1 Objection 1: It would seem that the first man's soul had no passions. For by the passions of the soul the flesh lusteth against the spirit Gal. 5, 7). But this did not happen in the state of innocence. Therefore in the state of innocence there were no passions of the soul.
1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in primo homine non fuerint animae passiones. Secundum enim passiones animae contingit quod caro concupiscit adversus spiritum. Sed hoc non erat in statu innocentiae. Ergo in statu innocentiae non erant animae passiones.
2 Objection 2: Further, Adam's soul was nobler than his body. But his body was impassible. Therefore no passions were in his soul.
2 Praeterea, anima Adae erat nobilior quam corpus. Sed corpus Adae fuit impassibile. Ergo nec in anima eius fuerunt passiones.
3 Objection 3: Further, the passions of the soul are restrained by the moral virtues. But in Adam the moral virtues were perfect. Therefore the passions were entirely excluded from him.
3 Praeterea, per virtutem moralem comprimuntur animae passiones. Sed in Adam fuit virtus moralis perfecta. Ergo totaliter passiones excludebantur ab eo.
4 On the contrary, Augustine says De Civ. Dei xiv, 10) that in our first parents there was undisturbed love of God, and other passions of the soul.
4 Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod erat in eis amor imperturbatus in Deum, et quaedam aliae animae passiones.
5 I answer that, The passions of the soul are in the sensual appetite, the object of which is good and evil. Wherefore some passions of the soul are directed to what is good, as love and joy; others to what is evil, as fear and sorrow. And since in the primitive state, evil was neither present nor imminent, nor was any good wanting which a good-will could desire to have then, as Augustine says De Civ. Dei xiv, 10), therefore Adam had no passion with evil as its object; such as fear, sorrow, and the like; neither had he passions in respect of good not possessed, but to be possessed then, as burning concupiscence. But those passions which regard present good, as joy and love; or which regard future good to be had at the proper time, as desire and hope that casteth not down, existed in the state of innocence; otherwise, however, than as they exist in ourselves. For our sensual appetite, wherein the passions reside, is not entirely subject to reason; hence at times our passions forestall and hinder reason's judgment; at other times they follow reason's judgment, accordingly as the sensual appetite obeys reason to some extent. But in the state of innocence the inferior appetite was wholly subject to reason: so that in that state the passions of the soul existed only as consequent upon the judgment of reason.
5 Respondeo dicendum quod passiones animae sunt in appetitu sensuali, cuius obiectum est bonum et malum. Unde omnium passionum animae quaedam ordinantur ad bonum, ut amor et gaudium; quaedam ad malum, ut timor et dolor. Et quia in primo statu nullum malum aderat nec imminebat; nec aliquod bonum aberat, quod cuperet bona voluntas pro tempore illo habendum, ut patet per Augustinum XIV de Civ. Dei, omnes illae passiones quae respiciunt malum, in Adam non erant ut timor et dolor et huiusmodi; similiter nec illae passiones quae respiciunt bonum non habitum et nunc habendum, ut cupiditas aestuans. Illae vero passiones quae possunt esse boni praesentis, ut gaudium et amor; vel quae sunt futuri boni ut suo tempore habendi, ut desiderium et spes non affligens; fuerunt in statu innocentiae. Aliter tamen quam in nobis. Nam in nobis appetitus sensualis, in quo sunt passiones, non totaliter subest rationi, unde passiones quandoque sunt in nobis praevenientes iudicium rationis, et impedientes; quandoque vero ex iudicio rationis consequentes, prout sensualis appetitus aliqualiter rationi obedit. In statu vero innocentiae inferior appetitus erat rationi totaliter subiectus, unde non erant in eo passiones animae, nisi ex rationis iudicio consequentes.
6 Reply to Objection 1: The flesh lusts against the spirit by the rebellion of the passions against reason; which could not occur in the state of innocence.
6 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, per hoc quod passiones rationi repugnant, quod in statu innocentiae non erat.
7 Reply to Objection 2: The human body was impassible in the state of innocence as regards the passions which alter the disposition of nature, as will be explained later on Question 97, Article 2); likewise the soul was impassible as regards the passions which impede the free use of reason.
7 Ad secundum dicendum quod corpus humanum in statu innocentiae erat impassibile quantum ad passiones quae removent dispositionem naturalem, ut infra dicetur. Et similiter anima fuit impassibilis quantum ad passiones quae impediunt rationem.
8 Reply to Objection 3: Perfection of moral virtue does not wholly take away the passions, but regulates them; for the temperate man desires as he ought to desire, and what he ought to desire, as stated in Ethic. iii, 11.
8 Ad tertium dicendum quod perfecta virtus moralis non totaliter tollit passiones, sed ordinat eas, temperati enim est concupiscere sicut oportet, et quae oportet, ut dicitur in III Ethic.