1 Objection 1: It seems that all things are subject to fate. For Boethius says De Consol. iv): The chain of fate moves the heaven and the stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them by a reciprocal transformation. By fate all things that are born into the world and perish are renewed in a uniform progression of offspring and seed. Nothing therefore seems to be excluded from the domain of fate.
1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnia fato subdantur. Dicit enim Boetius, in IV de Consol., series fati caelum et sidera movet, elementa in se invicem temperat, et alterna format transmutatione; eadem nascentia occidentiaque omnia per similes foetuum seminumque renovat progressus; haec actus fortunasque hominum indissolubili causarum connexione constringit. Nihil ergo excipi videtur, quod sub fati serie non contineatur.
2 Objection 2: Further, Augustine says De Civ. Dei v, 1) that fate is something real, as referred to the Divine will and power. But the Divine will is cause of all things that happen, as Augustine says De Trin. iii, 1 seqq.). Therefore all things are subject to fate.
2 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in V de Civ. Dei, quod fatum aliquid est, secundum quod ad voluntatem et potestatem Dei refertur. Sed voluntas Dei est causa omnium quae fiunt, ut Augustinus dicit in III de Trin. Ergo omnia subduntur fato.
3 Objection 3: Further, Boethius says De Consol. iv) that fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things. But all creatures are changeable, and God alone is truly unchangeable, as stated above Question 9, Article 2). Therefore fate is in all things.
3 Praeterea, fatum, secundum Boetium, est dispositio rebus mobilibus inhaerens. Sed omnes creaturae sunt mutabiles, et solus Deus vere immutabilis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo in omnibus creaturis est fatum.
4 On the contrary, Boethius says De Consol. iv) that some things subject to Providence are above the ordering of fate.
4 Sed contra est quod Boetius dicit, in IV de Consol., quod quaedam quae sub providentia locata sunt, fati seriem superant.
5 I answer that, As stated above Article 2), fate is the ordering of second causes to effects foreseen by God. Whatever, therefore, is subject to second causes, is subject also to fate. But whatever is done immediately by God, since it is not subject to second causes, neither is it subject to fate; such are creation, the glorification of spiritual substances, and the like. And this is what Boethius says De Consol. iv): viz. that those things which are nigh to God have a state of immobility, and exceed the changeable order of fate. Hence it is clear that the further a thing is from the First Mind, the more it is involved in the chain of fate; since so much the more it is bound up with second causes.
5 Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, fatum est ordinatio secundarum causarum ad effectus divinitus provisos. Quaecumque igitur causis secundis subduntur, ea subduntur et fato. Si qua vero sunt quae immediate a Deo fiunt, cum non subdantur secundis causis, non subduntur fato; sicut creatio rerum, glorificatio spiritualium substantiarum, et alia huiusmodi. Et hoc est quod Boetius dicit, quod ea quae sunt primae divinitati propinqua, stabiliter fixa, fatalis ordinem mobilitatis excedunt. Ex quo etiam patet quod quanto aliquid longius a prima mente discedit, nexibus fati maioribus implicatur; quia magis subiicitur necessitati secundarum causarum.
6 Reply to Objection 1: All the things mentioned in this passage are done by God by means of second causes; for this reason they are contained in the order of fate. But it is not the same with everything else, as stated above.
6 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnia illa quae ibi tanguntur, fiunt a Deo mediantibus causis secundis; et ideo sub fati serie continentur. Sed non est eadem ratio de omnibus aliis, ut supra dictum est.
7 Reply to Objection 2: Fate is to be referred to the Divine will and power, as to its first principle. Consequently it does not follow that whatever is subject to the Divine will or power, is subject also to fate, as already stated.
7 Ad secundum dicendum quod fatum refertur ad voluntatem et potestatem Dei, sicut ad primum principium. Unde non oportet quod quidquid subiicitur voluntati divinae vel potestati, subiiciatur fato, ut dictum est.
8 Reply to Objection 3: Although all creatures are in some way changeable, yet some of them do not proceed from changeable created causes. And these, therefore, are not subject to fate, as stated above.
8 Ad tertium dicendum quod, quamvis omnes creaturae sint aliquo modo mutabiles, tamen aliquae earum non procedunt a causis creatis mutabilibus. Et ideo non subiiciuntur fato, ut dictum est.