1 Objection 1: It would seem that creatures do not need to be kept in being by God. For what cannot not-be, does not need to be kept in being; just as that which cannot depart, does not need to be kept from departing. But some creatures by their very nature cannot not-be. Therefore not all creatures need to be kept in being by God. The middle proposition is proved thus. That which is included in the nature of a thing is necessarily in that thing, and its contrary cannot be in it; thus a multiple of two must necessarily be even, and cannot possibly be an odd number. Now form brings being with itself, because everything is actually in being, so far as it has form. But some creatures are subsistent forms, as we have said of the angels Question 50, Articles 2, 5): and thus to be is in them of themselves. The same reasoning applies to those creatures whose matter is in potentiality to one form only, as above explained of heavenly bodies Question 66, Article 2). Therefore such creatures as these have in their nature to be necessarily, and cannot not-be; for there can be no potentiality to not-being, either in the form which has being of itself, or in matter existing under a form which it cannot lose, since it is not in potentiality to any other form.
1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod creaturae non indigeant ut a Deo conserventur in esse. Quod enim non potest non esse, non indiget ut conservetur in esse, sicut quod non potest abscedere, non indiget ut conservetur ne abscedat. Sed quaedam creaturae sunt quae secundum sui naturam non possunt non esse. Ergo non omnes creaturae indigent ut a Deo conserventur in esse. Probatio mediae. Quod per se inest alicui, necesse est ei inesse, et oppositum eius impossibile est ei inesse, sicut necessarium est binarium esse parem, et impossibile est eum esse imparem. Esse autem per se consequitur ad formam, quia unumquodque secundum hoc est ens actu, quod habet formam. Quaedam autem creaturae sunt, quae sunt formae quaedam subsistentes, sicut de Angelis dictum est; et sic per se inest eis esse. Et eadem ratio est de illis quorum materia non est in potentia nisi ad unam formam, sicut supra dictum est de corporibus caelestibus. Huiusmodi ergo creaturae secundum suam naturam ex necessitate sunt, et non possunt non esse, potentia enim ad non esse non potest fundari neque in forma, quam per se sequitur esse; neque in materia existente sub forma quam non potest amittere, cum non sit in potentia ad aliam formam.
2 Objection 2: Further, God is more powerful than any created agent. But a created agent, even after ceasing to act, can cause its effect to be preserved in being; thus the house continues to stand after the builder has ceased to build; and water remains hot for some time after the fire has ceased to heat. Much more, therefore, can God cause His creature to be kept in being, after He has ceased to create it.
2 Praeterea, Deus est potentior quolibet creato agente. Sed aliquod creatum agens potest communicare suo effectui ut conservetur in esse, etiam eius operatione cessante, sicut cessante actione aedificatoris, remanet domus; et cessante actione ignis, remanet aqua calefacta per aliquod tempus. Ergo multo magis Deus potest suae creaturae conferre quod conservetur in esse, sua operatione cessante.
3 Objection 3: Further, nothing violent can occur, except there be some active cause thereof. But tendency to not-being is unnatural and violent to any creature, since all creatures naturally desire to be. Therefore no creature can tend to not-being, except through some active cause of corruption. Now there are creatures of such a nature that nothing can cause them to corrupt; such are spiritual substances and heavenly bodies. Therefore such creatures cannot tend to not-being, even if God were to withdraw His action.
3 Praeterea, nullum violentum potest contingere absque aliqua causa agente. Sed tendere ad non esse est innaturale et violentum cuilibet creaturae, quia quaelibet creatura naturaliter appetit esse. Ergo nulla creatura potest tendere in non esse, nisi aliquo agente ad corruptionem. Sed quaedam sunt ad quorum corruptionem nihil agere potest; sicut spirituales substantiae, et corpora caelestia. Ergo huiusmodi creaturae non possunt tendere in non esse, etiam Dei operatione cessante.
