1 Objection 1: It would seem that Adam had not all the virtues. For some virtues are directed to curb passions: thus immoderate concupiscence is restrained by temperance, and immoderate fear by fortitude. But in the state of innocence no immoderation existed in the passions. Therefore neither did these virtues then exist.
1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Adam non habuerit omnes virtutes. Quaedam enim virtutes ordinantur ad refraenandam immoderantiam passionum; sicut per temperantiam refraenatur immoderata concupiscentia, et per fortitudinem immoderatus timor. Sed immoderantia passionum non erat in statu innocentiae. Ergo nec dictae virtutes.
2 Objection 2: Further, some virtues are concerned with the passions which have evil as their object; as meekness with anger; fortitude with fear. But these passions did not exist in the state of innocence, as stated above Article 2). Therefore neither did those virtues exist then.
2 Praeterea, quaedam virtutes sunt circa passiones respicientes malum; ut mansuetudo circa iras, et fortitudo circa timores. Sed tales passiones non erant in statu innocentiae, ut dictum est. Ergo nec huiusmodi virtutes.
3 Objection 3: Further, penance is a virtue that regards sin committed. Mercy, too, is a virtue concerned with unhappiness. But in the state of innocence neither sin nor unhappiness existed. Therefore neither did those virtues exist.
3 Praeterea, poenitentia est quaedam virtus respiciens peccatum prius commissum. Misericordia etiam est quaedam virtus respiciens miseriam. Sed in statu innocentiae non erat peccatum nec miseria. Ergo neque huiusmodi virtutes.
4 Objection 4: Further, perseverance is a virtue. But Adam possessed it not; as proved by his subsequent sin. Therefore he possessed not every virtue.
4 Praeterea, perseverantia est quaedam virtus. Sed hanc Adam non habuit; ut sequens peccatum ostendit. Ergo non habuit omnes virtutes.
5 Objection 5: Further, faith is a virtue. But it did not exist in the state of innocence; for it implies an obscurity of knowledge which seems to be incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state.
5 Praeterea, fides quaedam virtus est. Sed haec in statu innocentiae non fuit, importat enim aenigmaticam cognitionem, quae perfectioni primi status repugnare videtur.
6 On the contrary, Augustine says, in a homily Serm. contra Judaeos): The prince of sin overcame Adam who was made from the slime of the earth to the image of God, adorned with modesty, restrained by temperance, refulgent with brightness.
6 Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in quadam homilia, princeps vitiorum devicit Adam de limo terrae ad imaginem Dei factum, pudicitia armatum, temperantia compositum, claritate splendidum.
7 I answer that, in the state of innocence man in a certain sense possessed all the virtues; and this can be proved from what precedes. For it was shown above Article 1) that such was the rectitude of the primitive state, that reason was subject to God, and the lower powers to reason. Now the virtues are nothing but those perfections whereby reason is directed to God, and the inferior powers regulated according to the dictate of reason, as will be explained in the Treatise on the Virtues FS, Question 63, Article 2).
Wherefore the rectitude of the primitive state required that man should in a sense possess every virtue. It must, however, be noted that some virtues of their very nature do not involve imperfection, such as charity and justice; and these virtues did exist in the primitive state absolutely, both in habit and in act. But other virtues are of such a nature as to imply imperfection either in their act, or on the part of the matter. If such imperfection be consistent with the perfection of the primitive state, such virtues necessarily existed in that state; as faith, which is of things not seen, and hope which is of things not yet possessed.
For the perfection of that state did not extend to the vision of the Divine Essence, and the possession of God with the enjoyment of final beatitude. Hence faith and hope could exist in the primitive state, both as to habit and as to act. But any virtue which implies imperfection incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state, could exist in that state as a habit, but not as to the act; for instance, penance, which is sorrow for sin committed; and mercy, which is sorrow for others' unhappiness; because sorrow, guilt, and unhappiness are incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state.
Wherefore such virtues existed as habits in the first man, but not as to their acts; for he was so disposed that he would repent, if there had been a sin to repent for; and had he seen unhappiness in his neighbor, he would have done his best to remedy it. This is in accordance with what the Philosopher says, Shame, which regards what is ill done, may be found in a virtuous man, but only conditionally; as being so disposed that he would be ashamed if he did wrong Ethic. iv, 9).
7 Respondeo dicendum quod homo in statu innocentiae aliqualiter habuit omnes virtutes. Et hoc ex dictis potest esse manifestum. Dictum est enim supra quod talis erat rectitudo primi status, quod ratio erat Deo subiecta, inferiores autem vires rationi. Virtutes autem nihil aliud sunt quam perfectiones quaedam, quibus ratio ordinatur in Deum, et inferiores vires disponuntur secundum regulam rationis; ut magis patebit cum de virtutibus agetur. Unde rectitudo primi status exigebat ut homo aliqualiter omnes virtutes haberet. Sed considerandum est quod virtutum quaedam sunt, quae de sui ratione nullam imperfectionem important, ut caritas et iustitia.
