1 Objection 1: It seems that these names applied to God are synonymous names. For synonymous names are those which mean exactly the same. But these names applied to God mean entirely the same thing in God; for the goodness of God is His essence, and likewise it is His wisdom. Therefore these names are entirely synonymous.
1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ista nomina dicta de Deo, sint nomina synonyma. Synonyma enim nomina dicuntur, quae omnino idem significant. Sed ista nomina dicta de Deo, omnino idem significant in Deo, quia bonitas Dei est eius essentia, et similiter sapientia. Ergo ista nomina sunt omnino synonyma.
2 Objection 2: Further, if it be said these names signify one and the same thing in reality, but differ in idea, it can be objected that an idea to which no reality corresponds is a vain notion. Therefore if these ideas are many, and the thing is one, it seems also that all these ideas are vain notions.
2 Si dicatur quod ista nomina significant idem secundum rem, sed secundum rationes diversas, contra, ratio cui non respondet aliquid in re, est vana; si ergo istae rationes sunt multae, et res est una, videtur quod rationes istae sint vanae.
3 Objection 3: Further, a thing which is one in reality and in idea, is more one than what is one in reality and many in idea. But God is supremely one. Therefore it seems that He is not one in reality and many in idea; and thus the names applied to God do not signify different ideas; and thus they are synonymous.
3 Praeterea, magis est unum quod est unum re et ratione, quam quod est unum re et multiplex ratione. Sed Deus est maxime unus. Ergo videtur quod non sit unus re et multiplex ratione. Et sic nomina dicta de Deo non significant rationes diversas, et ita sunt synonyma.
4 On the contrary, All synonyms united with each other are redundant, as when we say, vesture clothing. Therefore if all names applied to God are synonymous, we cannot properly say good God or the like, and yet it is written, O most mighty, great and powerful, the Lord of hosts is Thy name Jer. 32, 18).
4 Sed contra, omnia synonyma, sibi invicem adiuncta, nugationem adducunt, sicut si dicatur vestis indumentum. Si igitur omnia nomina dicta de Deo sunt synonyma, non posset convenienter dici Deus bonus, vel aliquid huiusmodi; cum tamen scriptum sit Ierem. XXXII, fortissime, magne, potens, dominus exercituum nomen tibi.
5 I answer that, These names spoken of God are not synonymous. This would be easy to understand, if we said that these names are used to remove, or to express the relation of cause to creatures; for thus it would follow that there are different ideas as regards the diverse things denied of God, or as regards diverse effects connoted. But even according to what was said above Article 2), that these names signify the divine substance, although in an imperfect manner, it is also clear from what has been said Articles 1, 2) that they have diverse meanings.
For the idea signified by the name is the conception in the intellect of the thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since it knows God from creatures, in order to understand God, forms conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from God to creatures, which perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and simply, whereas in creatures they are received and divided and multiplied. As therefore, to the different perfections of creatures, there corresponds one simple principle represented by different perfections of creatures in a various and manifold manner, so also to the various and multiplied conceptions of our intellect, there corresponds one altogether simple principle, according to these conceptions, imperfectly understood.
Therefore although the names applied to God signify one thing, still because they signify that under many and different aspects, they are not synonymous. Thus appears the solution of the First Objection, since synonymous terms signify one thing under one aspect; for words which signify different aspects of one things, do not signify primarily and absolutely one thing; because the term only signifies the thing through the medium of the intellectual conception, as was said above.
5 Respondeo dicendum quod huiusmodi nomina dicta de Deo, non sunt synonyma. Quod quidem facile esset videre, si diceremus quod huiusmodi nomina sunt inducta ad removendum, vel ad designandum habitudinem causae respectu creaturarum, sic enim essent diversae rationes horum nominum secundum diversa negata, vel secundum diversos effectus connotatos. Sed secundum quod dictum est huiusmodi nomina substantiam divinam significare, licet imperfecte, etiam plane apparet, secundum praemissa, quod habent rationes diversas. Ratio enim quam significat nomen, est conceptio intellectus de re significata per nomen. Intellectus autem noster, cum cognoscat Deum ex creaturis, format ad intelligendum Deum conceptiones proportionatas perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturas. Quae quidem perfectiones in Deo praeexistunt unite et simpliciter, in creaturis vero recipiuntur divise et multipliciter. Sicut igitur diversis perfectionibus creaturarum respondet unum simplex principium, repraesentatum per diversas perfectiones creaturarum varie et multipliciter; ita variis et multiplicibus conceptibus intellectus nostri respondet unum omnino simplex, secundum huiusmodi conceptiones imperfecte intellectum. Et ideo nomina Deo attributa, licet significent unam rem, tamen, quia significant eam sub rationibus multis et diversis, non sunt synonyma. Et sic patet solutio ad primum, quia nomina synonyma dicuntur, quae significant unum secundum unam rationem. Quae enim significant rationes diversas unius rei, non primo et per se unum significant, quia nomen non significat rem, nisi mediante conceptione intellectus, ut dictum est.
6 Reply to Objection 2: The many aspects of these names are not empty and vain, for there corresponds to all of them one simple reality represented by them in a manifold and imperfect manner.
6 Ad secundum dicendum quod rationes plures horum nominum non sunt cassae et vanae, quia omnibus eis respondet unum quid simplex, per omnia huiusmodi multipliciter et imperfecte repraesentatum.
7 Reply to Objection 3: The perfect unity of God requires that what are manifold and divided in others should exist in Him simply and unitedly. Thus it comes about that He is one in reality, and yet multiple in idea, because our intellect apprehends Him in a manifold manner, as things represent Him.
7 Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc ipsum ad perfectam Dei unitatem pertinet, quod ea quae sunt multipliciter et divisim in aliis, in ipso sunt simpliciter et unite. Et ex hoc contingit quod est unus re et plures secundum rationem, quia intellectus noster ita multipliciter apprehendit eum, sicut res multipliciter ipsum repraesentant.