4 Objection 4: Further, if God keeps creatures in being, this is done by some action. Now every action of an agent, if that action be efficacious, produces something in the effect. Therefore the preserving power of God must produce something in the creature. But this is not so; because this action does not give being to the creature, since being is not given to that which already is: nor does it add anything new to the creature; because either God would not keep the creature in being continually, or He would be continually adding something new to the creature; either of which is unreasonable. Therefore creatures are not kept in being by God.
4 Praeterea, si Deus conservat res in esse, hoc erit per aliquam actionem. Per quamlibet autem actionem agentis, si sit efficax, aliquid fit in effectu. Oportet igitur quod per actionem Dei conservantis aliquid fiat in creatura. Sed hoc non videtur. Non enim per huiusmodi actionem fit ipsum esse creaturae, quia quod iam est, non fit. Neque iterum aliquid aliud superadditum, quia vel non continue Deus conservaret creaturam in esse, vel continue aliquid adderetur creaturae, quod est inconveniens. Non igitur creaturae conservantur in esse a Deo.
5 On the contrary, It is written Heb. 1, 3): Upholding all things by the word of His power.
5 Sed contra est quod dicitur Heb. I, portans omnia verbo virtutis suae.
6 I answer that, Both reason and faith bind us to say that creatures are kept in being by God. To make this clear, we must consider that a thing is preserved by another in two ways. First, indirectly, and accidentally; thus a person is said to preserve anything by removing the cause of its corruption, as a man may be said to preserve a child, whom he guards from falling into the fire. In this way God preserves some things, but not all, for there are some things of such a nature that nothing can corrupt them, so that it is not necessary to keep them from corruption.
Secondly, a thing is said to preserve another per se' and directly, namely, when what is preserved depends on the preserver in such a way that it cannot exist without it. In this manner all creatures need to be preserved by God. For the being of every creature depends on God, so that not for a moment could it subsist, but would fall into nothingness were it not kept in being by the operation of the Divine power, as Gregory says Moral.
xvi). This is made clear as follows: Every effect depends on its cause, so far as it is its cause. But we must observe that an agent may be the cause of the becoming of its effect, but not directly of its being. This may be seen both in artificial and in natural beings: for the builder causes the house in its becoming, but he is not the direct cause of its being. For it is clear that the being of the house is a result of its form, which consists in the putting together and arrangement of the materials, and results from the natural qualities of certain things.
Thus a cook dresses the food by applying the natural activity of fire; thus a builder constructs a house, by making use of cement, stones, and wood which are able to be put together in a certain order and to preserve it. Therefore the being of a house depends on the nature of these materials, just as its becoming depends on the action of the builder. The same principle applies to natural things. For if an agent is not the cause of a form as such, neither will it be directly the cause of being which results from that form; but it will be the cause of the effect, in its becoming only.
Now it is clear that of two things in the same species one cannot directly cause the other's form as such, since it would then be the cause of its own form, which is essentially the same as the form of the other; but it can be the cause of this form for as much as it is in matter, in other words, it may be the cause that this matter receives this form. And this is to be the cause of becoming, as when man begets man, and fire causes fire.
Thus whenever a natural effect is such that it has an aptitude to receive from its active cause an impression specifically the same as in that active cause, then the becoming of the effect, but not its being, depends on the agent. Sometimes, however, the effect has not this aptitude to receive the impression of its cause, in the same way as it exists in the agent: as may be seen clearly in all agents which do not produce an effect of the same species as themselves: thus the heavenly bodies cause the generation of inferior bodies which differ from them in species.
Such an agent can be the cause of a form as such, and not merely as existing in this matter, consequently it is not merely the cause of becoming but also the cause of being. Therefore as the becoming of a thing cannot continue when that action of the agent ceases which causes the becoming of the effect: so neither can the being of a thing continue after that action of the agent has ceased, which is the cause of the effect not only in becoming but also in being.
