1 Objection 1: It would seem that the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence. For different things do not proceed from one simple thing. But the essence of the soul is one and simple. Since, therefore, the powers of the soul are many and various, they cannot proceed from its essence.
1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod potentiae animae non fluant ab eius essentia. Ab uno enim simplici non procedunt diversa. Essentia autem animae est una et simplex. Cum ergo potentiae animae sint multae et diversae, non possunt procedere ab eius essentia.
2 Objection 2: Further, that from which a thing proceeds is its cause. But the essence of the soul cannot be said to be the cause of the powers; as is clear if one considers the different kinds of causes. Therefore the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence.
2 Praeterea, illud a quo aliud procedit, est causa eius. Sed essentia animae non potest dici causa potentiarum; ut patet discurrenti per singula causarum genera. Ergo potentiae animae non fluunt ab eius essentia.
3 Objection 3: Further, emanation involves some sort of movement. But nothing is moved by itself, as the Philosopher proves Phys. vii, 1, 2); except, perhaps, by reason of a part of itself, as an animal is said to be moved by itself, because one part thereof moves and another is moved. Neither is the soul moved, as the Philosopher proves De Anima i, 4). Therefore the soul does not produce its powers within itself.
3 Praeterea, emanatio quendam motum nominat. Sed nihil movetur a seipso, ut probatur in VII libro Physic.; nisi forte ratione partis, sicut animal dicitur moveri a seipso, quia una pars eius est movens et alia mota. Neque etiam anima movetur, ut probatur in I de anima. Non ergo anima causat in se suas potentias.
4 On the contrary, The powers of the soul are its natural properties. But the subject is the cause of its proper accidents; whence also it is included in the definition of accident, as is clear from Metaph. vii Did. vi, 4). Therefore the powers of the soul proceed from its essence as their cause.
4 Sed contra, potentiae animae sunt quaedam proprietates naturales ipsius. Sed subiectum est causa propriorum accidentium, unde et ponitur in definitione accidentis, ut patet in VII Metaphys. Ergo potentiae animae procedunt ab eius essentia sicut a causa.
5 I answer that, The substantial and the accidental form partly agree and partly differ. They agree in this, that each is an act; and that by each of them something is after a manner actual. They differ, however, in two respects. First, because the substantial form makes a thing to exist absolutely, and its subject is something purely potential. But the accidental form does not make a thing to exist absolutely but to be such, or so great, or in some particular condition; for its subject is an actual being.
Hence it is clear that actuality is observed in the substantial form prior to its being observed in the subject: and since that which is first in a genus is the cause in that genus, the substantial form causes existence in its subject. On the other hand, actuality is observed in the subject of the accidental form prior to its being observed in the accidental form; wherefore the actuality of the accidental form is caused by the actuality of the subject.
So the subject, forasmuch as it is in potentiality, is receptive of the accidental form: but forasmuch as it is in act, it produces it. This I say of the proper and per se accident; for with regard to the extraneous accident, the subject is receptive only, the accident being caused by an extrinsic agent. Secondly, substantial and accidental forms differ, because, since that which is the less principal exists for the sake of that which is the more principal, matter therefore exists on account of the substantial form; while on the contrary, the accidental form exists on account of the completeness of the subject.
Now it is clear, from what has been said Article 5), that either the subject of the soul's powers is the soul itself alone, which can be the subject of an accident, forasmuch as it has something of potentiality, as we have said above Article 1, ad 6); or else this subject is the composite. Now the composite is actual by the soul. Whence it is clear that all the powers of the soul, whether their subject be the soul alone, or the composite, flow from the essence of the soul, as from their principle; because it has already been said that the accident is caused by the subject according as it is actual, and is received into it according as it is in potentiality.
5 Respondeo dicendum quod forma substantialis et accidentalis partim conveniunt, et partim differunt. Conveniunt quidem in hoc, quod utraque est actus, et secundum utramque est aliquid quodammodo in actu. Differunt autem in duobus. Primo quidem, quia forma substantialis facit esse simpliciter, et eius subiectum est ens in potentia tantum. Forma autem accidentalis non facit esse simpliciter; sed esse tale, aut tantum, aut aliquo modo se habens, subiectum enim eius est ens in actu. Unde patet quod actualitas per prius invenitur in forma substantiali quam in eius subiecto, et quia primum est causa in quolibet genere, forma substantialis causat esse in actu in suo subiecto.
Sed e converso, actualitas per prius invenitur in subiecto formae accidentalis, quam in forma accidentali, unde actualitas formae accidentalis causatur ab actualitate subiecti. Ita quod subiectum, inquantum est in potentia, est susceptivum formae accidentalis, inquantum autem est in actu, est eius productivum. Et hoc dico de proprio et per se accidente, nam respectu accidentis extranei, subiectum est susceptivum tantum; productivum vero talis accidentis est agens extrinsecum. Secundo autem differunt substantialis forma et accidentalis, quia, cum minus principale sit propter principalius, materia est propter formam substantialem; sed e converso, forma accidentalis est propter completionem subiecti.
Manifestum est autem ex dictis quod potentiarum animae subiectum est vel ipsa anima sola, quae potest esse subiectum accidentis secundum quod habet aliquid potentialitatis, ut supra dictum est; vel compositum. Compositum autem est in actu per animam. Unde manifestum est quod omnes potentiae animae, sive subiectum earum sit anima sola, sive compositum, fluunt ab essentia animae sicut a principio, quia iam dictum est quod accidens causatur a subiecto secundum quod est actu, et recipitur in eo inquantum est in potentia.
6 Reply to Objection 1: From one simple thing many things may proceed naturally, in a certain order; or again if there be diversity of recipients. Thus, from the one essence of the soul many and various powers proceed; both because order exists among these powers; and also by reason of the diversity of the corporeal organs.
6 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ab uno simplici possunt naturaliter multa procedere ordine quodam. Et iterum propter diversitatem recipientium. Sic igitur ab una essentia animae procedunt multae et diversae potentiae, tum propter ordinem potentiarum, tum etiam secundum diversitatem organorum corporalium.
7 Reply to Objection 2: The subject is both the final cause, and in a way the active cause, of its proper accident. It is also as it were the material cause, inasmuch as it is receptive of the accident. From this we may gather that the essence of the soul is the cause of all its powers, as their end, and as their active principle; and of some as receptive thereof.
7 Ad secundum dicendum quod subiectum est causa proprii accidentis et finalis, et quodammodo activa; et etiam ut materialis, inquantum est susceptivum accidentis. Et ex hoc potest accipi quod essentia animae est causa omnium potentiarum sicut finis et sicut principium activum; quarundam autem sicut susceptivum.
8 Reply to Objection 3: The emanation of proper accidents from their subject is not by way of transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance; thus one thing results naturally from another, as color from light.
8 Ad tertium dicendum quod emanatio propriorum accidentium a subiecto non est per aliquam transmutationem; sed per aliquam naturalem resultationem, sicut ex uno naturaliter aliud resultat, ut ex luce color.