1 Objection 1: It would seem that there is no free-will in the angels. For the act of free-will is to choose. But there can be no choice with the angels, because choice is the desire of something after taking counsel, while counsel is a kind of inquiry, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. But the angels' knowledge is not the result of inquiring, for this belongs to the discursiveness of reason. Therefore it appears that there is no free-will in the angels.
1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Angelis non sit liberum arbitrium. Actus enim liberi arbitrii est eligere. Sed electio non potest esse in Angelis, cum electio sit appetitus praeconsiliati, consilium autem est inquisitio quaedam ut dicitur in III Ethic.; Angeli autem non cognoscunt inquirendo, quia hoc pertinet ad discursum rationis. Ergo videtur quod in Angelis non sit liberum arbitrium.
2 Objection 2: Further, free-will implies indifference to alternatives. But in the angels on the part of their intellect there is no such indifference; because, as was observed already Question 58, Article 5), their intellect is not deceived as to things which are naturally intelligible to them. Therefore neither on the part of their appetitive faculty can there be free-will.
2 Praeterea, liberum arbitrium se habet ad utrumlibet. Sed ex parte intellectus non est aliquid se habens ad utrumlibet in Angelis, quia intellectus eorum non fallitur in naturalibus intelligibilibus, ut dictum est. Ergo nec ex parte appetitus liberum arbitrium in eis esse potest.
3 Objection 3: Further, the natural endowments of the angels belong to them according to degrees of more or less; because in the higher angels the intellectual nature is more perfect than in the lower. But the free-will does not admit of degrees. Therefore there is no free-will in them.
3 Praeterea, ea quae sunt naturalia in Angelis, conveniunt eis secundum magis et minus, quia in superioribus Angelis natura intellectualis est perfectior quam in inferioribus. Liberum autem arbitrium non recipit magis et minus. Ergo in Angelis non est liberum arbitrium.
4 On the contrary, Free-will is part of man's dignity. But the angels' dignity surpasses that of men. Therefore, since free-will is in men, with much more reason is it in the angels.
4 Sed contra, libertas arbitrii ad dignitatem hominis pertinet. Sed Angeli digniores sunt hominibus. Ergo libertas arbitrii, cum sit in hominibus, multo magis est in Angelis.
5 I answer that, Some things there are which act, not from any previous judgment, but, as it were, moved and made to act by others; just as the arrow is directed to the target by the archer. Others act from some kind of judgment; but not from free-will, such as irrational animals; for the sheep flies from the wolf by a kind of judgment whereby it esteems it to be hurtful to itself: such a judgment is not a free one, but implanted by nature. Only an agent endowed with an intellect can act with a judgment which is free, in so far as it apprehends the common note of goodness; from which it can judge this or the other thing to be good. Consequently, wherever there is intellect, there is free-will. It is therefore manifest that just as there is intellect, so is there free-will in the angels, and in a higher degree of perfection than in man.
5 Respondeo dicendum quod quaedam sunt quae non agunt ex aliquo arbitrio, sed quasi ab aliis acta et mota, sicut sagitta a sagittante movetur ad finem. Quaedam vero agunt quodam arbitrio, sed non libero, sicut animalia irrationalia, ovis enim fugit lupum ex quodam iudicio, quo existimat eum sibi noxium; sed hoc iudicium non est sibi liberum, sed a natura inditum. Sed solum id quod habet intellectum, potest agere iudicio libero, inquantum cognoscit universalem rationem boni, ex qua potest iudicare hoc vel illud esse bonum. Unde ubicumque est intellectus, est liberum arbitrium. Et sic patet liberum arbitrium esse in Angelis etiam excellentius quam in hominibus, sicut et intellectum.
6 Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of choice, as it is in man. As a man's estimate in speculative matters differs from an angel's in this, that the one needs not to inquire, while the other does so need; so is it in practical matters. Hence there is choice in the angels, yet not with the inquisitive deliberation of counsel, but by the sudden acceptance of truth.
6 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de electione secundum quod est hominis. Sicut autem aestimatio hominis in speculativis differt ab aestimatione Angeli in hoc, quod una est absque inquisitione, alia vero per inquisitionem; ita et in operativis. Unde in Angelis est electio; non tamen cum inquisitiva deliberatione consilii, sed per subitam acceptionem veritatis.
7 Reply to Objection 2: As was observed already Article 2), knowledge is effected by the presence of the known within the knower. Now it is a mark of imperfection in anything not to have within it what it should naturally have. Consequently an angel would not be perfect in his nature, if his intellect were not determined to every truth which he can know naturally. But the act of the appetitive faculty comes of this, that the affection is directed to something outside. Yet the perfection of a thing does not come from everything to which it is inclined, but only from something which is higher than it. Therefore it does not argue imperfection in an angel if his will be not determined with regard to things beneath him; but it would argue imperfection in him, with he to be indeterminate to what is above him.
7 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, cognitio fit per hoc quod cognita sunt in cognoscente. Ad imperfectionem autem alicuius rei pertinet, si non sit in ea id quod natum est in ea esse. Unde Angelus non esset perfectus in sua natura, si intellectus eius non esset determinatus ad omnem veritatem quam naturaliter cognoscere potest. Sed actus appetitivae virtutis est per hoc quod affectus inclinatur ad rem exteriorem. Non autem dependet perfectio rei ex omni re ad quam inclinatur, sed solum ex superiori. Et ideo non pertinet ad imperfectionem Angeli, si non habet voluntatem determinatam respectu eorum quae infra ipsum sunt. Pertineret autem ad imperfectionem eius, si indeterminate se haberet ad illud quod supra ipsum est.
8 Reply to Objection 3: Free-will exists in a nobler manner in the higher angels than it does in the lower, as also does the judgment of the intellect. Yet it is true that liberty, in so far as the removal of compulsion is considered, is not susceptible of greater and less degree; because privations and negations are not lessened nor increased directly of themselves; but only by their cause, or through the addition of some qualification.
8 Ad tertium dicendum quod liberum arbitrium nobiliori modo est in superioribus Angelis, quam in inferioribus, sicut et iudicium intellectus. Tamen verum est quod ipsa libertas, secundum quod in ea consideratur quaedam remotio coactionis, non suscipit magis et minus, quia privationes et negationes non remittuntur nec intenduntur per se, sed solum per suam causam, vel secundum aliquam affirmationem adiunctam.