This is why hot water retains heat after the cessation of the fire's action; while, on the contrary, the air does not continue to be lit up, even for a moment, when the sun ceases to act upon it, because water is a matter susceptive of the fire's heat in the same way as it exists in the fire. Wherefore if it were to be reduced to the perfect form of fire, it would retain that form always; whereas if it has the form of fire imperfectly and inchoately, the heat will remain for a time only, by reason of the imperfect participation of the principle of heat.
On the other hand, air is not of such a nature as to receive light in the same way as it exists in the sun, which is the principle of light. Therefore, since it has not root in the air, the light ceases with the action of the sun. Now every creature may be compared to God, as the air is to the sun which enlightens it. For as the sun possesses light by its nature, and as the air is enlightened by sharing the sun's nature; so God alone is Being in virtue of His own Essence, since His Essence is His existence; whereas every creature has being by participation, so that its essence is not its existence.
Therefore, as Augustine says Gen. ad lit. iv, 12): If the ruling power of God were withdrawn from His creatures, their nature would at once cease, and all nature would collapse. In the same work Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) he says: As the air becomes light by the presence of the sun, so is man enlightened by the presence of God, and in His absence returns at once to darkness.
6 Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere, et secundum fidem et secundum rationem, quod creaturae conservantur in esse a Deo. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod aliquid conservatur ab altero dupliciter. Uno modo, indirecte et per accidens, sicut ille dicitur rem conservare, qui removet corrumpens; puta si aliquis puerum custodiat ne cadat in ignem, dicitur eum conservare. Et sic etiam Deus dicitur aliqua conservare, sed non omnia, quia quaedam sunt quae non habent corrumpentia, quae necesse sit removere ad rei conservationem.
Alio modo dicitur aliquid rem aliquam conservare per se et directe, inquantum scilicet illud quod conservatur, dependet a conservante, ut sine eo esse non possit. Et hoc modo omnes creaturae indigent divina conservatione. Dependet enim esse cuiuslibet creaturae a Deo, ita quod nec ad momentum subsistere possent, sed in nihilum redigerentur, nisi operatione divinae virtutis conservarentur in esse, sicut Gregorius dicit. Et hoc sic perspici potest. Omnis enim effectus dependet a sua causa, secundum quod est causa eius. Sed considerandum est quod aliquod agens est causa sui effectus secundum fieri tantum, et non directe secundum esse eius.
Quod quidem contingit et in artificialibus, et in rebus naturalibus. Aedificator enim est causa domus quantum ad eius fieri, non autem directe quantum ad esse eius. Manifestum est enim quod esse domus consequitur formam eius, forma autem domus est compositio et ordo, quae quidem forma consequitur naturalem virtutem quarundam rerum. Sicut enim coquus coquit cibum adhibendo aliquam virtutem naturalem activam, scilicet ignis; ita aedificator facit domum adhibendo caementum, lapides et ligna, quae sunt susceptiva et conservativa talis compositionis et ordinis.
Unde esse domus dependet ex naturis harum rerum, sicut fieri domus dependet ex actione aedificatoris. Et simili ratione est considerandum in rebus naturalibus. Quia si aliquod agens non est causa formae inquantum huiusmodi, non erit per se causa esse quod consequitur ad talem formam, sed erit causa effectus secundum fieri tantum. Manifestum est autem quod, si aliqua duo sunt eiusdem speciei, unum non potest esse per se causa formae alterius, inquantum est talis forma, quia sic esset causa formae propriae, cum sit eadem ratio utriusque.
Sed potest esse causa huiusmodi formae secundum quod est in materia, idest quod haec materia acquirat hanc formam. Et hoc est esse causa secundum fieri; sicut cum homo generat hominem, et ignis ignem. Et ideo quandocumque naturalis effectus est natus impressionem agentis recipere secundum eandem rationem secundum quam est in agente, tunc fieri effectus dependet ab agente, non autem esse ipsius. Sed aliquando effectus non est natus recipere impressionem agentis secundum eandem rationem secundum quam est in agente, sicut patet in omnibus agentibus quae non agunt simile secundum speciem; sicut caelestia corpora sunt causa generationis inferiorum corporum dissimilium secundum speciem.
