisi circa ea quae absolute necesse est Deum velle, talia autem non sunt quae circa creaturas vult, ut dictum est. Potest autem voluntas divina homini manifestari per revelationem, cui fides innititur. Unde mundum incoepisse est credibile, non autem demonstrabile vel scibile. Et hoc utile est ut consideretur, ne forte aliquis, quod fidei est demonstrare praesumens, rationes non necessarias inducat, quae praebeant materiam irridendi infidelibus, existimantibus nos propter huiusmodi rationes credere quae fidei sunt.
11 Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says De Civ. Dei xi, 4), the opinion of philosophers who asserted the eternity of the world was twofold. For some said that the substance of the world was not from God, which is an intolerable error; and therefore it is refuted by proofs that are cogent. Some, however, said that the world was eternal, although made by God. For they hold that the world has a beginning, not of time, but of creation, so that in a certain hardly intelligible way it was always made.
And they try to explain their meaning thus De Civ. Dei x, 31): for as, if the foot were always in the dust from eternity, there would always be a footprint which without doubt was caused by him who trod on it, so also the world always was, because its Maker always existed. To understand this we must consider that the efficient cause, which acts by motion, of necessity precedes its effect in time; because the effect is only in the end of the action, and every agent must be the principle of action.
But if the action is instantaneous and not successive, it is not necessary for the maker to be prior to the thing made in duration as appears in the case of illumination. Hence they say that it does not follow necessarily if God is the active cause of the world, that He should be prior to the world in duration; because creation, by which He produced the world, is not a successive change, as was said above Question 45, Article 2).
11 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus, XI de Civ. Dei, philosophorum ponentium aeternitatem mundi, duplex fuit opinio. Quidam enim posuerunt quod substantia mundi non sit a Deo. Et horum est intollerabilis error; et ideo ex necessitate refellitur. Quidam autem sic posuerunt mundum aeternum, quod tamen mundum a Deo factum dixerunt. Non enim mundum temporis volunt habere, sed suae creationis initium, ut quodam modo vix intelligibili semper sit factus. Id autem quomodo intelligant, invenerunt, ut idem dicit in X de Civ. Dei. Sicut enim, inquiunt, si pes ex aeternitate semper fuisset in pulvere, semper subesset vestigium, quod a calcante factum nemo dubitaret; sic et mundus semper fuit, semper existente qui fecit. Et ad hoc intelligendum, considerandum est quod causa efficiens quae agit per motum, de necessitate praecedit tempore suum effectum, quia effectus non est nisi in termino actionis, agens autem omne oportet esse principium actionis. Sed si actio sit instantanea, et non successiva, non est necessarium faciens esse prius facto duratione; sicut patet in illuminatione. Unde dicunt quod non sequitur ex necessitate, si Deus est causa activa mundi, quod sit prior mundo duratione, quia creatio, qua mundum produxit, non est mutatio successiva, ut supra dictum est.
12 Reply to Objection 2: Those who would say that the world was eternal, would say that the world was made by God from nothing, not that it was made after nothing, according to what we understand by the word creation, but that it was not made from anything; and so also some of them do not reject the word creation, as appears from Avicenna Metaph. ix, text 4).
12 Ad secundum dicendum quod illi qui ponerent mundum aeternum, dicerent mundum factum a Deo ex nihilo, non quod factus sit post nihilum, secundum quod nos intelligimus per nomen creationis; sed quia non est factus de aliquo. Et sic etiam non recusant aliqui eorum creationis nomen, ut patet ex Avicenna in sua metaphysica.
13 Reply to Objection 3: This is the argument of Anaxagoras as quoted in Phys. viii, text 15). But it does not lead to a necessary conclusion, except as to that intellect which deliberates in order to find out what should be done, which is like movement. Such is the human intellect, but not the divine intellect Question 14, Articles 7, 12).
13 Ad tertium dicendum quod illa est ratio Anaxagorae, quae ponitur in III Physic. Sed non de necessitate concludit, nisi de intellectu qui deliberando investigat quid agendum sit, quod est simile motui. Talis autem est intellectus humanus, sed non divinus, ut supra patet.
14 Reply to Objection 4: Those who hold the eternity of the world hold that some region was changed an infinite number of times, from being uninhabitable to being inhabitable and vice versa, and likewise they hold that the arts, by reason of various corruptions and accidents, were subject to an infinite variety of advance and decay. Hence Aristotle says Meteor. i), that it is absurd from such particular changes to hold the opinion of the newness of the whole world.
