1 Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts in the superior appetite, which is the will. For the concupiscible power is so called from concupiscere to desire), and the irascible part from irasci to be angry). But there is a concupiscence which cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, but only to the intellectual, which is the will; as the concupiscence of wisdom, of which it is said Ws. 6, 21): The concupiscence of wisdom bringeth to the eternal kingdom. There is also a certain anger which cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, but only to the intellectual; as when our anger is directed against vice. Wherefore Jerome commenting on Mt. 13, 33 warns us to have the hatred of vice in the irascible part. Therefore we should distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts of the intellectual soul as well as in the sensitive.
1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis distingui debeant in appetitu superiori, qui est voluntas. Vis enim concupiscibilis dicitur a concupiscendo; et irascibilis ab irascendo. Sed aliqua concupiscentia est quae non potest pertinere ad appetitum sensitivum, sed solum ad intellectivum, qui est voluntas; sicut concupiscentia sapientiae, de qua dicitur Sap. VI, concupiscentia sapientiae perducit ad regnum perpetuum. Est etiam quaedam ira quae non potest pertinere ad appetitum sensitivum, sed intellectivum tantum; sicut cum irascimur contra vitia. Unde et Hieronymus, super Matth., monet ut odium vitiorum possideamus in irascibili. Ergo irascibilis et concupiscibilis distingui debent in appetitu intellectivo, sicut et in sensitivo.
2 Objection 2: Further, as is commonly said, charity is in the concupiscible, and hope in the irascible part. But they cannot be in the sensitive appetite, because their objects are not sensible, but intellectual. Therefore we must assign an irascible and concupiscible power to the intellectual part.
2 Praeterea, secundum quod communiter dicitur, caritas est in concupiscibili, spes autem in irascibili. Non autem possunt esse in appetitu sensitivo, quia non sunt sensibilium obiectorum, sed intelligibilium. Ergo concupiscibilis et irascibilis sunt ponenda in parte intellectiva.
3 Objection 3: Further, it is said De Spiritu et Anima) that the soul has these powers, namely, the irascible, concupiscible, and rational, before it is united to the body. But no power of the sensitive part belongs to the soul alone, but to the soul and body united, as we have said above Question 78, Articles 5, 8). Therefore the irascible and concupiscible powers are in the will, which is the intellectual appetite.
3 Praeterea, in libro de spiritu et anima dicitur quod has potentias scilicet irascibilem et concupiscibilem, et rationalem) habet anima antequam corpori misceatur. Sed nulla potentia sensitivae partis est animae tantum, sed coniuncti, ut supra dictum est. Ergo irascibilis et concupiscibilis sunt in voluntate, quae est appetitus intellectivus.
4 On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) says that the irrational part of the soul is divided into the desiderative and irascible, and Damascene says the same De Fide Orth. ii, 12). And the Philosopher says De Anima iii, 9) that the will is in reason, while in the irrational part of the soul are concupiscence and anger, or desire and animus.
4 Sed contra est quod Gregorius Nyssenus, dicit, quod irrationalis pars animae dividitur in desiderativum et irascitivum; et idem dicit Damascenus, in libro II. Et philosophus dicit, in III de anima quod voluntas in ratione est, in irrationali autem parte animae concupiscentia et ira, vel desiderium et animus.
5 I answer that, The irascible and concupiscible are not parts of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. Because, as was said above Question 59, Article 4; Question 79, Article 7), a power which is directed to an object according to some common notion is not differentiated by special differences which are contained under that common notion. For instance, because sight regards the visible thing under the common notion of something colored, the visual power is not multiplied according to the different kinds of color: but if there were a power regarding white as white, and not as something colored, it would be distinct from a power regarding black as black.
