1 Objection 1: It would seem that time was not created simultaneously with formless matter. For Augustine says Confess. xii, 12): I find two things that Thou didst create before time was, the primary corporeal matter, and the angelic nature. Therefore time was not created with formless matter.
1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod tempus non sit concreatum materiae informi. Dicit enim Augustinus, XII Confess., ad Deum loquens, duo reperio quae fecisti carentia temporibus, scilicet materiam primam corporalem, et naturam angelicam. Non ergo tempus est concreatum materiae informi.
2 Objection 2: Further, time is divided by day and night. But in the beginning there was neither day nor night, for these began when God divided the light from the darkness. Therefore in the beginning time was not.
2 Praeterea, tempus dividitur per diem et noctem. Sed a principio nec nox nec dies erat, sed postmodum, cum divisit Deus lucem a tenebris. Ergo a principio non erat tempus.
3 Objection 3: Further, time is the measure of the firmament's movement; and the firmament is said to have been made on the second day. Therefore in the beginning time was not.
3 Praeterea, tempus est numerus motus firmamenti, quod legitur factum secundo die. Ergo non a principio erat tempus.
4 Objection 4: Further, movement precedes time, and therefore should be reckoned among the first things created, rather than time.
4 Praeterea, motus est prior tempore. Magis igitur deberet numerari inter primo creata motus, quam tempus.
5 Objection 5: Further, as time is the extrinsic measure of created things, so is place. Place, then, as truly as time, must be reckoned among the things first created.
5 Praeterea, sicut tempus est mensura extrinseca, ita et locus. Non ergo magis debet computari inter primo creata tempus, quam locus.
6 On the contrary, Augustine says Gen. ad lit. i, 3): Both spiritual and corporeal creatures were created at the beginning of time.
6 Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, super Gen. ad Litt., quod spiritualis et corporalis creatura est creata in principio temporis.
7 I answer that, It is commonly said that the first things created were these four, the angelic nature, the empyrean heaven, formless corporeal matter, and time. It must be observed, however, that this is not the opinion of Augustine. For he Confess. xii, 12) specifies only two things as first created, the angelic nature and corporeal matter, making no mention of the empyrean heaven. But these two, namely, the angelic nature and formless matter, precede the formation, by nature only, and not by duration; and therefore, as they precede formation, so do they precede movement and time. Time, therefore, cannot be included among them. But the enumeration above given is that of other holy writers, who hold that the formlessness of matter preceded by duration its form, and this view postulates the existence of time as the measure of duration: for otherwise there would be no such measure.
7 Respondeo dicendum quod communiter dicitur quatuor esse primo creata, scilicet naturam angelicam, caelum Empyreum, materiam corporalem informem, et tempus. Sed attendendum est quod hoc dictum non procedit secundum Augustini opinionem. Augustinus enim ponit duo primo creata, scilicet naturam angelicam et materiam corporalem, nulla mentione facta de caelo Empyreo. Haec autem duo, scilicet natura angelica et materia informis, praecedunt formationem non duratione, sed natura. Et sicut natura praecedunt formationem, ita etiam et motum et tempus. Unde tempus non potest eis connumerari. Procedit autem praedicta connumeratio secundum opinionem aliorum sanctorum, ponentium quod informitas materiae duratione praecessit formationem, et tunc pro illa duratione necesse est ponere tempus aliquod; aliter enim mensura durationis accipi non posset.
8 Reply to Objection 1: The teaching of Augustine rests on the opinion that the angelic nature and formless matter precede time by origin or nature.
8 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus hoc dicit ea ratione qua natura angelica et materia informis praecedunt origine, seu natura, tempus.
9 Reply to Objection 2: As in the opinion of some holy writers matter was in some measure formless before it received its full form, so time was in a manner formless before it was fully formed and distinguished into day and night.
9 Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut, secundum alios sanctos, materia erat quodammodo informis, et postea fuit formata; ita tempus quodammodo fuit informe, et postmodum formatum, et distinctum per diem et noctem.
10 Reply to Objection 3: If the movement of the firmament did not begin immediately from the beginning, then the time that preceded was the measure, not of the firmament's movement, but of the first movement of whatsoever kind. For it is accidental to time to be the measure of the firmament's movement, in so far as this is the first movement. But if the first movement was another than this, time would have been its measure, for everything is measured by the first of its kind. And it must be granted that forthwith from the beginning, there was movement of some kind, at least in the succession of concepts and affections in the angelic mind: while movement without time cannot be conceived, since time is nothing else than the measure of priority and succession in movement.
10 Ad tertium dicendum quod, si motus firmamenti non statim a principio incoepit, tunc tempus quod praecessit, non erat numerus motus firmamenti, sed cuiuscumque primi motus. Accidit enim tempori quod sit numerus motus firmamenti, inquantum hic motus est primus motuum, si autem esset alius motus primus, illius motus esset tempus mensura, quia omnia mensurantur primo sui generis. Oportet autem dicere statim a principio fuisse aliquem motum, ad minus secundum successionem conceptionum et affectionum in mente angelica. Motum autem non est intelligere sine tempore, cum nihil aliud sit tempus quam numerus prioris et posterioris in motu.
11 Reply to Objection 4: Among the first created things are to be reckoned those which have a general relationship to things. And, therefore, among these time must be included, as having the nature of a common measure; but not movement, which is related only to the movable subject.
11 Ad quartum dicendum quod inter primo creata computantur ea quae habent generalem habitudinem ad res. Et ideo computari debuit tempus, quod habet rationem communis mensurae, non autem motus, qui comparatur solum ad subiectum mobile.
12 Reply to Objection 5: Place is implied as existing in the empyrean heaven, this being the boundary of the universe. And since place has reference to things permanent, it was created at once in its totality. But time, as not being permanent, was created in its beginning: even as actually we cannot lay hold of any part of time save the now.
12 Ad quintum dicendum quod locus intelligitur in caelo Empyreo omnia continente. Et quia locus est de permanentibus, concreatus est totus simul. Tempus autem, quod non est permanens, concreatum est in suo principio, sicut etiam modo nihil est accipere in actu de tempore nisi nunc.