1 Objection 1: It seems that ideas are not many. For an idea in God is His essence. But God's essence is one only. Therefore there is only one idea.
1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint plures ideae. Idea enim in Deo est eius essentia. Sed essentia Dei est una tantum. Ergo et idea est una.
2 Objection 2: Further, as the idea is the principle of knowing and operating, so are art and wisdom. But in God there are not several arts or wisdoms. Therefore in Him there is no plurality of ideas.
2 Praeterea, sicut idea est principium cognoscendi et operandi, ita ars et sapientia. Sed in Deo non sunt plures artes et sapientiae. Ergo nec plures ideae.
3 Objection 3: Further, if it be said that ideas are multiplied according to their relations to different creatures, it may be argued on the contrary that the plurality of ideas is eternal. If, then, ideas are many, but creatures temporal, then the temporal must be the cause of the eternal.
3 Si dicatur quod ideae multiplicantur secundum respectus ad diversas creaturas, contra, pluralitas idearum est ab aeterno. Si ergo ideae sunt plures, creaturae autem sunt temporales, ergo temporale erit causa aeterni.
4 Objection 4: Further, these relations are either real in creatures only, or in God also. If in creatures only, since creatures are not from eternity, the plurality of ideas cannot be from eternity, if ideas are multiplied only according to these relations. But if they are real in God, it follows that there is a real plurality in God other than the plurality of Persons: and this is against the teaching of Damascene De Fide Orth. i, 10), who says, in God all things are one, except ingenerability, generation, and procession. Ideas therefore are not many.
4 Praeterea, respectus isti aut sunt secundum rem in creaturis tantum, aut etiam in Deo. Si in creaturis tantum, cum creaturae non sint ab aeterno, pluralitas idearum non erit ab aeterno, si multiplicentur solum secundum huiusmodi respectus. Si autem realiter sunt in Deo, sequitur quod alia pluralitas realis sit in Deo quam pluralitas personarum, quod est contra Damascenum, dicentem quod in divinis omnia unum sunt, praeter ingenerationem, generationem et processionem. Sic igitur non sunt plures ideae.
5 On the contrary, Augustine says Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), Ideas are certain principal forms, or permanent and immutable types of things, they themselves not being formed. Thus they are eternal, and existing always in the same manner, as being contained in the divine intelligence. Whilst, however, they themselves neither come into being nor decay, yet we say that in accordance with them everything is formed that can rise or decay, and all that actually does so.
5 Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., ideae sunt principales quaedam formae vel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quia ipsae formatae non sunt, ac per hoc aeternae ac semper eodem modo se habentes, quae divina intelligentia continentur. Sed cum ipsae neque oriantur neque intereant, secundum eas tamen formari dicitur omne quod oriri et interire potest, et omne quod oritur et interit.
6 I answer that, It must necessarily be held that ideas are many. In proof of which it is to be considered that in every effect the ultimate end is the proper intention of the principal agent, as the order of an army is the proper intention) of the general. Now the highest good existing in things is the good of the order of the universe, as the Philosopher clearly teaches in Metaph. xii. Therefore the order of the universe is properly intended by God, and is not the accidental result of a succession of agents, as has been supposed by those who have taught that God created only the first creature, and that this creature created the second creature, and so on, until this great multitude of beings was produced.
According to this opinion God would have the idea of the first created thing alone; whereas, if the order itself of the universe was created by Him immediately, and intended by Him, He must have the idea of the order of the universe. Now there cannot be an idea of any whole, unless particular ideas are had of those parts of which the whole is made; just as a builder cannot conceive the idea of a house unless he has the idea of each of its parts.
So, then, it must needs be that in the divine mind there are the proper ideas of all things. Hence Augustine says Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), that each thing was created by God according to the idea proper to it, from which it follows that in the divine mind ideas are many. Now it can easily be seen how this is not repugnant to the simplicity of God, if we consider that the idea of a work is in the mind of the operator as that which is understood, and not as the image whereby he understands, which is a form that makes the intellect in act.
For the form of the house in the mind of the builder, is something understood by him, to the likeness of which he forms the house in matter. Now, it is not repugnant to the simplicity of the divine mind that it understand many things; though it would be repugnant to its simplicity were His understanding to be formed by a plurality of images. Hence many ideas exist in the divine mind, as things understood by it; as can be proved thus.
Inasmuch as He knows His own essence perfectly, He knows it according to every mode in which it can be known. Now it can be known not only as it is in itself, but as it can be participated in by creatures according to some degree of likeness. But every creature has its own proper species, according to which it participates in some degree in likeness to the divine essence. So far, therefore, as God knows His essence as capable of such imitation by any creature, He knows it as the particular type and idea of that creature; and in like manner as regards other creatures. So it is clear that God understands many particular types of things and these are many ideas.
