1 Objection 1: It would seem that free-will is not an appetitive, but a cognitive power. For Damascene De Fide Orth. ii, 27) says that free-will straightway accompanies the rational nature. But reason is a cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.
1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod liberum arbitrium non sit potentia appetitiva, sed cognitiva. Dicit enim Damascenus quod cum rationali confestim comitatur liberum arbitrium. Sed ratio est potentia cognitiva. Ergo liberum arbitrium est potentia cognitiva.
2 Objection 2: Further, free-will is so called as though it were a free judgment. But to judge is an act of a cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.
2 Praeterea, liberum arbitrium dicitur quasi liberum iudicium. Sed iudicare est actus cognitivae virtutis. Ergo liberum arbitrium est cognitiva potentia.
3 Objection 3: Further, the principal function of free-will is to choose. But choice seems to belong to knowledge, because it implies a certain comparison of one thing to another, which belongs to the cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.
3 Praeterea, ad liberum arbitrium praecipue pertinet electio. Sed electio videtur ad cognitionem pertinere, quia electio importat quandam comparationem unius ad alterum, quod est proprium cognitivae virtutis. Ergo liberum arbitrium est potentia cognitiva.
4 On the contrary, The Philosopher says Ethic. iii, 3) that choice is the desire of those things which are in us. But desire is an act of the appetitive power: therefore choice is also. But free-will is that by which we choose. Therefore free-will is an appetitive power.
4 Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod electio est desiderium eorum quae sunt in nobis. Sed desiderium est actus appetitivae virtutis. Ergo et electio. Liberum autem arbitrium est secundum quod eligimus. Ergo liberum arbitrium est virtus appetitiva.
5 I answer that, The proper act of free-will is choice: for we say that we have a free-will because we can take one thing while refusing another; and this is to choose. Therefore we must consider the nature of free-will, by considering the nature of choice. Now two things concur in choice: one on the part of the cognitive power, the other on the part of the appetitive power. On the part of the cognitive power, counsel is required, by which we judge one thing to be preferred to another: and on the part of the appetitive power, it is required that the appetite should accept the judgment of counsel. Therefore Aristotle Ethic. vi, 2) leaves it in doubt whether choice belongs principally to the appetitive or the cognitive power: since he says that choice is either an appetitive intellect or an intellectual appetite. But Ethic. iii, 3) he inclines to its being an intellectual appetite when he describes choice as a desire proceeding from counsel. And the reason of this is because the proper object of choice is the means to the end: and this, as such, is in the nature of that good which is called useful: wherefore since good, as such, is the object of the appetite, it follows that choice is principally an act of the appetitive power. And thus free-will is an appetitive power.
5 Respondeo dicendum quod proprium liberi arbitrii est electio, ex hoc enim liberi arbitrii esse dicimur, quod possumus unum recipere, alio recusato, quod est eligere. Et ideo naturam liberi arbitrii ex electione considerare oportet. Ad electionem autem concurrit aliquid ex parte cognitivae virtutis, et aliquid ex parte appetitivae, ex parte quidem cognitivae, requiritur consilium, per quod diiudicatur quid sit alteri praeferendum; ex parte autem appetitivae, requiritur quod appetendo acceptetur id quod per consilium diiudicatur. Et ideo Aristoteles in VI Ethic. sub dubio derelinquit utrum principalius pertineat electio ad vim appetitivam, vel ad vim cognitivam, dicit enim quod electio vel est intellectus appetitivus, vel appetitus intellectivus. Sed in III Ethic. in hoc magis declinat quod sit appetitus intellectivus, nominans electionem desiderium consiliabile. Et huius ratio est, quia proprium obiectum electionis est illud quod est ad finem, hoc autem, inquantum huiusmodi, habet rationem boni quod dicitur utile, unde cum bonum, inquantum huiusmodi, sit obiectum appetitus, sequitur quod electio sit principaliter actus appetitivae virtutis. Et sic liberum arbitrium est appetitiva potentia.
6 Reply to Objection 1: The appetitive powers accompany the apprehensive, and in this sense Damascene says that free-will straightway accompanies the rational power.
6 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod potentiae appetitivae concomitantur apprehensivas. Et secundum hoc dicit Damascenus quod cum rationali confestim comitatur liberum arbitrium.
7 Reply to Objection 2: Judgment, as it were, concludes and terminates counsel. Now counsel is terminated, first, by the judgment of reason; secondly, by the acceptation of the appetite: whence the Philosopher Ethic. iii, 3) says that, having formed a judgment by counsel, we desire in accordance with that counsel. And in this sense choice itself is a judgment from which free-will takes its name.
7 Ad secundum dicendum quod iudicium est quasi conclusio et determinatio consilii. Determinatur autem consilium, primo quidem per sententiam rationis, et secundo per acceptationem appetitus, unde philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod ex consiliari iudicantes desideramus secundum consilium. Et hoc modo ipsa electio dicitur quoddam iudicium, a quo nominatur liberum arbitrium.
8 Reply to Objection 3: This comparison which is implied in the choice belongs to the preceding counsel, which is an act of reason. For though the appetite does not make comparisons, yet forasmuch as it is moved by the apprehensive power which does compare, it has some likeness of comparison by choosing one in preference to another.
8 Ad tertium dicendum quod ista collatio quae importatur in nomine electionis, pertinet ad consilium praecedens, quod est rationis. Appetitus enim, quamvis non sit collativus, tamen inquantum a vi cognitiva conferente movetur, habet quandam collationis similitudinem, dum unum alteri praeoptat.