1 Objection 1: It would seem that likeness is not properly distinguished from image. For genus is not properly distinguished from species. Now, likeness is to image as genus to species: because, where there is image, forthwith there is likeness, but not conversely as Augustine says Questions. 83, qu. 74). Therefore likeness is not properly to be distinguished from image.
1 Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod similitudo ab imagine non convenienter distinguatur. Genus enim non convenienter distinguitur a specie. Sed similitudo comparatur ad imaginem, ut genus ad speciem, quia ubi est imago, ibi est continuo similitudo, sed non convertitur, ut dicitur in libro octoginta trium quaest. Ergo inconvenienter similitudo ab imagine distinguitur.
2 Objection 2: Further, the nature of the image consists not only in the representation of the Divine Persons, but also in the representation of the Divine Essence, to which representation belong immortality and indivisibility. So it is not true to say that the likeness is in the essence because it is immortal and indivisible; whereas the image is in other things Sent. ii, D, xvi).
2 Praeterea, ratio imaginis attenditur non solum secundum repraesentationem divinarum personarum, sed etiam secundum repraesentationem divinae essentiae, ad quam repraesentationem pertinet immortalitas et indivisibilitas. Non ergo convenienter dicitur quod similitudo est in essentia, quia est immortalis et indivisibilis; imago autem in aliis.
3 Objection 3: Further, the image of God in man is threefold, the image of nature, of grace, and of glory, as above explained Article 4). But innocence and righteousness belong to grace. Therefore it is incorrectly said Sent. ii, D, xvi) that the image is taken from the memory, the understanding and the will, while the likeness is from innocence and righteousness.
3 Praeterea, imago Dei in homine est triplex, scilicet naturae, gratiae et gloriae, ut supra habitum est. Sed innocentia et iustitia ad gratiam pertinent. Inconvenienter ergo dicitur quod imago accipitur secundum memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem; similitudo autem secundum innocentiam et iustitiam.
4 Objection 4: Further, knowledge of truth belongs to the intellect, and love of virtue to the will; which two things are parts of the image. Therefore it is incorrect to say Sent. ii, D, xvi) that the image consists in the knowledge of truth, and the likeness in the love of virtue.
4 Praeterea, cognitio veritatis ad intelligentiam pertinet, amor autem virtutis ad voluntatem, quae sunt duae partes imaginis. Non ergo convenienter dicitur quod imago sit in cognitione veritatis, similitudo in dilectione virtutis.
5 On the contrary, Augustine says Questions. 83, qu. 51): Some consider that these two were mentioned not without reason, namely image and likeness, since, if they meant the same, one would have sufficed.
5 Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., sunt qui non frustra intelligunt duo dicta esse ad imaginem et similitudinem; cum, si una res esset, unum nomen sufficere potuisset.
6 I answer that, Likeness is a kind of unity, for oneness in quality causes likeness, as the Philosopher says Metaph. v, Did. iv, 15). Now, since one is a transcendental, it is both common to all, and adapted to each single thing, just as the good and the true. Wherefore, as the good can be compared to each individual thing both as its preamble, and as subsequent to it, as signifying some perfection in it, so also in the same way there exists a kind of comparison between likeness and image.
For the good is a preamble to man, inasmuch as man is an individual good; and, again, the good is subsequent to man, inasmuch as we may say of a certain man that he is good, by reason of his perfect virtue. In like manner, likeness may be considered in the light of a preamble to image, inasmuch as it is something more general than image, as we have said above Article 1): and, again, it may be considered as subsequent to image, inasmuch as it signifies a certain perfection of image.
For we say that an image is like or unlike what it represents, according as the representation is perfect or imperfect. Thus likeness may be distinguished from image in two ways: first as its preamble and existing in more things, and in this sense likeness regards things which are more common than the intellectual properties, wherein the image is properly to be seen. In this sense it is stated Questions. 83, qu. 51) that the spirit namely, the mind) without doubt was made to the image of God.
But the other parts of man, belonging to the soul's inferior faculties, or even to the body, are in the opinion of some made to God's likeness. In this sense he says De Quant. Animae ii) that the likeness of God is found in the soul's incorruptibility; for corruptible and incorruptible are differences of universal beings. But likeness may be considered in another way, as signifying the expression and perfection of the image. In this sense Damascene says De Fide Orth.
ii, 12) that the image implies an intelligent being, endowed with free-will and self-movement, whereas likeness implies a likeness of power, as far as this may be possible in man. In the same sense likeness is said to belong to the love of virtue: for there is no virtue without love of virtue.
