1 Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man was passible. For sensation is a kind of passion. But in the state of innocence man would have been sensitive. Therefore he would have been passible.
1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo in statu innocentiae fuisset passibilis. Sentire enim est pati quoddam. Sed homo in statu innocentiae fuisset sensibilis. Ergo fuisset passibilis.
2 Objection 2: Further, sleep is a kind of passion. Now, man slept in the state of innocence, according to Gn. 2, 21, God cast a deep sleep upon Adam. Therefore he would have been passible.
2 Praeterea, somnus passio quaedam est. Sed homo in statu innocentiae dormivisset; secundum illud Gen. II, immisit Deus soporem in Adam. Ergo fuisset passibilis.
3 Objection 3: Further, the same passage goes on to say that He took a rib out of Adam. Therefore he was passible even to the degree of the cutting out of part of his body.
3 Praeterea, ibidem subditur quod tulit unam de costis eius. Ergo fuisset passibilis etiam per abscissionem partis.
4 Objection 4: Further, man's body was soft. But a soft body is naturally passible as regards a hard body; therefore if a hard body had come in contact with the soft body of the first man, the latter would have suffered from the impact. Therefore the first man was passible.
4 Praeterea, corpus hominis molle fuit. Sed molle naturaliter passivum est a duro. Ergo si corpori primi hominis obvium fuisset aliquod corpus durum, ab eo passum fuisset. Et sic primus homo fuit passibilis.
5 On the contrary, Had man been passible, he would have been also corruptible, because, as the Philosopher says Top. vi, 3): Excessive suffering wastes the very substance.
5 Sed contra est quia, si fuit passibilis, fuit etiam corruptibilis, quia passio, magis facta, abiicit a substantia.
6 I answer that, Passion may be taken in two senses. First, in its proper sense, and thus a thing is said to suffer when changed from its natural disposition. For passion is the effect of action; and in nature contraries are mutually active or passive, according as one thing changes another from its natural disposition. Secondly, passion can be taken in a general sense for any kind of change, even if belonging to the perfecting process of nature. Thus understanding and sensation are said to be passions. In this second sense, man was passible in the state of innocence, and was passive both in soul and body. In the first sense, man was impassible, both in soul and body, as he was likewise immortal; for he could curb his passion, as he could avoid death, so long as he refrained from sin. Thus it is clear how to reply to the first two objections; since sensation and sleep do not remove from man his natural disposition, but are ordered to his natural welfare.
6 Respondeo dicendum quod passio dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, proprie, et sic pati dicitur quod a sua naturali dispositione removetur. Passio enim est effectus actionis, in rebus autem naturalibus contraria agunt et patiuntur ad invicem, quorum unum removet alterum a sua naturali dispositione. Alio modo, dicitur passio communiter, secundum quamcumque mutationem, etiam si pertineat ad perfectionem naturae; sicut intelligere vel sentire dicitur pati quoddam. Hoc igitur secundo modo, homo in statu innocentiae passibilis erat, et patiebatur, et secundum animam et secundum corpus. Primo autem modo dicta passione, erat impassibilis et secundum animam et secundum corpus, sicut et immortalis, poterat enim passionem prohibere, sicut et mortem, si absque peccato perstitisset. Et per hoc patet responsio ad duo prima. Nam sentire et dormire non removent hominem a naturali dispositione, sed ad bonum naturae ordinantur.
7 Reply to Objection 3: As already explained Question 92, Article 3, ad 2), the rib was in Adam as the principle of the human race, as the semen in man, who is a principle through generation. Hence as man does not suffer any natural deterioration by seminal issue; so neither did he through the separation of the rib.
7 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, costa illa fuit in Adam, inquantum erat principium humani generis; sicut semen est in homine, inquantum est principium per generationem. Sicut igitur decisio seminis non est cum passione quae removeat hominem a naturali dispositione, ita etiam est dicendum de separatione illius costae.
8 Reply to Objection 4: Man's body in the state of innocence could be preserved from suffering injury from a hard body; partly by the use of his reason, whereby he could avoid what was harmful; and partly also by Divine Providence, so preserving him, that nothing of a harmful nature could come upon him unawares.
8 Ad quartum dicendum quod corpus hominis in statu innocentiae poterat praeservari ne pateretur laesionem ab aliquo duro, partim quidem per propriam rationem, per quam poterat nociva vitare; partim etiam per divinam providentiam, quae sic ipsum tuebatur, ut nihil ei occurreret ex improviso, a quo laederetur.