1 Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence all would have been equal. For Gregory says Moral. xxi): Where there is no sin, there is no inequality. But in the state of innocence there was no sin. Therefore all were equal.
1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod homines in statu innocentiae omnes fuissent aequales. Dicit enim Gregorius quod, ubi non delinquimus, omnes pares sumus. Sed in statu innocentiae non erat delictum. Ergo omnes erant pares.
2 Objection 2: Further, likeness and equality are the basis of mutual love, according to Ecclus. 13, 19, Every beast loveth its like; so also every man him that is nearest to himself. Now in that state there was among men an abundance of love, which is the bond of peace. Therefore all were equal in the state of innocence.
2 Praeterea, similitudo et aequalitas est ratio mutuae dilectionis; secundum illud Eccli. XIII, omne animal diligit sibi simile, sic et omnis homo proximum sibi. In illo autem statu inter homines abundabat dilectio, quae est vinculum pacis. Ergo omnes fuissent pares in statu innocentiae.
3 Objection 3: Further, the cause ceasing, the effect also ceases. But the cause of present inequality among men seems to arise, on the part of God, from the fact that He rewards some and punishes others; and on the part of nature, from the fact that some, through a defect of nature, are born weak and deficient, others strong and perfect, which would not have been the case in the primitive state. Therefore, etc.
3 Praeterea, cessante causa, cessat effectus. Sed causa inaequalitatis inter homines videtur nunc esse, ex parte quidem Dei, quod quosdam pro meritis praemiat, quosdam vero punit, ex parte vero naturae, quia propter naturae defectum quidam nascuntur debiles et orbati, quidam autem fortes et perfecti. Quae in primo statu non fuissent.
4 On the contrary, It is written Rm. 13, 1): The things which are of God, are well ordered Vulg. Those that are, are ordained of God). But order chiefly consists in inequality; for Augustine says De Civ. Dei xix, 13): Order disposes things equal and unequal in their proper place. Therefore in the primitive state, which was most proper and orderly, inequality would have existed.
4 Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom. XIII, quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt. Ordo autem maxime videtur in disparitate consistere, dicit enim Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio. Ergo in primo statu, qui decentissimus fuisset, disparitas inveniretur.
5 I answer that, We must needs admit that in the primitive state there would have been some inequality, at least as regards sex, because generation depends upon diversity of sex: and likewise as regards age; for some would have been born of others; nor would sexual union have been sterile. Moreover, as regards the soul, there would have been inequality as to righteousness and knowledge. For man worked not of necessity, but of his own free-will, by virtue of which man can apply himself, more or less, to action, desire, or knowledge; hence some would have made a greater advance in virtue and knowledge than others. There might also have been bodily disparity. For the human body was not entirely exempt from the laws of nature, so as not to receive from exterior sources more or less advantage and help: since indeed it was dependent on food wherewith to sustain life. So we may say that, according to the climate, or the movement of the stars, some would have been born more robust in body than others, and also greater, and more beautiful, and all ways better disposed; so that, however, in those who were thus surpassed, there would have been no defect or fault either in soul or body.
5 Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere aliquam disparitatem in primo statu fuisse, ad minus quantum ad sexum, quia sine diversitate sexus, generatio non fuisset. Similiter etiam quantum ad aetatem, sic enim quidam ex aliis nascebantur; nec illi qui miscebantur, steriles erant. Sed et secundum animam diversitas fuisset, et quantum ad iustitiam et quantum ad scientiam. Non enim ex necessitate homo operabatur, sed per liberum arbitrium; ex quo homo habet quod possit magis et minus animum applicare ad aliquid faciendum vel volendum vel cognoscendum. Unde quidam magis profecissent in iustitia et scientia quam alii. Ex parte etiam corporis, poterat esse disparitas. Non enim erat exemptum corpus humanum totaliter a legibus naturae, quin ex exterioribus agentibus aliquod commodum aut auxilium reciperet magis et minus, cum etiam et cibis eorum vita sustentaretur. Et sic nihil prohibet dicere quin secundum diversam dispositionem aeris et diversum situm stellarum, aliqui robustiores corpore generarentur quam alii, et maiores et pulchriores et melius complexionati. Ita tamen quod in illis qui excederentur, nullus esset defectus sive peccatum, sive circa animam sive circa corpus.
6 Reply to Objection 1: By those words Gregory means to exclude such inequality as exists between virtue and vice; the result of which is that some are placed in subjection to others as a penalty.
6 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Gregorius per verba illa intendit excludere disparitatem quae est secundum differentiam iustitiae et peccati; ex qua contingit quod aliqui poenaliter sunt sub aliis coercendi.
7 Reply to Objection 2: Equality is the cause of equality in mutual love. Yet between those who are unequal there can be a greater love than between equals; although there be not an equal response: for a father naturally loves his son more than a brother loves his brother; although the son does not love his father as much as he is loved by him.
7 Ad secundum dicendum quod aequalitas est causa quod dilectio mutua sit aequalis. Sed tamen inter inaequales potest esse maior dilectio quam inter aequales, licet non aequaliter utrinque respondeat. Pater enim plus diligit filium naturaliter, quam frater fratrem; licet filius non tantundem diligat patrem, sicut ab eo diligitur.
8 Reply to Objection 3: The cause of inequality could be on the part of God; not indeed that He would punish some and reward others, but that He would exalt some above others; so that the beauty of order would the more shine forth among men. Inequality might also arise on the part of nature as above described, without any defect of nature.
8 Ad tertium dicendum quod causa disparitatis poterat esse et ex parte Dei, non quidem ut puniret quosdam et quosdam praemiaret; sed ut quosdam plus, quosdam minus sublimaret, ut pulchritudo ordinis magis in hominibus reluceret. Et etiam ex parte naturae poterat disparitas causari secundum praedictum modum, absque aliquo defectu naturae.