6 Respondeo dicendum quod similitudo quaedam unitas est, unum enim in qualitate similitudinem causat, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Unum autem, cum sit de transcendentibus, et commune est omnibus, et ad singula potest aptari; sicut et bonum et verum. Unde, sicut bonum alicui rei particulari potest comparari ut praeambulum ad ipsam, et ut subsequens, prout designat aliquam perfectionem ipsius; ita etiam est de comparatione similitudinis ad imaginem. Est enim bonum praeambulum ad hominem, secundum quod homo est quoddam particulare bonum, et rursus bonum subsequitur ad hominem, inquantum aliquem hominem specialiter dicimus esse bonum, propter perfectionem virtutis.
Et similiter similitudo consideratur ut praeambulum ad imaginem, inquantum est communius quam imago, ut supra dictum est, consideratur etiam ut subsequens ad imaginem, inquantum significat quandam imaginis perfectionem; dicimus enim imaginem alicuius esse similem vel non similem ei cuius est imago, inquantum perfecte vel imperfecte repraesentat ipsum. Sic ergo similitudo potest ab imagine distingui dupliciter. Uno modo, prout est praeambula ad ipsam, et in pluribus existens. Et sic similitudo attenditur secundum ea quae sunt communiora proprietatibus naturae intellectualis, secundum quas proprie attenditur imago.
Et secundum hoc dicitur in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod spiritus, idest mens, ad imaginem Dei, nullo dubitante, factus est, cetera autem hominis, scilicet quae pertinent ad inferiores partes animae, vel etiam ad ipsum corpus, ad similitudinem facta esse aliqui volunt. Secundum hoc etiam in libro de quantitate animae dicitur quod similitudo Dei attenditur in anima, inquantum est incorruptibilis, nam corruptibile et incorruptibile sunt differentiae entis communis. Alio modo potest considerari similitudo, secundum quod significat imaginis expressionem et perfectionem. Et secundum hoc Damascenus dicit quod id quod est secundum imaginem, intellectuale significat, et arbitrio liberum per se potestativum, quod autem secundum similitudinem, virtutis, secundum quod homini possibile est inesse, similitudinem. Et ad idem refertur quod similitudo dicitur ad dilectionem virtutis pertinere, non enim est virtus sine dilectione virtutis.
7 Reply to Objection 1: Likeness is not distinct from image in the general notion of likeness for thus it is included in image); but so far as any likeness falls short of image, or again, as it perfects the idea of image.
7 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod similitudo non distinguitur ab imagine secundum communem rationem similitudinis sic enim includitur in ratione ipsius imaginis), sed secundum quod aliqua similitudo deficit a ratione imaginis, vel etiam est imaginis perfectiva.
8 Reply to Objection 2: The soul's essence belongs to the image, as representing the Divine Essence in those things which belong to the intellectual nature; but not in those conditions subsequent to general notions of being, such as simplicity and indissolubility.
8 Ad secundum dicendum quod essentia animae pertinet ad imaginem, prout repraesentat divinam essentiam secundum ea quae sunt propria intellectualis naturae, non autem secundum conditiones consequentes ens in communi, ut est esse simplicem et indissolubilem.
9 Reply to Objection 3: Even certain virtues are natural to the soul, at least, in their seeds, by reason of which we may say that a natural likeness exists in the soul. Nor it is unfitting to us the term image from one point of view and from another the term likeness.
9 Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam virtutes quaedam naturaliter insunt animae, ad minus secundum quaedam earum semina, et secundum has posset attendi similitudo naturalis. Quamvis non sit inconveniens ut id quod secundum assignationem unam dicitur imago, secundum aliam dicatur similitudo.
10 Reply to Objection 4: Love of the word, which is knowledge loved, belongs to the nature of image; but love of virtue belongs to likeness, as virtue itself belongs to likeness.
10 Ad quartum dicendum quod dilectio verbi, quod est amata notitia, pertinet ad rationem imaginis, sed dilectio virtutis pertinet ad similitudinem, sicut et virtus.