1 Objection 1: It seems that God enters into the composition of other things, for Dionysius says Coel. Hier. iv): The being of all things is that which is above being, the Godhead. But the being of all things enters into the composition of everything. Therefore God enters into the composition of other things.
1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus in compositionem aliorum veniat. Dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. Cael. Hier., esse omnium est, quae super esse est deitas. Sed esse omnium intrat compositionem uniuscuiusque. Ergo Deus in compositionem aliorum venit.
2 Objection 2: Further, God is a form; for Augustine says De Verb. Dom.,) that, the word of God, which is God, is an uncreated form. But a form is part of a compound. Therefore God is part of some compound.
2 Praeterea, Deus est forma, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de verbis domini, quod verbum Dei quod est Deus) est forma quaedam non formata. Sed forma est pars compositi. Ergo Deus est pars alicuius compositi.
3 Objection 3: Further, whatever things exist, in no way differing from each other, are the same. But God and primary matter exist, and in no way differ from each other. Therefore they are absolutely the same. But primary matter enters into the composition things. Therefore also does God. Proof of the minor, whatever things differ, they differ by some differences, and therefore must be composite. But God and primary matter are altogether simple. Therefore they nowise differ from each other.
3 Praeterea, quaecumque sunt et nullo modo differunt, sunt idem. Sed Deus et materia prima sunt, et nullo modo differunt. Ergo penitus sunt idem. Sed materia prima intrat compositionem rerum. Ergo et Deus. Probatio mediae, quaecumque differunt, aliquibus differentiis differunt, et ita oportet ea esse composita; sed Deus et materia prima sunt omnino simplicia; ergo nullo modo differunt.
4 On the contrary, Dionysius says Div. Nom. ii): There can be no touching Him, that is, God, nor any other union with Him by mingling part with part. Further, the first cause rules all things without commingling with them, as the Philosopher says De Causis).
4 Sed contra est quod dicit Dionysius, II cap. de Div. Nom., quod neque tactus est eius scilicet Dei), neque alia quaedam ad partes commiscendi communio. Praeterea, dicitur in libro de causis, quod causa prima regit omnes res, praeterquam commisceatur eis.
5 I answer that, On this point there have been three errors. Some have affirmed that God is the world-soul, as is clear from Augustine De Civ. Dei vii, 6). This is practically the same as the opinion of those who assert that God is the soul of the highest heaven. Again, others have said that God is the formal principle of all things; and this was the theory of the Almaricians. The third error is that of David of Dinant, who most absurdly taught that God was primary matter.
Now all these contain manifest untruth; since it is not possible for God to enter into the composition of anything, either as a formal or a material principle. First, because God is the first efficient cause. Now the efficient cause is not identical numerically with the form of the thing caused, but only specifically: for man begets man. But primary matter can be neither numerically nor specifically identical with an efficient cause; for the former is merely potential, while the latter is actual.
Secondly, because, since God is the first efficient cause, to act belongs to Him primarily and essentially. But that which enters into composition with anything does not act primarily and essentially, but rather the composite so acts; for the hand does not act, but the man by his hand; and, fire warms by its heat. Hence God cannot be part of a compound. Thirdly, because no part of a compound can be absolutely primal among beings, not even matter, nor form, though they are the primal parts of every compound.
For matter is merely potential; and potentiality is absolutely posterior to actuality, as is clear from the foregoing Question 3, Article 1): while a form which is part of a compound is a participated form; and as that which participates is posterior to that which is essential, so likewise is that which is participated; as fire in ignited objects is posterior to fire that is essentially such. Now it has been proved that God is absolutely primal being Question 2, Article 3).
5 Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc fuerunt tres errores. Quidam enim posuerunt quod Deus esset anima mundi, ut patet per Augustinum in Lib. VII de civitate Dei, et ad hoc etiam reducitur, quod quidam dixerunt Deum esse animam primi caeli. Alii autem dixerunt Deum esse principium formale omnium rerum. Et haec dicitur fuisse opinio Almarianorum. Sed tertius error fuit David de Dinando, qui stultissime posuit Deum esse materiam primam. Omnia enim haec manifestam continent falsitatem, neque est possibile Deum aliquo modo in compositionem alicuius venire, nec sicut principium formale, nec sicut principium materiale.
Primo quidem, quia supra diximus Deum esse primam causam efficientem. Causa autem efficiens cum forma rei factae non incidit in idem numero, sed solum in idem specie, homo enim generat hominem. Materia vero cum causa efficiente non incidit in idem numero, nec in idem specie, quia hoc est in potentia, illud vero in actu. Secundo, quia cum Deus sit prima causa efficiens, eius est primo et per se agere. Quod autem venit in compositionem alicuius, non est primo et per se agens, sed magis compositum, non enim manus agit, sed homo per manum; et ignis calefacit per calorem.
Unde Deus non potest esse pars alicuius compositi. Tertio, quia nulla pars compositi potest esse simpliciter prima in entibus; neque etiam materia et forma, quae sunt primae partes compositorum. Nam materia est in potentia, potentia autem est posterior actu simpliciter, ut ex dictis patet. Forma autem quae est pars compositi, est forma participata, sicut autem participans est posterius eo quod est per essentiam, ita et ipsum participatum; sicut ignis in ignitis est posterior eo quod est per essentiam. Ostensum est autem quod Deus est primum ens simpliciter.
6 Reply to Objection 1: The Godhead is called the being of all things, as their efficient and exemplar cause, but not as being their essence.
6 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod deitas dicitur esse omnium effective et exemplariter, non autem per essentiam.
7 Reply to Objection 2: The Word is an exemplar form; but not a form that is part of a compound.
7 Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum est forma exemplaris, non autem forma quae est pars compositi.
8 Reply to Objection 3: Simple things do not differ by added differences, for this is the property of compounds. Thus man and horse differ by their differences, rational and irrational; which differences, however, do not differ from each other by other differences. Hence, to be quite accurate, it is better to say that they are, not different, but diverse. Hence, according to the Philosopher Metaph. x), things which are diverse are absolutely distinct, but things which are different differ by something. Therefore, strictly speaking, primary matter and God do not differ, but are by their very being, diverse. Hence it does not follow they are the same.
8 Ad tertium dicendum quod simplicia non differunt aliquibus aliis differentiis, hoc enim compositorum est. Homo enim et equus differunt rationali et irrationali differentiis, quae quidem differentiae non differunt amplius ab invicem aliis differentiis. Unde, si fiat vis in verbo, non proprie dicuntur differre, sed diversa esse, nam, secundum philosophum X Metaphys., diversum absolute dicitur, sed omne differens aliquo differt. Unde, si fiat vis in verbo, materia prima et Deus non differunt, sed sunt diversa seipsis. Unde non sequitur quod sint idem.