6 Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere plures ideas. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod in quolibet effectu illud quod est ultimus finis, proprie est intentum a principali agente; sicut ordo exercitus a duce. Illud autem quod est optimum in rebus existens, est bonum ordinis universi, ut patet per philosophum in XII Metaphys. Ordo igitur universi est proprie a Deo intentus, et non per accidens proveniens secundum successionem agentium, prout quidam dixerunt quod Deus creavit primum creatum tantum, quod creatum creavit secundum creatum, et sic inde quousque producta est tanta rerum multitudo, secundum quam opinionem, Deus non haberet nisi ideam primi creati.
Sed si ipse ordo universi est per se creatus ab eo, et intentus ab ipso, necesse est quod habeat ideam ordinis universi. Ratio autem alicuius totius haberi non potest, nisi habeantur propriae rationes eorum ex quibus totum constituitur, sicut aedificator speciem domus concipere non posset, nisi apud ipsum esset propria ratio cuiuslibet partium eius. Sic igitur oportet quod in mente divina sint propriae rationes omnium rerum. Unde dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod singula propriis rationibus a Deo creata sunt.
Unde sequitur quod in mente divina sint plures ideae. Hoc autem quomodo divinae simplicitati non repugnet, facile est videre, si quis consideret ideam operati esse in mente operantis sicut quod intelligitur; non autem sicut species qua intelligitur, quae est forma faciens intellectum in actu. Forma enim domus in mente aedificatoris est aliquid ab eo intellectum, ad cuius similitudinem domum in materia format. Non est autem contra simplicitatem divini intellectus, quod multa intelligat, sed contra simplicitatem eius esset, si per plures species eius intellectus formaretur.
Unde plures ideae sunt in mente divina ut intellectae ab ipso. Quod hoc modo potest videri. Ipse enim essentiam suam perfecte cognoscit, unde cognoscit eam secundum omnem modum quo cognoscibilis est. Potest autem cognosci non solum secundum quod in se est, sed secundum quod est participabilis secundum aliquem modum similitudinis a creaturis. Unaquaeque autem creatura habet propriam speciem, secundum quod aliquo modo participat divinae essentiae similitudinem. Sic igitur inquantum Deus cognoscit suam essentiam ut sic imitabilem a tali creatura, cognoscit eam ut propriam rationem et ideam huius creaturae. Et similiter de aliis. Et sic patet quod Deus intelligit plures rationes proprias plurium rerum; quae sunt plures ideae.
7 Reply to Objection 1: The divine essence is not called an idea in so far as it is that essence, but only in so far as it is the likeness or type of this or that thing. Hence ideas are said to be many, inasmuch as many types are understood through the self-same essence.
7 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod idea non nominat divinam essentiam inquantum est essentia, sed inquantum est similitudo vel ratio huius vel illius rei. Unde secundum quod sunt plures rationes intellectae ex una essentia, secundum hoc dicuntur plures ideae.
8 Reply to Objection 2: By wisdom and art we signify that by which God understands; but an idea, that which God understands. For God by one understands many things, and that not only according to what they are in themselves, but also according as they are understood, and this is to understand the several types of things. In the same way, an architect is said to understand a house, when he understands the form of the house in matter. But if he understands the form of a house, as devised by himself, from the fact that he understands that he understands it, he thereby understands the type or idea of the house. Now not only does God understand many things by His essence, but He also understands that He understands many things by His essence. And this means that He understands the several types of things; or that many ideas are in His intellect as understood by Him.
8 Ad secundum dicendum quod sapientia et ars significantur ut quo Deus intelligit, sed idea ut quod Deus intelligit. Deus autem uno intelligit multa; et non solum secundum quod in seipsis sunt, sed etiam secundum quod intellecta sunt; quod est intelligere plures rationes rerum. Sicut artifex, dum intelligit formam domus in materia, dicitur intelligere domum, dum autem intelligit formam domus ut a se speculatam, ex eo quod intelligit se intelligere eam, intelligit ideam vel rationem domus. Deus autem non solum intelligit multas res per essentiam suam, sed etiam intelligit se intelligere multa per essentiam suam. Sed hoc est intelligere plures rationes rerum; vel, plures ideas esse in intellectu eius ut intellectas.
9 Reply to Objection 3: Such relations, whereby ideas are multiplied, are caused not by the things themselves, but by the divine intellect comparing its own essence with these things.
9 Ad tertium dicendum quod huiusmodi respectus, quibus multiplicantur ideae, non causantur a rebus, sed ab intellectu divino, comparante essentiam suam ad res.
10 Reply to Objection 4: Relations multiplying ideas do not exist in created things, but in God. Yet they are not real relations, such as those whereby the Persons are distinguished, but relations understood by God.
10 Ad quartum dicendum quod respectus multiplicantes ideas, non sunt in rebus creatis, sed in Deo. Non tamen sunt reales respectus, sicut illi quibus distinguuntur personae, sed respectus intellecti a Deo.