1 Objection 1: It would seem that angels have bodies naturally united to them. For Origen says Peri Archon i): It is God's attribute alone, that is, it belongs to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, as a property of nature, that He is understood to exist without any material substance and without any companionship of corporeal addition. Bernard likewise says Hom. vi. super Cant.): Let us assign incorporeity to God alone even as we do immortality, whose nature alone, neither for its own sake nor on account of anything else, needs the help of any corporeal organ. But it is clear that every created spirit needs corporeal substance. Augustine also says Gen. ad lit. iii): The demons are called animals of the atmosphere because their nature is akin to that of aerial bodies. But the nature of demons and angels is the same. Therefore angels have bodies naturally united to them.
1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angeli habeant corpora naturaliter sibi unita. Dicit enim Origenes, in libro peri archon, solius Dei, idest patris et filii et spiritus sancti, naturae illud proprium est, ut sine materiali substantia et absque ulla corporeae adiectionis societate, intelligatur existere. Bernardus etiam dicit, in VI homilia super Cant., demus Deo soli, sicut immortalitatem sic incorporeitatem, cuius natura sola neque propter se neque propter alium, solatio indiget instrumenti corporei. Liquet autem omnem spiritum creatum corporeo indigere solatio. Augustinus etiam dicit, super Gen. ad Litt., Daemones aerea dicuntur animalia, quia corporum aereorum natura vigent. Eadem autem est natura Daemonis et Angeli. Ergo Angeli habent corpora naturaliter sibi unita.
2 Objection 2: Further, Gregory Hom. x in Ev.) calls an angel a rational animal. But every animal is composed of body and soul. Therefore angels have bodies naturally united to them.
2 Praeterea, Gregorius, in homilia Epiphaniae, nominat Angelum rationale animal. Omne autem animal componitur ex corpore et anima. Ergo Angeli habent corpora naturaliter sibi unita.
3 Objection 3: Further, life is more perfect in the angels than in souls. But the soul not only lives, but gives life to the body. Therefore the angels animate bodies which are naturally united to them.
3 Praeterea, perfectior est vita in Angelis quam in animabus. Sed anima non solum vivit, sed etiam vivificat corpus. Ergo Angeli vivificant corpora naturaliter sibi unita.
4 On the contrary, Dionysius says Div. Nom. iv) that the angels are understood to be incorporeal.
4 Sed contra est quod dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod Angeli sicut incorporales intelliguntur.
5 I answer that, The angels have not bodies naturally united to them. For whatever belongs to any nature as an accident is not found universally in that nature; thus, for instance, to have wings, because it is not of the essence of an animal, does not belong to every animal. Now since to understand is not the act of a body, nor of any corporeal energy, as will be shown later Question 75, Article 2), it follows that to have a body united to it is not of the nature of an intellectual substance, as such; but it is accidental to some intellectual substance on account of something else. Even so it belongs to the human soul to be united to a body, because it is imperfect and exists potentially in the genus of intellectual substances, not having the fulness of knowledge in its own nature, but acquiring it from sensible things through the bodily senses, as will be explained later on Question 84, Article 6; Question 89, Article 1). Now whenever we find something imperfect in any genus we must presuppose something perfect in that genus. Therefore in the intellectual nature there are some perfectly intellectual substances, which do not need to acquire knowledge from sensible things. Consequently not all intellectual substances are united to bodies; but some are quite separated from bodies, and these we call angels.
5 Respondeo dicendum quod Angeli non habent corpora sibi naturaliter unita. Quod enim accidit alicui naturae, non invenitur universaliter in natura illa, sicut habere alas, quia non est de ratione animalis, non convenit omni animali. Cum autem intelligere non sit actus corporis nec alicuius virtutis corporeae, ut infra patebit, habere corpus unitum non est de ratione substantiae intellectualis inquantum huiusmodi, sed accidit alicui substantiae intellectuali propter aliquid aliud; sicut humanae animae competit uniri corpori, quia est imperfecta et in potentia existens in genere intellectualium substantiarum, non habens in sui natura plenitudinem scientiae, sed acquirens eam per sensus corporeos a sensibilibus rebus, ut infra dicetur. In quocumque autem genere invenitur aliquid imperfectum, oportet praeexistere aliquid perfectum in genere illo. Sunt igitur aliquae substantiae perfectae intellectuales in natura intellectuali, non indigentes acquirere scientiam a sensibilibus rebus. Non igitur omnes substantiae intellectuales sunt unitae corporibus; sed aliquae sunt a corporibus separatae. Et has dicimus Angelos.
6 Reply to Objection 1: As was said above Question 50, Article 1) it was the opinion of some that every being is a body; and consequently some seem to have thought that there were no incorporeal substances existing except as united to bodies; so much so that some even held that God was the soul of the world, as Augustine tells us De Civ. Dei vii). As this is contrary to Catholic Faith, which asserts that God is exalted above all things, according to Ps. 8, 2: Thy magnificence is exalted beyond the heavens; Origen, while refusing to say such a thing of God, followed the above opinion of others regarding the other substances; being deceived here as he was also in many other points, by following the opinions of the ancient philosophers. Bernard's expression can be explained, that the created spirit needs some bodily instrument, which is not naturally united to it, but assumed for some purpose, as will be explained Article 2). Augustine speaks, not as asserting the fact, but merely using the opinion of the Platonists, who maintained that there are some aerial animals, which they termed demons.
6 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, quorundam opinio fuit quod omne ens esset corpus. Et ex hac existimatione derivatum videtur, quod aliqui existimaverunt nullas substantias incorporeas esse nisi corporibus unitas; adeo quod quidam etiam posuerunt Deum esse animam mundi, ut Augustinus narrat in VII de Civ. Dei. Sed quia hoc fidei Catholicae repugnat, quae ponit Deum super omnia exaltatum, secundum illud Psalmi VIII, elevata est magnificentia tua super caelos, Origenes, hoc de Deo dicere recusans, de aliis secutus est aliorum opinionem; sicut et in multis aliis deceptus fuit, sequens antiquorum philosophorum opiniones. Verbum autem Bernardi potest exponi, quod spiritus creati indigeant corporali instrumento, non naturaliter unito, sed ad aliquid assumpto, ut infra dicetur. Augustinus autem loquitur non asserendo, sed opinione Platonicorum utens, qui ponebant esse quaedam animalia aerea, quae Daemones nominabant.
7 Reply to Objection 2: Gregory calls the angel a rational animal metaphorically, on account of the likeness to the rational nature.
7 Ad secundum dicendum quod Gregorius nominat Angelum rationale animal metaphorice, propter similitudinem rationis.
8 Reply to Objection 3: To give life effectively is a perfection simply speaking; hence it belongs to God, as is said 1 Kgs. 2, 6): The Lord killeth, and maketh alive. But to give life formally belongs to a substance which is part of some nature, and which has not within itself the full nature of the species. Hence an intellectual substance which is not united to a body is more perfect than one which is united to a body.
8 Ad tertium dicendum quod vivificare effective simpliciter perfectionis est. Unde et Deo convenit secundum illud I Reg. II, dominus mortificat et vivificat. Sed vivificare formaliter est substantiae quae est pars alicuius naturae, et non habentis in se integram naturam speciei. Unde substantia intellectualis quae non est unita corpori, est perfectior quam ea quae est corpori unita.