14 Ad quartum dicendum quod ponentes aeternitatem mundi, ponunt aliquam regionem infinities esse mutatam de inhabitabili in habitabilem, et e converso. Et similiter ponunt quod artes, propter diversas corruptiones et accidentia, infinities fuerunt inventae, et iterum corruptae. Unde Aristoteles dicit, in libro Meteor., quod ridiculum est ex huiusmodi particularibus mutationibus opinionem accipere de novitate mundi totius.
15 Reply to Objection 5: Even supposing that the world always was, it would not be equal to God in eternity, as Boethius says De Consol. v, 6); because the divine Being is all being simultaneously without succession; but with the world it is otherwise.
15 Ad quintum dicendum quod, etsi mundus semper fuisset, non tamen parificaretur Deo in aeternitate, ut dicit Boetius, in fine de Consolat., quia esse divinum est esse totum simul, absque successione; non autem sic est de mundo.
16 Reply to Objection 6: Passage is always understood as being from term to term. Whatever bygone day we choose, from it to the present day there is a finite number of days which can be passed through. The objection is founded on the idea that, given two extremes, there is an infinite number of mean terms.
16 Ad sextum dicendum quod transitus semper intelligitur a termino in terminum. Quaecumque autem praeterita dies signetur, ab illa usque ad istam sunt finiti dies, qui pertransiri poterunt. Obiectio autem procedit ac si, positis extremis, sint media infinita.
17 Reply to Objection 7: In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity per se, thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes that are per se required for a certain effect; for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity accidentally as regards efficient causes; for instance, if all the causes thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of only one cause, their multiplication being accidental, as an artificer acts by means of many hammers accidentally, because one after the other may be broken. It is accidental, therefore, that one particular hammer acts after the action of another; and likewise it is accidental to this particular man as generator to be generated by another man; for he generates as a man, and not as the son of another man. For all men generating hold one grade in efficient causes, viz. the grade of a particular generator. Hence it is not impossible for a man to be generated by man to infinity; but such a thing would be impossible if the generation of this man depended upon this man, and on an elementary body, and on the sun, and so on to infinity.
17 Ad septimum dicendum quod in causis efficientibus impossibile est procedere in infinitum per se; ut puta si causae quae per se requiruntur ad aliquem effectum, multiplicarentur in infinitum; sicut si lapis moveretur a baculo, et baculus a manu, et hoc in infinitum. Sed per accidens in infinitum procedere in causis agentibus non reputatur impossibile; ut puta si omnes causae quae in infinitum multiplicantur, non teneant ordinem nisi unius causae, sed earum multiplicatio sit per accidens; sicut artifex agit multis martellis per accidens, quia unus post unum frangitur. Accidit ergo huic martello, quod agat post actionem alterius martelli. Et similiter accidit huic homini, inquantum generat, quod sit generatus ab alio, generat enim inquantum homo, et non inquantum est filius alterius hominis; omnes enim homines generantes habent gradum unum in causis efficientibus, scilicet gradum particularis generantis. Unde non est impossibile quod homo generetur ab homine in infinitum. Esset autem impossibile, si generatio huius hominis dependeret ab hoc homine, et a corpore elementari, et a sole, et sic in infinitum.
18 Reply to Objection 8: Those who hold the eternity of the world evade this reason in many ways. For some do not think it impossible for there to be an actual infinity of souls, as appears from the Metaphysics of Algazel, who says that such a thing is an accidental infinity. But this was disproved above Question 7, Article 4). Some say that the soul is corrupted with the body. And some say that of all souls only one will remain. But others, as Augustine says, asserted on this account a circuit of souls, viz. that souls separated from their bodies return again thither after a course of time; a fuller consideration of which matters will be given later Question 75, Article 2; Question 118, Article 6). But be it noted that this argument considers only a particular case. Hence one might say that the world was eternal, or least some creature, as an angel, but not man. But we are considering the question in general, as to whether any creature can exist from eternity.
18 Ad octavum dicendum quod hanc rationem ponentes aeternitatem mundi multipliciter effugiunt quidam enim non reputant impossibile esse infinitas animas actu; ut patet in metaphysica Algazelis, dicentis hoc esse infinitum per accidens. Sed hoc improbatum est superius. Quidam vero dicunt animam corrumpi cum corpore. Quidam vero quod ex omnibus animabus remanet una tantum. Alii vero, ut Augustinus dicit, posuerunt propter hoc circuitum animarum; ut scilicet animae separatae a corporibus, post determinata temporum curricula, iterum redirent ad corpora. De quibus omnibus in sequentibus est agendum. Considerandum tamen quod haec ratio particularis est. Unde posset dicere aliquis quod mundus fuit aeternus, vel saltem aliqua creatura, ut Angelus; non autem homo. Nos autem intendimus universaliter, an aliqua creatura fuerit ab aeterno.