Now the sensitive appetite does not consider the common notion of good, because neither do the senses apprehend the universal. And therefore the parts of the sensitive appetite are differentiated by the different notions of particular good: for the concupiscible regards as proper to it the notion of good, as something pleasant to the senses and suitable to nature: whereas the irascible regards the notion of good as something that wards off and repels what is hurtful. But the will regards good according to the common notion of good, and therefore in the will, which is the intellectual appetite, there is no differentiation of appetitive powers, so that there be in the intellectual appetite an irascible power distinct from a concupiscible power: just as neither on the part of the intellect are the apprehensive powers multiplied, although they are on the part of the senses.
5 Respondeo dicendum quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis non sunt partes intellectivi appetitus, qui dicitur voluntas. Quia, sicut supra dictum est, potentia quae ordinatur ad aliquod obiectum secundum communem rationem, non diversificatur per differentias speciales sub illa ratione communi contentas. Sicut quia visus respicit visibile secundum rationem colorati, non multiplicantur visivae potentiae secundum diversas species colorum, si autem esset aliqua potentia quae esset albi inquantum est album, et non inquantum est coloratum, diversificaretur a potentia quae esset nigri inquantum est nigrum. Appetitus autem sensitivus non respicit communem rationem boni, quia nec sensus apprehendit universale. Et ideo secundum diversas rationes particularium bonorum, diversificantur partes appetitus sensitivi, nam concupiscibilis respicit propriam rationem boni, inquantum est delectabile secundum sensum, et conveniens naturae; irascibilis autem respicit rationem boni, secundum quod est repulsivum et impugnativum eius quod infert nocumentum. Sed voluntas respicit bonum sub communi ratione boni. Et ideo non diversificantur in ipsa, quae est appetitus intellectivus, aliquae potentiae appetitivae, ut sit in appetitu intellectivo alia potentia irascibilis, et alia concupiscibilis, sicut etiam ex parte intellectus non multiplicantur vires apprehensivae, licet multiplicentur ex parte sensus.
6 Reply to Objection 1: Love, concupiscence, and the like can be understood in two ways. Sometimes they are taken as passions, arising, that is, with a certain commotion of the soul. And thus they are commonly understood, and in this sense they are only in the sensitive appetite. They may, however, be taken in another way, as far as they are simple affections without passion or commotion of the soul, and thus they are acts of the will. And in this sense, too, they are attributed to the angels and to God. But if taken in this sense, they do not belong to different powers, but only to one power, which is called the will.
6 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod amor, concupiscentia, et huiusmodi, dupliciter accipiuntur. Quandoque quidem secundum quod sunt quaedam passiones, cum quadam scilicet concitatione animi provenientes. Et sic communiter accipiuntur, et hoc modo sunt solum in appetitu sensitivo. Alio modo significant simplicem affectum, absque passione vel animi concitatione. Et sic sunt actus voluntatis. Et hoc etiam modo attribuuntur Angelis et Deo. Sed prout sic accipiuntur, non pertinent ad diversas potentias, sed ad unam tantum potentiam, quae dicitur voluntas.
7 Reply to Objection 2: The will itself may be said to irascible, as far as it wills to repel evil, not from any sudden movement of a passion, but from a judgment of the reason. And in the same way the will may be said to be concupiscible on account of its desire for good. And thus in the irascible and concupiscible are charity and hope, that is, in the will as ordered to such acts. And in this way, too, we may understand the words quoted De Spiritu et Anima); that the irascible and concupiscible powers are in the soul before it is united to the body as long as we understand priority of nature, and not of time), although there is no need to have faith in what that book says. Whence the answer to the third objection is clear.
7 Ad secundum dicendum quod ipsa voluntas potest dici irascibilis, prout vult impugnare malum, non ex impetu passionis, sed ex iudicio rationis. Et eodem modo potest dici concupiscibilis, propter desiderium boni. Et sic in irascibili et concupiscibili sunt caritas et spes; idest in voluntate secundum quod habet ordinem ad huiusmodi actus. Sic etiam potest intelligi quod dicitur in libro de spiritu et anima, quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis sunt animae antequam uniatur corpori ut tamen intelligatur ordo naturae, et non temporis), licet non sit necessarium verbis illius libri fidem adhibere. Unde patet solutio ad tertium.