1 Objection 1: It would seem that an angel can be in several places at once. For an angel is not less endowed with power than the soul. But the soul is in several places at once, for it is entirely in every part of the body, as Augustine says De Trin. vi). Therefore an angel can be in several places at once.
1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus possit esse in pluribus locis simul. Angelus enim non est minoris virtutis quam anima. Sed anima est simul in pluribus locis, quia est tota in qualibet parte corporis, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo Angelus potest esse in pluribus locis simul.
2 Objection 2: Further, an angel is in the body which he assumes; and, since the body which he assumes is continuous, it would appear that he is in every part thereof. But according to the various parts there are various places. Therefore the angel is at one time in various places.
2 Praeterea, Angelus est in corpore assumpto; et cum assumat corpus continuum, videtur quod sit in qualibet eius parte. Sed secundum partes eius considerantur diversa loca. Ergo Angelus est simul in pluribus locis.
3 Objection 3: Further, Damascene says De Fide Orth. ii) that where the angel operates, there he is. But occasionally he operates in several places at one time, as is evident from the angel destroying Sodom Gn. 19, 25). Therefore an angel can be in several places at the one time.
3 Praeterea, Damascenus dicit quod ubi Angelus operatur, ibi est. Sed aliquando operatur simul in pluribus locis, ut patet de Angelo subvertente Sodomam, Gen. XIX. Ergo Angelus potest esse in pluribus locis simul.
4 On the contrary, Damascene says De Fide Orth. ii) that while the angels are in heaven, they are not on earth.
4 Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, quod Angeli, dum sunt in caelo, non sunt in terra.
5 I answer that, An angel's power and nature are finite, whereas the Divine power and essence, which is the universal cause of all things, is infinite: consequently God through His power touches all things, and is not merely present in some places, but is everywhere. Now since the angel's power is finite, it does not extend to all things, but to one determined thing. For whatever is compared with one power must be compared therewith as one determined thing. Consequently since all being is compared as one thing to God's universal power, so is one particular being compared as one with the angelic power.
Hence, since the angel is in a place by the application of his power to the place, it follows that he is not everywhere, nor in several places, but in only one place. Some, however, have been deceived in this matter. For some who were unable to go beyond the reach of their imaginations supposed the indivisibility of the angel to be like that of a point; consequently they thought that an angel could be only in a place which is a point.
But they were manifestly deceived, because a point is something indivisible, yet having its situation; whereas the angel is indivisible, and beyond the genus of quantity and situation. Consequently there is no occasion for determining in his regard one indivisible place as to situation: any place which is either divisible or indivisible, great or small suffices, according as to his own free-will he applies his power to a great or to a small body. So the entire body to which he is applied by his power, corresponds as one place to him.
Neither, if any angel moves the heavens, is it necessary for him to be everywhere. First of all, because his power is applied only to what is first moved by him. Now there is one part of the heavens in which there is movement first of all, namely, the part to the east: hence the Philosopher Phys. vii, text 84) attributes the power of the heavenly mover to the part which is in the east. Secondly, because philosophers do not hold that one separate substance moves all the spheres immediately.
Hence it need not be everywhere. So, then, it is evident that to be in a place appertains quite differently to a body, to an angel, and to God. For a body is in a place in a circumscribed fashion, since it is measured by the place. An angel, however, is not there in a circumscribed fashion, since he is not measured by the place, but definitively, because he is in a place in such a manner that he is not in another.
But God is neither circumscriptively nor definitively there, because He is everywhere. From this we can easily gather an answer to the objections: because the entire subject to which the angelic power is immediately applied, is reputed as one place, even though it be continuous.
5 Respondeo dicendum quod Angelus est virtutis et essentiae finitae. Divina autem virtus et essentia infinita est, et est universalis causa omnium, et ideo sua virtute omnia contingit, et non solum in pluribus locis est, sed ubique. Virtus autem Angeli, quia finita est, non se extendit ad omnia, sed ad aliquid unum determinatum. Oportet enim quidquid comparatur ad unam virtutem, ut unum aliquid comparari ad ipsam. Sicut igitur universum ens comparatur ut unum aliquid ad universalem Dei virtutem, ita et aliquod particulare ens comparatur ut aliquid unum ad Angeli virtutem.
Unde cum Angelus sit in loco per applicationem virtutis suae ad locum, sequitur quod non sit ubique, nec in pluribus locis, sed in uno loco tantum. Circa hoc tamen aliqui decepti sunt. Quidam enim, imaginationem transcendere non valentes, cogitaverunt indivisibilitatem Angeli ad modum indivisibilitatis puncti, et inde crediderunt quod Angelus non posset esse nisi in loco punctali. Sed manifeste decepti sunt. Nam punctum est indivisibile habens situm, sed Angelus est indivisibile extra genus quantitatis et situs existens. Unde non est necesse quod determinetur ei unus locus indivisibilis secundum situm; sed vel divisibilis vel indivisibilis, vel maior vel minor, secundum quod voluntarie applicat suam virtutem ad corpus maius vel minus.
Et sic totum corpus cui per suam virtutem applicatur, correspondet ei ut unus locus. Nec tamen oportet quod si aliquis Angelus movet caelum, quod sit ubique. Primo quidem, quia non applicatur virtus eius nisi ad id quod primo ab ipso movetur, una autem pars caeli est in qua primo est motus, scilicet pars orientis, unde etiam philosophus, in VIII Physic., virtutem motoris caelorum attribuit parti orientis. Secundo, quia non ponitur a philosophis quod una substantia separata moveat omnes orbes immediate.
Unde non oportet quod sit ubique. Sic igitur patet quod diversimode esse in loco convenit corpori, et Angelo, et Deo. Nam corpus est in loco circumscriptive, quia commensuratur loco. Angelus autem non circumscriptive, cum non commensuretur loco, sed definitive, quia ita est in uno loco, quod non in alio. Deus autem neque circumscriptive neque definitive, quia est ubique. Et per hoc patet de facili responsio ad obiecta, quia totum illud cui immediate applicatur virtus Angeli, reputatur ut unus locus eius, licet sit continuum.