1 Objection 1: It would seem that free-will is a power distinct from the will. For Damascene says De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that thelesis is one thing and boulesis another. But thelesis is the will, while boulesis seems to be the free-will, because boulesis, according to him, is will as concerning an object by way of comparison between two things. Therefore it seems that free-will is a distinct power from the will.
1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod liberum arbitrium sit alia potentia a voluntate. Dicit enim Damascenus, in libro II, quod aliud est thelesis, aliud vero bulesis, thelesis autem est voluntas; bulesis autem videtur arbitrium liberum, quia bulesis, secundum ipsum, est voluntas quae est circa aliquid quasi unius per comparationem ad alterum. Ergo videtur quod liberum arbitrium sit alia potentia a voluntate.
2 Objection 2: Further, powers are known by their acts. But choice, which is the act of free-will, is distinct from the act of willing, because the act of the will regards the end, whereas choice regards the means to the end Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will.
2 Praeterea, potentiae cognoscuntur per actus. Sed electio, quae est actus liberi arbitrii, est aliud a voluntate, ut dicitur in III Ethic., quia voluntas est de fine, electio autem de iis quae sunt ad finem. Ergo liberum arbitrium est alia potentia a voluntate.
3 Objection 3: Further, the will is the intellectual appetite. But in the intellect there are two powers, the active and the passive. Therefore, also on the part of the intellectual appetite, there must be another power besides the will. And this, seemingly, can only be free-will. Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will.
3 Praeterea, voluntas est appetitus intellectivus. Sed ex parte intellectus sunt duae potentiae, scilicet agens et possibilis. Ergo etiam ex parte appetitus intellectivi debet esse alia potentia praeter voluntatem. Et haec non videtur esse nisi liberum arbitrium. Ergo liberum arbitrium est alia potentia praeter voluntatem.
4 On the contrary, Damascene says De Fide Orth. iii, 14) free-will is nothing else than the will.
4 Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod liberum arbitrium nihil aliud est quam voluntas.
5 I answer that, The appetitive powers must be proportionate to the apprehensive powers, as we have said above Question 64, Article 2). Now, as on the part of the intellectual apprehension we have intellect and reason, so on the part of the intellectual appetite we have will, and free-will which is nothing else but the power of choice. And this is clear from their relations to their respective objects and acts. For the act of understanding implies the simple acceptation of something; whence we say that we understand first principles, which are known of themselves without any comparison.
But to reason, properly speaking, is to come from one thing to the knowledge of another: wherefore, properly speaking, we reason about conclusions, which are known from the principles. In like manner on the part of the appetite to will implies the simple appetite for something: wherefore the will is said to regard the end, which is desired for itself. But to choose is to desire something for the sake of obtaining something else: wherefore, properly speaking, it regards the means to the end.
Now, in matters of knowledge, the principles are related to the conclusion to which we assent on account of the principles: just as, in appetitive matters, the end is related to the means, which is desired on account of the end. Wherefore it is evident that as the intellect is to reason, so is the will to the power of choice, which is free-will. But it has been shown above Question 79, Article 8) that it belongs to the same power both to understand and to reason, even as it belongs to the same power to be at rest and to be in movement.
Wherefore it belongs also to the same power to will and to choose: and on this account the will and the free-will are not two powers, but one.
5 Respondeo dicendum quod potentias appetitivas oportet esse proportionatas potentiis apprehensivis, ut supra dictum est. Sicut autem ex parte apprehensionis intellectivae se habent intellectus et ratio, ita ex parte appetitus intellectivi se habent voluntas et liberum arbitrium, quod nihil aliud est quam vis electiva. Et hoc patet ex habitudine obiectorum et actuum. Nam intelligere importat simplicem acceptionem alicuius rei, unde intelligi dicuntur proprie principia, quae sine collatione per seipsa cognoscuntur. Ratiocinari autem proprie est devenire ex uno in cognitionem alterius, unde proprie de conclusionibus ratiocinamur, quae ex principiis innotescunt. Similiter ex parte appetitus, velle importat simplicem appetitum alicuius rei, unde voluntas dicitur esse de fine, qui propter se appetitur. Eligere autem est appetere aliquid propter alterum consequendum, unde proprie est eorum quae sunt ad finem. Sicut autem se habet in cognitivis principium ad conclusionem, cui propter principia assentimus; ita in appetitivis se habet finis ad ea quae sunt ad finem, quae propter finem appetuntur. Unde manifestum est quod sicut se habet intellectus ad rationem, ita se habet voluntas ad vim electivam, idest ad liberum arbitrium. Ostensum est autem supra quod eiusdem potentiae est intelligere et ratiocinari, sicut eiusdem virtutis est quiescere et moveri. Unde etiam eiusdem potentiae est velle et eligere. Et propter hoc voluntas et liberum arbitrium non sunt duae potentiae, sed una.
6 Reply to Objection 1: Boulesis is distinct from thelesis on account of a distinction, not of powers, but of acts.
6 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod bulesis distinguitur a thelesi, non propter diversitatem potentiarum, sed propter differentiam actuum.
7 Reply to Objection 2: Choice and will, that is, the act of willing, are different acts: yet they belong to the same power, as also to understand and to reason, as we have said.
7 Ad secundum dicendum quod electio et voluntas, idest ipsum velle, sunt diversi actus, sed tamen pertinent ad unam potentiam, sicut etiam intelligere et ratiocinari, ut dictum est.
8 Reply to Objection 3: The intellect is compared to the will as moving the will. And therefore there is no need to distinguish in the will an active and a passive will.
8 Ad tertium dicendum quod intellectus comparatur ad voluntatem ut movens. Et ideo non oportet in voluntate distinguere agens et possibile.