1 Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures. For Dionysius says Div. Nom. ii): Effects are contingent images of their causes. But God is the cause not only of rational, but also of irrational creatures. Therefore the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures.
1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod imago Dei inveniatur in irrationalibus creaturis. Dicit enim Dionysius, in libro de Div. Nom., habent causata causarum suarum contingentes imagines. Sed Deus est causa non solum rationalium creaturarum, sed etiam irrationalium. Ergo imago Dei invenitur in irrationalibus creaturis.
2 Objection 2: Further, the more distinct a likeness is, the nearer it approaches to the nature of an image. But Dionysius says Div. Nom. iv) that the solar ray has a very great similitude to the Divine goodness. Therefore it is made to the image of God.
2 Praeterea, quanto est expressior similitudo in aliquo, tanto magis accedit ad rationem imaginis. Sed Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod radius solaris maxime habet similitudinem divinae bonitatis. Ergo est ad imaginem Dei.
3 Objection 3: Further, the more perfect anything is in goodness, the more it is like God. But the whole universe is more perfect in goodness than man; for though each individual thing is good, all things together are called very good Gn. 1, 31). Therefore the whole universe is to the image of God, and not only man.
3 Praeterea, quanto aliquid est magis perfectum in bonitate, tanto magis est Deo simile. Sed totum universum est perfectius in bonitate quam homo, quia etsi bona sint singula, tamen simul omnia dicuntur valde bona, Gen. I. Ergo totum universum est ad imaginem Dei, et non solum homo.
4 Objection 4: Further, Boethius De Consol. iii) says of God: Holding the world in His mind, and forming it into His image. Therefore the whole world is to the image of God, and not only the rational creature.
4 Praeterea, Boetius in libro de Consol., dicit de Deo, mundum mente gerens, similique in imagine formans. Ergo totus mundus est ad imaginem Dei, et non solum rationalis creatura.
5 On the contrary, Augustine says Gen. ad lit. vi, 12): Man's excellence consists in the fact that God made him to His own image by giving him an intellectual soul, which raises him above the beasts of the field. Therefore things without intellect are not made to God's image.
5 Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, VI super Gen. ad Litt., hoc excellit in homine, quia Deus ad imaginem suam hominem fecit, propter hoc quod dedit ei mentem intellectualem, qua praestat pecoribus. Ea ergo quae non habent intellectum, non sunt ad imaginem Dei.
6 I answer that, Not every likeness, not even what is copied from something else, is sufficient to make an image; for if the likeness be only generic, or existing by virtue of some common accident, this does not suffice for one thing to be the image of another. For instance, a worm, though from man it may originate, cannot be called man's image, merely because of the generic likeness. Nor, if anything is made white like something else, can we say that it is the image of that thing; for whiteness is an accident belonging to many species. But the nature of an image requires likeness in species; thus the image of the king exists in his son: or, at least, in some specific accident, and chiefly in the shape; thus, we speak of a man's image in copper. Whence Hilary says pointedly that an image is of the same species. Now it is manifest that specific likeness follows the ultimate difference. But some things are like to God first and most commonly because they exist; secondly, because they live; and thirdly because they know or understand; and these last, as Augustine says Questions. 83, qu. 51) approach so near to God in likeness, that among all creatures nothing comes nearer to Him. It is clear, therefore, that intellectual creatures alone, properly speaking, are made to God's image.
6 Respondeo dicendum quod non quaelibet similitudo, etiam si sit expressa ex altero, sufficit ad rationem imaginis. Si enim similitudo sit secundum genus tantum, vel secundum aliquod accidens commune, non propter hoc dicetur aliquid esse ad imaginem alterius, non enim posset dici quod vermis qui oritur ex homine, sit imago hominis propter similitudinem generis; neque iterum potest dici quod, si aliquid fiat album ad similitudinem alterius, quod propter hoc sit ad eius imaginem, quia album est accidens commune pluribus speciebus. Requiritur autem ad rationem imaginis quod sit similitudo secundum speciem, sicut imago regis est in filio suo, vel ad minus secundum aliquod accidens proprium speciei, et praecipue secundum figuram, sicut hominis imago dicitur esse in cupro. Unde signanter Hilarius dicit quod imago est species indifferens. Manifestum est autem quod similitudo speciei attenditur secundum ultimam differentiam. Assimilantur autem aliqua Deo, primo quidem, et maxime communiter, inquantum sunt; secundo vero, inquantum vivunt; tertio vero, inquantum sapiunt vel intelligunt. Quae, ut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest., ita sunt Deo similitudine proxima, ut in creaturis nihil sit propinquius. Sic ergo patet quod solae intellectuales creaturae, proprie loquendo, sunt ad imaginem Dei.
7 Reply to Objection 1: Everything imperfect is a participation of what is perfect. Therefore even what falls short of the nature of an image, so far as it possesses any sort of likeness to God, participates in some degree the nature of an image. So Dionysius says that effects are contingent images of their causes; that is, as much as they happen contingit) to be so, but not absolutely.
7 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omne imperfectum est quaedam participatio perfecti. Et ideo etiam ea quae deficiunt a ratione imaginis, inquantum tamen aliqualem Dei similitudinem habent, participant aliquid de ratione imaginis. Et ideo Dionysius dicit quod causata habent causarum contingentes imagines, idest quantum contingit ea habere, et non simpliciter.
8 Reply to Objection 2: Dionysius compares the solar ray to Divine goodness, as regards its causality; not as regards its natural dignity which is involved in the idea of an image.
8 Ad secundum dicendum quod Dionysius assimilat radium solarem divinae bonitati quantum ad causalitatem; non secundum dignitatem naturae, quae requiritur ad rationem imaginis.
9 Reply to Objection 3: The universe is more perfect in goodness than the intellectual creature as regards extension and diffusion; but intensively and collectively the likeness to the Divine goodness is found rather in the intellectual creature, which has a capacity for the highest good. Or else we may say that a part is not rightly divided against the whole, but only against another part. Wherefore, when we say that the intellectual nature alone is to the image of God, we do not mean that the universe in any part is not to God's image, but that the other parts are excluded.
9 Ad tertium dicendum quod universum est perfectius in bonitate quam intellectualis creatura extensive et diffusive. Sed intensive et collective similitudo divinae perfectionis magis invenitur in intellectuali creatura, quae est capax summi boni. Vel dicendum quod pars non dividitur contra totum, sed contra aliam partem. Unde cum dicitur quod sola natura intellectualis est ad imaginem Dei, non excluditur quin universum, secundum aliquam sui partem, sit ad imaginem Dei; sed excluduntur aliae partes universi.
10 Reply to Objection 4: Boethius here uses the word image to express the likeness which the product of an art bears to the artistic species in the mind of the artist. Thus every creature is an image of the exemplar type thereof in the Divine mind. We are not, however, using the word image in this sense; but as it implies a likeness in nature, that is, inasmuch as all things, as being, are like to the First Being; as living, like to the First Life; and as intelligent, like to the Supreme Wisdom.
10 Ad quartum dicendum quod imago accipitur a Boetio secundum rationem similitudinis qua artificiatum imitatur speciem artis quae est in mente artificis, sic autem quaelibet creatura est imago rationis exemplaris quam habet in mente divina. Sic autem non loquimur nunc de imagine, sed secundum quod attenditur secundum similitudinem in natura; prout scilicet primo enti assimilantur omnia, inquantum sunt entia; et primae vitae inquantum sunt viventia; et summae sapientiae, inquantum sunt intelligentia.