1 Objection 1: It would seem that the will of the demons is not obstinate in evil. For liberty of will belongs to the nature of an intellectual being, which nature remains in the demons, as we said above Article 1). But liberty of will is directly and firstly ordained to good rather than to evil. Therefore the demons' will is not so obstinate in evil as not to be able to return to what is good.
1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Daemonum non sit obstinata in malo. Libertas enim arbitrii ad naturam intellectualis naturae pertinet, quae manet in Daemonibus, ut dictum est. Sed libertas arbitrii per se et prius ordinatur ad bonum quam ad malum. Ergo voluntas Daemonis non est ita obstinata in malo, quin possit redire ad bonum.
2 Objection 2: Further, since God's mercy is infinite, it is greater than the demons' malice, which is finite. But no one returns from the malice of sin to the goodness of justice save through God's mercy. Therefore the demons can likewise return from their state of malice to the state of justice.
2 Praeterea, maior est misericordia Dei, quae est infinita, quam Daemonis malitia, quae est finita. A malitia autem culpae ad bonitatem iustitiae nullus redit nisi per Dei misericordiam. Ergo etiam Daemones a statu malitiae possunt redire ad statum iustitiae.
3 Objection 3: Further, if the demons have a will obstinate in evil, then their will would be especially obstinate in the sin whereby they fell. But that sin, namely, pride, is in them no longer; because the motive for the sin no longer endures, namely, excellence. Therefore the demon is not obstinate in malice.
3 Praeterea, si Daemones habent voluntatem obstinatam in malo, maxime haberent eam obstinatam in peccato quo peccaverunt. Sed illud peccatum in eis nunc non manet, scilicet superbia quia nec motivum manet, scilicet excellentia. Ergo Daemon non est obstinatus in malitia.
4 Objection 4: Further, Gregory says Moral. iv) that man can be reinstated by another, since he fell through another. But, as was observed already Question 63, Article 8), the lower demons fell through the highest one. Therefore their fall can be repaired by another. Consequently they are not obstinate in malice.
4 Praeterea, Gregorius dicit quod homo per alium reparari potuit, quia per alium cecidit. Sed Daemones inferiores per primum ceciderunt, ut supra dictum est. Ergo eorum casus per alium reparari potest. Ergo non sunt in malitia obstinati.
5 Objection 5: Further, whoever is obstinate in malice, never performs any good work. But the demon performs some good works: for he confesses the truth, saying to Christ: I know Who Thou art, the holy one of God Mk. 1, 24). The demons also believe and tremble Jm. 2, 19). And Dionysius observes Div. Nom. iv), that they desire what is good and best, which is, to be, to live, to understand. Therefore they are not obstinate in malice.
5 Praeterea, quicumque est in malitia obstinatus, nunquam aliquod bonum opus operatur. Sed Daemon aliqua bona opera facit, confitetur enim veritatem, dicens Christo, scio quia sis sanctus Dei, Marc. I, Daemones etiam credunt et contremiscunt, ut dicitur Iacob. II; Dionysius etiam dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod bonum et optimum concupiscunt, esse, vivere et intelligere. Ergo non sunt obstinati in malitia.
6 On the contrary, It is said Ps. 73, 23): The pride of them that hate Thee, ascendeth continually; and this is understood of the demons. Therefore they remain ever obstinate in their malice.
6 Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo LXXIII, superbia eorum qui te oderunt, ascendit semper; quod de Daemonibus exponitur. Ergo semper obstinati in malitia perseverant.
7 I answer that, It was Origen's opinion that every will of the creature can by reason of free-will be inclined to good and evil; with the exception of the soul of Christ on account of the union of the Word. Such a statement deprives angels and saints of true beatitude, because everlasting stability is of the very nature of true beatitude; hence it is termed life everlasting. It is also contrary to the authority of Sacred Scripture, which declares that demons and wicked men shall be sent into everlasting punishment, and the good brought into everlasting life.
Consequently such an opinion must be considered erroneous; while according to Catholic Faith, it must be held firmly both that the will of the good angels is confirmed in good, and that the will of the demons is obstinate in evil. We must seek for the cause of this obstinacy, not in the gravity of the sin, but in the condition of their nature or state. For as Damascene says De Fide Orth. ii), death is to men, what the fall is to the angels.
Now it is clear that all the mortal sins of men, grave or less grave, are pardonable before death; whereas after death they are without remission and endure for ever. To find the cause, then, of this obstinacy, it must be borne in mind that the appetitive power is in all things proportioned to the apprehensive, whereby it is moved, as the movable by its mover. For the sensitive appetite seeks a particular good; while the will seeks the universal good, as was said above Question 59, Article 1); as also the sense apprehends particular objects, while the intellect considers universals.
Now the angel's apprehension differs from man's in this respect, that the angel by his intellect apprehends immovably, as we apprehend immovably first principles which are the object of the habit of intelligence; whereas man by his reason apprehends movably, passing from one consideration to another; and having the way open by which he may proceed to either of two opposites. Consequently man's will adheres to a thing movably, and with the power of forsaking it and of clinging to the opposite; whereas the angel's will adheres fixedly and immovably.
Therefore, if his will be considered before its adhesion, it can freely adhere either to this or to its opposite namely, in such things as he does not will naturally); but after he has once adhered, he clings immovably. So it is customary to say that man's free-will is flexible to the opposite both before and after choice; but the angel's free-will is flexible either opposite before the choice, but not after. Therefore the good angels who adhered to justice, were confirmed therein; whereas the wicked ones, sinning, are obstinate in sin. Later on we shall treat of the obstinacy of men who are damned SP, Question 98, Articles 1, 2).
