1 Objection 1: It seems that five expressions of will, namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission, are not rightly assigned to the divine will. For the same things that God bids us do by His precept or counsel, these He sometimes operates in us, and the same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes permits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct.
1 Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter circa divinam voluntatem ponantur quinque signa, scilicet, prohibitio, praeceptum, consilium, operatio et permissio. Nam eadem quae nobis praecipit Deus vel consulit, in nobis quandoque operatur, et eadem quae prohibet, quandoque permittit. Ergo non debent ex opposito dividi.
2 Objection 2: Further, God works nothing unless He wills it, as the Scripture says Wis. 11, 26). But the will of expression is distinct from the will of good pleasure. Therefore operation ought not to be comprehended in the will of expression.
2 Praeterea, nihil Deus operatur, nisi volens, ut dicitur Sap. XI. Sed voluntas signi distinguitur a voluntate beneplaciti. Ergo operatio sub voluntate signi comprehendi non debet.
3 Objection 3: Further, operation and permission appertain to all creatures in common, since God works in them all, and permits some action in them all. But precept, counsel, and prohibition belong to rational creatures only. Therefore they do not come rightly under one division, not being of one order.
3 Praeterea, operatio et permissio communiter ad omnes creaturas pertinent, quia in omnibus Deus operatur, et in omnibus aliquid fieri permittit. Sed praeceptum, consilium et prohibitio pertinent ad solam rationalem creaturam. Ergo non veniunt convenienter in unam divisionem, cum non sint unius ordinis.
4 Objection 4: Further, evil happens in more ways than good, since good happens in one way, but evil in all kinds of ways, as declared by the Philosopher Ethic. ii, 6), and Dionysius Div. Nom. iv, 22). It is not right therefore to assign one expression only in the case of evil, namely, prohibition, and two, namely, counsel and precept, in the case of good.
4 Praeterea, malum pluribus modis contingit quam bonum, quia bonum contingit uno modo, sed malum omnifariam, ut patet per philosophum in II Ethic., et per Dionysium in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Inconvenienter igitur respectu mali assignatur unum signum tantum, scilicet prohibitio; respectu vero boni, duo signa, scilicet consilium et praeceptum.
5 I answer that, By these signs we name the expression of will by which we are accustomed to show that we will something. A man may show that he wills something, either by himself or by means of another. He may show it by himself, by doing something either directly, or indirectly and accidentally. He shows it directly when he works in his own person; in that way the expression of his will is his own working. He shows it indirectly, by not hindering the doing of a thing; for what removes an impediment is called an accidental mover.
In this respect the expression is called permission. He declares his will by means of another when he orders another to perform a work, either by insisting upon it as necessary by precept, and by prohibiting its contrary; or by persuasion, which is a part of counsel. Since in these ways the will of man makes itself known, the same five are sometimes denominated with regard to the divine will, as the expression of that will. That precept, counsel, and prohibition are called the will of God is clear from the words of Mt.
6, 10: Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven. That permission and operation are called the will of God is clear from Augustine Enchiridion 95), who says: Nothing is done, unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually doing it. Or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time, permission being with respect to evil, operation with regard to good. Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept to good that is necessary and counsel to good that is of supererogation.
