1 Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul was made before the body. For the work of creation preceded the work of distinction and adornment, as shown above Question 66, Article 1; Question 70, Article 1). But the soul was made by creation; whereas the body was made at the end of the work of adornment. Therefore the soul of man was made before the body.
1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima humana fuerit producta ante corpus. Opus enim creationis praecessit opus distinctionis et ornatus, ut supra habitum est. Sed anima producta est in esse per creationem; corpus autem factum est in fine ornatus. Ergo anima hominis producta est ante corpus.
2 Objection 2: Further, the rational soul has more in common with the angels than with the brute animals. But angels were created before bodies, or at least, at the beginning with corporeal matter; whereas the body of man was formed on the sixth day, when also the animals were made. Therefore the soul of man was created before the body.
2 Praeterea, anima rationalis magis convenit cum Angelis quam cum animalibus brutis. Sed Angeli creati fuerunt ante corpora, vel statim a principio cum corporali materia; corpus autem hominis formatum est sexto die, quando et bruta animalia sunt producta. Ergo anima hominis fuit creata ante corpus.
3 Objection 3: Further, the end is proportionate to the beginning. But in the end the soul outlasts the body. Therefore in the beginning it was created before the body.
3 Praeterea, finis proportionatur principio. Sed anima in fine remanet post corpus. Ergo et in principio fuit creata ante corpus.
4 On the contrary, The proper act is produced in its proper potentiality. Therefore since the soul is the proper act of the body, the soul was produced in the body.
4 Sed contra est quod actus proprius fit in potentia propria. Cum ergo anima sit proprius actus corporis, anima producta est in corpore.
5 I answer that, Origen Peri Archon i, 7, 8) held that not only the soul of the first man, but also the souls of all men were created at the same time as the angels, before their bodies: because he thought that all spiritual substances, whether souls or angels, are equal in their natural condition, and differ only by merit; so that some of them, namely, the souls of men or of heavenly bodies, are united to bodies while others remain in their different orders entirely free from matter.
Of this opinion we have already spoken Question 47, Article 2); and so we need say nothing about it here. Augustine, however Gen. ad lit. vii, 24), says that the soul of the first man was created at the same time as the angels, before the body, for another reason; because he supposes that the body of man, during the work of the six days, was produced, not actually, but only as to some causal virtues; which cannot be said of the soul, because neither was it made of any pre-existing corporeal or spiritual matter, nor could it be produced from any created virtue.
Therefore it seems that the soul itself, during the work of the six days, when all things were made, was created, together with the angels; and that afterwards, by its own will, was joined to the service of the body. But he does not say this by way of assertion; as his words prove. For he says Gen. ad lit. vii, 29): We may believe, if neither Scripture nor reason forbid, that man was made on the sixth day, in the sense that his body was created as to its causal virtue in the elements of the world, but that the soul was already created.
Now this could be upheld by those who hold that the soul has of itself a complete species and nature, and that it is not united to the body as its form, but as its administrator. But if the soul is united to the body as its form, and is naturally a part of human nature, the above supposition is quite impossible. For it is clear that God made the first things in their perfect natural state, as their species required.
Now the soul, as a part of human nature, has its natural perfection only as united to the body. Therefore it would have been unfitting for the soul to be created without the body. Therefore, if we admit the opinion of Augustine about the work of the six days Question 74, Article 2), we may say that the human soul preceded in the work of the six days by a certain generic similitude, so far as it has intellectual nature in common with the angels; but was itself created at the same time as the body.
According to the other saints, both the body and soul of the first man were produced in the work of the six days.
5 Respondeo dicendum quod Origenes posuit non solum animam primi hominis, sed animas omnium hominum ante corpora simul cum Angelis creatas; propter hoc quod credidit omnes spirituales substantias, tam animas quam Angelos, aequales esse secundum suae naturae conditionem, sed solum merito distare; sic ut quaedam earum corporibus alligarentur, quae sunt animae hominum vel caelestium corporum; quaedam vero in sui puritate, secundum diversos ordines, remanerent. De qua opinione supra iam diximus, et ideo relinquatur ad praesens. Augustinus vero, in VII super Gen.
ad Litt., dicit quod anima primi hominis ante corpus cum Angelis est creata, propter aliam rationem. Quia scilicet ponit quod corpus hominis in illis operibus sex dierum non fuit productum in actu, sed solum secundum causales rationes, quod non potest de anima dici; quia nec ex aliqua materia corporali aut spirituali praeexistente facta fuit, nec ex aliqua virtute creata produci potuit. Et ideo videtur quod ipsamet anima in operibus sex dierum, in quibus omnia facta fuerunt, simul cum Angelis fuerit creata; et quod postmodum propria voluntate inclinata fuit ad corpus administrandum.
Sed hoc non dicit asserendo, ut eius verba demonstrant. Dicit enim, credatur, si nulla Scripturarum auctoritas seu veritatis ratio contradicit, hominem ita factum sexto die, ut corporis quidem humani ratio causalis in elementis mundi, anima vero iam ipsa crearetur. Posset autem hoc utique tolerari secundum eos qui ponunt quod anima habet per se speciem et naturam completam, et quod non unitur corpori ut forma, sed solum ad ipsum administrandum. Si autem anima unitur corpori ut forma, et est naturaliter pars humanae naturae, hoc omnino esse non potest.
Manifestum est enim quod Deus primas res instituit in perfecto statu suae naturae, secundum quod uniuscuiusque rei species exigebat. Anima autem, cum sit pars humanae naturae, non habet naturalem perfectionem nisi secundum quod est corpori unita. Unde non fuisset conveniens animam sine corpore creari. Sustinendo ergo opinionem Augustini de operibus sex dierum, dici poterit quod anima humana praecessit in operibus sex dierum secundum quandam similitudinem generis, prout convenit cum Angelis in intellectuali natura; ipsa vero fuit creata simul cum corpore. Secundum alios vero sanctos, tam anima quam corpus primi hominis in operibus sex dierum sunt producta.
6 Reply to Objection 1: If the soul by its nature were a complete species, so that it might be created as to itself, this reason would prove that the soul was created by itself in the beginning. But as the soul is naturally the form of the body, it was necessarily created, not separately, but in the body. Reply to Objection 2: The same observation applies to the second objection. For if the soul had a species of itself it would have something still more in common with the angels. But, as the form of the body, it belongs to the animal genus, as a formal principle.
6 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si natura animae haberet integram speciem, ita quod secundum se crearetur, ratio illa procederet, ut per se in principio crearetur. Sed quia naturaliter est forma corporis, non fuit seorsum creanda, sed debuit creari in corpore. Et similiter est dicendum ad secundum. Nam anima si per se speciem haberet, magis conveniret cum Angelis. Sed inquantum est forma corporis, pertinet ad genus animalium, ut formale principium.
7 Reply to Objection 3: That the soul remains after the body, is due to a defect of the body, namely, death. Which defect was not due when the soul was first created.
7 Ad tertium dicendum quod animam remanere post corpus, accidit per defectum corporis, qui est mors. Qui quidem defectus in principio creationis animae, esse non debuit.