1 Objection 1: It would seem that the will desires nothing. For Augustine says De Civ. Dei v, 10) that it anything is necessary, it is not voluntary. But whatever the will desires is voluntary. Therefore nothing that the will desires is desired of necessity.
1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas nihil ex necessitate appetat. Dicit enim Augustinus, in V de Civ. Dei, quod si aliquid est necessarium, non est voluntarium. Sed omne quod voluntas appetit, est voluntarium. Ergo nihil quod voluntas appetit, est necessario desideratum.
2 Objection 2: Further, the rational powers, according to the Philosopher Metaph. viii, 2), extend to opposite things. But the will is a rational power, because, as he says De Anima iii, 9), the will is in the reason. Therefore the will extends to opposite things, and therefore it is determined to nothing of necessity.
2 Praeterea, potestates rationales, secundum philosophum, se habent ad opposita. Sed voluntas est potestas rationalis, quia, ut dicitur in III de anima, voluntas in ratione est. Ergo voluntas se habet ad opposita. Ad nihil ergo de necessitate determinatur.
3 Objection 3: Further, by the will we are masters of our own actions. But we are not masters of that which is of necessity. Therefore the act of the will cannot be necessitated.
3 Praeterea, secundum voluntatem sumus domini nostrorum actuum. Sed eius quod ex necessitate est, non sumus domini. Ergo actus voluntatis non potest de necessitate esse.
4 On the contrary, Augustine says De Trin. xiii, 4) that all desire happiness with one will. Now if this were not necessary, but contingent, there would at least be a few exceptions. Therefore the will desires something of necessity.
4 Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIII de Trin., quod beatitudinem omnes una voluntate appetunt. Si autem non esset necessarium sed contingens, deficeret ad minus in paucioribus. Ergo voluntas ex necessitate aliquid vult.
5 I answer that, The word necessity is employed in many ways. For that which must be is necessary. Now that a thing must be may belong to it by an intrinsic principle, either material, as when we say that everything composed of contraries is of necessity corruptible, or formal, as when we say that it is necessary for the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right angles. And this is natural and absolute necessity. In another way, that a thing must be, belongs to it by reason of something extrinsic, which is either the end or the agent.
On the part of the end, as when without it the end is not to be attained or so well attained: for instance, food is said to be necessary for life, and a horse is necessary for a journey. This is called necessity of end, and sometimes also utility. On the part of the agent, a thing must be, when someone is forced by some agent, so that he is not able to do the contrary. This is called necessity of coercion.
Now this necessity of coercion is altogether repugnant to the will. For we call that violent which is against the inclination of a thing. But the very movement of the will is an inclination to something. Therefore, as a thing is called natural because it is according to the inclination of nature, so a thing is called voluntary because it is according to the inclination of the will. Therefore, just as it is impossible for a thing to be at the same time violent and natural, so it is impossible for a thing to be absolutely coerced or violent, and voluntary.
But necessity of end is not repugnant to the will, when the end cannot be attained except in one way: thus from the will to cross the sea, arises in the will the necessity to wish for a ship. In like manner neither is natural necessity repugnant to the will. Indeed, more than this, for as the intellect of necessity adheres to the first principles, the will must of necessity adhere to the last end, which is happiness: since the end is in practical matters what the principle is in speculative matters.
For what befits a thing naturally and immovably must be the root and principle of all else appertaining thereto, since the nature of a thing is the first in everything, and every movement arises from something immovable.
5 Respondeo dicendum quod necessitas dicitur multipliciter. Necesse est enim quod non potest non esse. Quod quidem convenit alicui, uno modo ex principio intrinseco, sive materiali, sicut cum dicimus quod omne compositum ex contrariis necesse est corrumpi; sive formali, sicut cum dicimus quod necesse est triangulum habere tres angulos aequales duobus rectis. Et haec est necessitas naturalis et absoluta. Alio modo convenit alicui quod non possit non esse, ex aliquo extrinseco, vel fine vel agente. Fine quidem, sicut cum aliquis non potest sine hoc consequi, aut bene consequi finem aliquem, ut cibus dicitur necessarius ad vitam, et equus ad iter.
Et haec vocatur necessitas finis; quae interdum etiam utilitas dicitur. Ex agente autem hoc alicui convenit, sicut cum aliquis cogitur ab aliquo agente, ita quod non possit contrarium agere. Et haec vocatur necessitas coactionis. Haec igitur coactionis necessitas omnino repugnat voluntati. Nam hoc dicimus esse violentum, quod est contra inclinationem rei. Ipse autem motus voluntatis est inclinatio quaedam in aliquid. Et ideo sicut dicitur aliquid naturale quia est secundum inclinationem naturae, ita dicitur aliquid voluntarium quia est secundum inclinationem voluntatis.
Sicut ergo impossibile est quod aliquid simul sit violentum et naturale; ita impossibile est quod aliquid simpliciter sit coactum sive violentum, et voluntarium. Necessitas autem finis non repugnat voluntati, quando ad finem non potest perveniri nisi uno modo, sicut ex voluntate transeundi mare, fit necessitas in voluntate ut velit navem. Similiter etiam nec necessitas naturalis repugnat voluntati. Quinimmo necesse est quod, sicut intellectus ex necessitate inhaeret primis principiis, ita voluntas ex necessitate inhaereat ultimo fini, qui est beatitudo, finis enim se habet in operativis sicut principium in speculativis, ut dicitur in II Physic.
Oportet enim quod illud quod naturaliter alicui convenit et immobiliter, sit fundamentum et principium omnium aliorum, quia natura rei est primum in unoquoque, et omnis motus procedit ab aliquo immobili.
6 Reply to Objection 1: The words of Augustine are to be understood of the necessity of coercion. But natural necessity does not take away the liberty of the will, as he says himself De Civ. Dei v, 10).
6 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum Augustini est intelligendum de necessario necessitate coactionis. Necessitas autem naturalis non aufert libertatem voluntatis, ut ipsemet in eodem libro dicit.
7 Reply to Objection 2: The will, so far as it desires a thing naturally, corresponds rather to the intellect as regards natural principles than to the reason, which extends to opposite things. Wherefore in this respect it is rather an intellectual than a rational power.
7 Ad secundum dicendum quod voluntas secundum quod aliquid naturaliter vult, magis respondet intellectui naturalium principiorum, quam rationi, quae ad opposita se habet. Unde secundum hoc, magis est intellectualis quam rationalis potestas.
8 Reply to Objection 3: We are masters of our own actions by reason of our being able to choose this or that. But choice regards not the end, but the means to the end, as the Philosopher says Ethic. iii, 9). Wherefore the desire of the ultimate end does not regard those actions of which we are masters.
8 Ad tertium dicendum quod sumus domini nostrorum actuum secundum quod possumus hoc vel illud eligere. Electio autem non est de fine, sed de his quae sunt ad finem, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Unde appetitus ultimi finis non est de his quorum domini sumus.