7 Respondeo dicendum quod Origenis positio fuit quod omnis voluntas creaturae, propter libertatem arbitrii, potest flecti et in bonum et in malum, excepta anima Christi propter unionem verbi. Sed haec positio tollit veritatem beatitudinis a sanctis Angelis et hominibus, quia stabilitas sempiterna est de ratione verae beatitudinis; unde et vita aeterna nominatur. Repugnat etiam auctoritati Scripturae sacrae, quae Daemones et homines malos in supplicium aeternum mittendos, bonos autem in vitam aeternam transferendos pronuntiat, Matth. XXV. Unde haec positio est tanquam erronea reputanda; et tenendum est firmiter, secundum fidem Catholicam, quod et voluntas bonorum Angelorum confirmata est in bono, et voluntas Daemonum obstinata est in malo.
Causam autem huius obstinationis oportet accipere, non ex gravitate culpae, sed ex conditione naturae status. Hoc enim est hominibus mors, quod Angelis casus, ut Damascenus dicit. Manifestum est autem quod omnia mortalia peccata hominum, sive sint magna sive sint parva, ante mortem sunt remissibilia; post mortem vero, irremissibilia, et perpetuo manentia. Ad inquirendum ergo causam huiusmodi obstinationis, considerandum est quod vis appetitiva in omnibus proportionatur apprehensivae a qua movetur, sicut mobile motori. Appetitus enim sensitivus est boni particularis, voluntas vero universalis, ut supra dictum est; sicut etiam sensus apprehensivus est singularium, intellectus vero universalium.
Differt autem apprehensio Angeli ab apprehensione hominis in hoc, quod Angelus apprehendit immobiliter per intellectum, sicut et nos immobiliter apprehendimus prima principia, quorum est intellectus, homo vero per rationem apprehendit mobiliter, discurrendo de uno ad aliud, habens viam procedendi ad utrumque oppositorum. Unde et voluntas hominis adhaeret alicui mobiliter, quasi potens etiam ab eo discedere et contrario adhaerere, voluntas autem Angeli adhaeret fixe et immobiliter. Et ideo, si consideretur ante adhaesionem, potest libere adhaerere et huic et opposito in his scilicet quae non naturaliter vult), sed postquam iam adhaesit, immobiliter adhaeret.
Et ideo consuevit dici quod liberum arbitrium hominis flexibile est ad oppositum et ante electionem, et post; liberum autem arbitrium Angeli est flexibile ad utrumque oppositum ante electionem, sed non post. Sic igitur et boni Angeli, semper adhaerentes iustitiae, sunt in illa confirmati, mali vero, peccantes, sunt in peccato obstinati. De obstinatione vero hominum damnatorum infra dicetur.
8 Reply to Objection 1: The good and wicked angels have free-will, but according to the manner and condition of their state, as has been said.
8 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod boni et mali Angeli habent liberum arbitrium, sed secundum modum et conditionem suae naturae, ut dictum est.
9 Reply to Objection 2: God's mercy delivers from sin those who repent. But such as are not capable of repenting, cling immovably to sin, and are not delivered by the Divine mercy.
9 Ad secundum dicendum quod misericordia Dei liberat a peccato poenitentes. Illi vero qui poenitentiae capaces non sunt, immobiliter malo adhaerentes per divinam misericordiam non liberantur.
10 Reply to Objection 3: The devil's first sin still remains in him according to desire; although not as to his believing that he can obtain what he desired. Even so, if a man were to believe that he can commit murder, and wills to commit it, and afterwards the power is taken from him; nevertheless, the will to murder can stay with him, so that he would he had done it, or still would do it if he could.
10 Ad tertium dicendum quod adhuc manet in Diabolo peccatum quo primo peccavit, quantum ad appetitum; licet non quantum ad hoc quod credat se posse obtinere. Sicut si aliquis credat se posse facere homicidium, et velit facere, et postea adimatur ei potestas; nihilominus voluntas homicidii in eo manere potest, ut velit fecisse, vel velit facere si posset.
11 Reply to Objection 4: The fact that man sinned from another's suggestion, is not the whole cause of man's sin being pardonable. Consequently the argument does not hold good.
11 Ad quartum dicendum quod non est tota causa quare peccatum hominis sit remissibile, quia alio suggerente peccavit. Et ideo ratio non sequitur.
12 Reply to Objection 5: A demon's act is twofold. One comes of deliberate will; and this is properly called his own act. Such an act on the demon's part is always wicked; because, although at times he does something good, yet he does not do it well; as when he tells the truth in order to deceive; and when he believes and confesses, yet not willingly, but compelled by the evidence of things. Another kind of act is natural to the demon; this can be good and bears witness to the goodness of nature. Yet he abuses even such good acts to evil purpose.
12 Ad quintum dicendum quod actus Daemonis est duplex. Quidam scilicet ex voluntate deliberata procedens, et hic proprie potest dici actus eius. Et talis actus Daemonis semper est malus, quia etsi aliquando aliquod bonum faciat, non tamen bene facit; sicut dum veritatem dicit ut decipiat, et dum non voluntarie credit et confitetur, sed rerum evidentia coactus. Alius autem actus Daemonis est naturalis; qui bonus esse potest, et attestatur bonitati naturae. Et tamen etiam tali bono actu abutuntur ad malum.