Et tale agens potest esse causa formae secundum rationem talis formae, et non solum secundum quod acquiritur in hac materia, et ideo est causa non solum fiendi, sed essendi. Sicut igitur fieri rei non potest remanere, cessante actione agentis quod est causa effectus secundum fieri; ita nec esse rei potest remanere, cessante actione agentis quod est causa effectus non solum secundum fieri, sed etiam secundum esse. Et haec est ratio quare aqua calefacta retinet calorem, cessante actione ignis; non autem remanet aer illuminatus, nec ad momentum, cessante actione solis.
Quia scilicet materia aquae susceptiva est caloris ignis secundum eandem rationem qua est in igne, unde si perfecte perducatur ad formam ignis, retinebit calorem semper; si autem imperfecte participet aliquid de forma ignis secundum quandam inchoationem, calor non semper remanebit, sed ad tempus, propter debilem participationem principii caloris. Aer autem nullo modo natus est recipere lumen secundum eandem rationem secundum quam est in sole, ut scilicet recipiat formam solis, quae est principium luminis, et ideo, quia non habet radicem in aere, statim cessat lumen, cessante actione solis.
Sic autem se habet omnis creatura ad Deum, sicut aer ad solem illuminantem. Sicut enim sol est lucens per suam naturam, aer autem fit luminosus participando lumen a sole, non tamen participando naturam solis; ita solus Deus est ens per essentiam suam, quia eius essentia est suum esse; omnis autem creatura est ens participative, non quod sua essentia sit eius esse. Et ideo, ut Augustinus dicit IV super Gen. ad Litt., virtus Dei ab eis quae creata sunt regendis si cessaret aliquando, simul et illorum cessaret species, omnisque natura concideret.
Et in VIII eiusdem libri dicit quod, sicut aer praesente lumine fit lucidus, sic homo, Deo sibi praesente, illuminatur, absente autem, continuo tenebratur.
7 Reply to Objection 1: Being naturally results from the form of a creature, given the influence of the Divine action; just as light results from the diaphanous nature of the air, given the action of the sun. Wherefore the potentiality to not-being in spiritual creatures and heavenly bodies is rather something in God, Who can withdraw His influence, than in the form or matter of those creatures.
7 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod esse per se consequitur formam creaturae, supposito tamen influxu Dei, sicut lumen sequitur diaphanum aeris, supposito influxu solis. Unde potentia ad non esse in spiritualibus creaturis et corporibus caelestibus, magis est in Deo, qui potest subtrahere suum influxum, quam in forma vel in materia talium creaturarum.
8 Reply to Objection 2: God cannot grant to a creature to be preserved in being after the cessation of the Divine influence: as neither can He make it not to have received its being from Himself. For the creature needs to be preserved by God in so far as the being of an effect depends on the cause of its being. So that there is no comparison with an agent that is not the cause of being' but only of becoming.
8 Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus non potest communicare alicui creaturae ut conservetur in esse, sua operatione cessante; sicut non potest ei communicare quod non sit causa esse illius. Intantum enim indiget creatura conservari a Deo, inquantum esse effectus dependet a causa essendi. Unde non est simile de agente quod non est causa essendi, sed fieri tantum.
9 Reply to Objection 3: This argument holds in regard to that preservation which consists in the removal of corruption: but all creatures do not need to be preserved thus, as stated above.
9 Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de conservatione quae est per remotionem corrumpentis; qua non indigent omnes creaturae, ut dictum est.
10 Reply to Objection 4: The preservation of things by God is a continuation of that action whereby He gives existence, which action is without either motion or time; so also the preservation of light in the air is by the continual influence of the sun.
10 Ad quartum dicendum quod conservatio rerum a Deo non est per aliquam novam actionem; sed per continuationem actionis qua dat esse, quae quidem actio est sine motu et tempore. Sicut etiam conservatio luminis in aere est per continuatum influxum a sole.