5 Respondeo dicendum quod huiusmodi signa voluntatis dicuntur ea, quibus consuevimus demonstrare nos aliquid velle. Potest autem aliquis declarare se velle aliquid, vel per seipsum, vel per alium. Per seipsum quidem, inquantum facit aliquid, vel directe, vel indirecte et per accidens. Directe quidem, cum per se aliquid operatur, et quantum ad hoc, dicitur esse signum operatio. Indirecte autem, inquantum non impedit operationem, nam removens prohibens dicitur movens per accidens, ut dicitur in VIII Physic. Et quantum ad hoc, dicitur signum permissio. Per alium autem declarat se aliquid velle, inquantum ordinat alium ad aliquid faciendum; vel necessaria inductione, quod fit praecipiendo quod quis vult, et prohibendo contrarium; vel aliqua persuasoria inductione, quod pertinet ad consilium. Quia igitur his modis declaratur aliquem velle aliquid, propter hoc ista quinque nominantur interdum nomine voluntatis divinae, tanquam signa voluntatis. Quod enim praeceptum, consilium et prohibitio dicantur Dei voluntas, patet per id quod dicitur Matth. VI fiat voluntas tua, sicut in caelo et in terra. Quod autem permissio vel operatio dicantur Dei voluntas patet per Augustinum, qui dicit in Enchirid., nihil fit, nisi omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel faciendo. Vel potest dici quod permissio et operatio referuntur ad praesens permissio quidem ad malum, operatio vero ad bonum. Ad futurum vero, prohibitio, respectu mali; respectu vero boni necessarii, praeceptum; respectu vero superabundantis boni, consilium.
6 Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing to prevent anyone declaring his will about the same matter in different ways; thus we find many words that mean the same thing. Hence there is not reason why the same thing should not be the subject of precept, operation, and counsel; or of prohibition or permission.
6 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet, circa eandem rem, aliquem diversimode declarare se aliquid velle, sicut inveniuntur multa nomina idem significantia. Unde nihil prohibet idem subiacere praecepto et consilio et operationi, et prohibitioni vel permissioni.
7 Reply to Objection 2: As God may by metaphor be said to will what by His will, properly speaking, He wills not; so He may by metaphor be said to will what He does, properly speaking, will. Hence there is nothing to prevent the same thing being the object of the will of good pleasure, and of the will of expression. But operation is always the same as the will of good pleasure; while precept and counsel are not; both because the former regards the present, and the two latter the future; and because the former is of itself the effect of the will; the latter its effect as fulfilled by means of another.
7 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Deus potest significari metaphorice velle id quod non vult voluntate proprie accepta, ita potest metaphorice significari velle id quod proprie vult. Unde nihil prohibet de eodem esse voluntatem beneplaciti, et voluntatem signi. Sed operatio semper est eadem cum voluntate beneplaciti, non autem praeceptum vel consilium, tum quia haec est de praesenti, illud de futuro; tum quia haec per se est effectus voluntatis, illud autem per alium, ut dictum est.
8 Reply to Objection 3: Rational creatures are masters of their own acts; and for this reason certain special expressions of the divine will are assigned to their acts, inasmuch as God ordains rational creatures to act voluntarily and of themselves. Other creatures act only as moved by the divine operation; therefore only operation and permission are concerned with these.
8 Ad tertium dicendum quod creatura rationalis est domina sui actus, et ideo circa ipsam specialia quaedam signa divinae voluntatis assignantur, inquantum rationalem creaturam Deus ordinat ad agendum voluntarie et per se. Sed aliae creaturae non agunt nisi motae ex operatione divina, et ideo circa alias non habent locum nisi operatio et permissio.
9 Reply to Objection 4: All evil of sin, though happening in many ways, agrees in being out of harmony with the divine will. Hence with regard to evil, only one expression is assigned, that of prohibition. On the other hand, good stands in various relations to the divine goodness, since there are good deeds without which we cannot attain to the fruition of that goodness, and these are the subject of precept; and there are others by which we attain to it more perfectly, and these are the subject of counsel. Or it may be said that counsel is not only concerned with the obtaining of greater good; but also with the avoiding of lesser evils.
9 Ad quartum dicendum quod omne malum culpae, licet multipliciter contingat, tamen in hoc convenit, quod discordat a voluntate divina et ideo unum signum respectu malorum assignatur, scilicet prohibitio. Sed diversimode bona se habent ad bonitatem divinam. Quia quaedam sunt, sine quibus fruitionem divinae bonitatis consequi non possumus, et respectu horum est praeceptum. Quaedam vero sunt, quibus perfectius consequimur, et respectu horum est consilium. Vel dicendum quod consilium est non solum de melioribus bonis assequendis, sed etiam de minoribus malis vitandis.