1 Objection 1: It seems that goodness differs really from being. For Boethius says De Hebdom.): I perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing: that they are is another. Therefore goodness and being really differ.
1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonum differat secundum rem ab ente. Dicit enim Boetius, in libro de Hebdom., intueor in rebus aliud esse quod sunt bona, et aliud esse quod sunt. Ergo bonum et ens differunt secundum rem.
2 Objection 2: Further, nothing can be its own form. But that is called good which has the form of being, according to the commentary on De Causis. Therefore goodness differs really from being.
2 Praeterea, nihil informatur seipso. Sed bonum dicitur per informationem entis, ut habetur in commento libri de causis. Ergo bonum differt secundum rem ab ente.
3 Objection 3: Further, goodness can be more or less. But being cannot be more or less. Therefore goodness differs really from being.
3 Praeterea, bonum suscipit magis et minus. Esse autem non suscipit magis et minus. Ergo bonum differt secundum rem ab ente.
4 On the contrary, Augustine says De Doctr. Christ. i, 42) that, inasmuch as we exist we are good.
4 Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de doctrina Christiana, quod inquantum sumus, boni sumus.
5 I answer that, Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea; which is clear from the following argument. The essence of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the Philosopher says Ethic. i): Goodness is what all desire. Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection. But everything is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as it exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is clear from the foregoing Question 3, Article 4; Question 4, Article 1). Hence it is clear that goodness and being are the same really. But goodness presents the aspect of desirableness, which being does not present.
5 Respondeo dicendum quod bonum et ens sunt idem secundum rem, sed differunt secundum rationem tantum. Quod sic patet. Ratio enim boni in hoc consistit, quod aliquid sit appetibile, unde philosophus, in I Ethic., dicit quod bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Manifestum est autem quod unumquodque est appetibile secundum quod est perfectum, nam omnia appetunt suam perfectionem. Intantum est autem perfectum unumquodque, inquantum est actu, unde manifestum est quod intantum est aliquid bonum, inquantum est ens, esse enim est actualitas omnis rei, ut ex superioribus patet. Unde manifestum est quod bonum et ens sunt idem secundum rem, sed bonum dicit rationem appetibilis, quam non dicit ens.
6 Reply to Objection 1: Although goodness and being are the same really, nevertheless since they differ in thought, they are not predicated of a thing absolutely in the same way. Since being properly signifies that something actually is, and actuality properly correlates to potentiality; a thing is, in consequence, said simply to have being, accordingly as it is primarily distinguished from that which is only in potentiality; and this is precisely each thing's substantial being. Hence by its substantial being, everything is said to have being simply; but by any further actuality it is said to have being relatively.
Thus to be white implies relative being, for to be white does not take a thing out of simply potential being; because only a thing that actually has being can receive this mode of being. But goodness signifies perfection which is desirable; and consequently of ultimate perfection. Hence that which has ultimate perfection is said to be simply good; but that which has not the ultimate perfection it ought to have although, in so far as it is at all actual, it has some perfection), is not said to be perfect simply nor good simply, but only relatively.
In this way, therefore, viewed in its primal that is, substantial) being a thing is said to be simply, and to be good relatively that is, in so far as it has being) but viewed in its complete actuality, a thing is said to be relatively, and to be good simply. Hence the saying of Boethius De Hebrom.), I perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing; that they are is another, is to be referred to a thing's goodness simply, and having being simply.
Because, regarded in its primal actuality, a thing simply exists; and regarded in its complete actuality, it is good simply, in such sort that even in its primal actuality, it is in some sort good, and even in its complete actuality, it in some sort has being.
6 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet bonum et ens sint idem secundum rem, quia tamen differunt secundum rationem, non eodem modo dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter, et bonum simpliciter. Nam cum ens dicat aliquid proprie esse in actu; actus autem proprie ordinem habeat ad potentiam; secundum hoc simpliciter aliquid dicitur ens, secundum quod primo discernitur ab eo quod est in potentia tantum. Hoc autem est esse substantiale rei uniuscuiusque; unde per suum esse substantiale dicitur unumquodque ens simpliciter. Per actus autem superadditos, dicitur aliquid esse secundum quid, sicut esse album significat esse secundum quid, non enim esse album aufert esse in potentia simpliciter, cum adveniat rei iam praeexistenti in actu. Sed bonum dicit rationem perfecti, quod est appetibile, et per consequens dicit rationem ultimi. Unde id quod est ultimo perfectum, dicitur bonum simpliciter. Quod autem non habet ultimam perfectionem quam debet habere, quamvis habeat aliquam perfectionem inquantum est actu, non tamen dicitur perfectum simpliciter, nec bonum simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Sic ergo secundum primum esse, quod est substantiale, dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter et bonum secundum quid, idest inquantum est ens, secundum vero ultimum actum dicitur aliquid ens secundum quid, et bonum simpliciter. Sic ergo quod dicit Boetius, quod in rebus aliud est quod sunt bona, et aliud quod sunt, referendum est ad esse bonum et ad esse simpliciter, quia secundum primum actum est aliquid ens simpliciter; et secundum ultimum, bonum simpliciter. Et tamen secundum primum actum est quodammodo bonum, et secundum ultimum actum est quodammodo ens.
7 Reply to Objection 2: Goodness is a form so far as absolute goodness signifies complete actuality. Reply to Objection 3: Again, goodness is spoken of as more or less according to a thing's superadded actuality, for example, as to knowledge or virtue.
7 Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum dicitur per informationem, prout accipitur bonum simpliciter, secundum ultimum actum. Et similiter dicendum ad tertium, quod bonum dicitur secundum magis et minus, secundum actum supervenientem; puta secundum scientiam vel virtutem.