Et huiusmodi virtutes fuerunt in statu innocentiae simpliciter, et quantum ad habitum et quantum ad actum. Quaedam vero sunt, quae de sui ratione imperfectionem important, vel ex parte actus vel ex parte materiae. Et si huiusmodi imperfectio non repugnat perfectioni primi status, nihilominus huiusmodi virtutes poterant esse in primo statu; sicut fides, quae est eorum quae non videntur, et spes, quae est eorum quae non habentur. Perfectio enim primi status non se extendebat ad hoc, ut videret Deum per essentiam, et ut haberet eum cum fruitione finalis beatitudinis, unde fides et spes esse poterant in primo statu, et quantum ad habitum et quantum ad actum.
Si vero imperfectio quae est de ratione virtutis alicuius, repugnat perfectioni primi status, poterat huiusmodi virtus ibi esse secundum habitum, sed non secundum actum, ut patet de poenitentia, quae est dolor de peccato commisso, et de misericordia, quae est dolor de miseria aliena; perfectioni enim primi status repugnat tam dolor, quam culpa et miseria. Unde huiusmodi virtutes erant in primo homine secundum habitum, sed non secundum actum, erat enim primus homo sic dispositus, ut si peccatum praecessisset, doleret; et similiter si miseriam in alio videret, eam pro posse repelleret.
Sicut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod verecundia, quae est de turpi facto, contingit studioso solum sub conditione, est enim sic dispositus, quod verecundaretur si turpe aliquid committeret.
8 Reply to Objection 1: It is accidental to temperance and fortitude to subdue superabundant passion, in so far as they are in a subject which happens to have superabundant passions, and yet those virtues are per se' competent to moderate the passions.
8 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod accidit temperantiae et fortitudini quod superabundantiam passionum repellat, inquantum invenit passiones superabundantes in subiecto. Sed per se convenit huiusmodi virtutibus passiones moderari.
9 Reply to Objection 2: Passions which have evil for their object were incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state, if that evil be in the one affected by the passion; such as fear and sorrow. But passions which relate to evil in another are not incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state; for in that state man could hate the demons' malice, as he could love God's goodness. Thus the virtues which relate to such passions could exist in the primitive state, in habit and in act. Virtues, however, relating to passions which regard evil in the same subject, if relating to such passions only, could not exist in the primitive state in act, but only in habit, as we have said above of penance and of mercy. But other virtues there are which have relation not to such passions only, but to others; such as temperance, which relates not only to sorrow, but also to joy; and fortitude, which relates not only to fear, but also to daring and hope. Thus the act of temperance could exist in the primitive state, so far as it moderates pleasure; and in like manner, fortitude, as moderating daring and hope, but not as moderating sorrow and fear.
9 Ad secundum dicendum quod illae passiones ad malum ordinatae, repugnant perfectioni primi status, quae habent respectum ad malum in ipso qui afficitur passione, ut timor et dolor. Sed passiones quae respiciunt malum in altero, non repugnant perfectioni primi status, poterat enim homo in primo statu habere odio malitiam Daemonum, sicut et diligere bonitatem Dei. Unde et virtutes quae circa tales passiones essent, possent esse in primo statu, et quantum ad habitum et quantum ad actum. Quae vero sunt circa passiones respicientes malum in eodem subiecto, si circa huiusmodi solas passiones sunt, non poterant esse in primo statu secundum actum, sed solum secundum habitum; sicut de poenitentia et misericordia dictum est. Sed sunt quaedam virtutes quae non sunt circa has passiones solum, sed etiam circa alias; sicut temperantia, quae non solum est circa tristitias, sed etiam circa delectationes; et fortitudo, quae non solum est circa timores, sed etiam circa audaciam et spem. Unde poterat esse in primo statu actus temperantiae, secundum quod est moderativa delectationum; et similiter fortitudo, secundum quod est moderativa audaciae sive spei; non autem secundum quod moderantur tristitiam et timorem.
10 Reply to Objection 3: appears from what has been said above.
10 Ad tertium patet solutio ex his quae dicta sunt.
11 Reply to Objection 4: Perseverance may be taken in two ways: in one sense as a particular virtue, signifying a habit whereby a man makes a choice of persevering in good; in that sense Adam possessed perseverance. In another sense it is taken as a circumstance of virtue; signifying a certain uninterrupted continuation of virtue; in which sense Adam did not possess perseverance.
11 Ad quartum dicendum quod perseverantia dupliciter sumitur. Uno modo, prout est quaedam virtus, et sic significat quendam habitum, quo quis eligit perseverare in bono. Et sic Adam perseverantiam habuit. Alio modo, prout est circumstantia virtutis, et sic significat continuationem quandam virtutis absque interruptione. Et hoc modo Adam perseverantiam non habuit.
12 Reply to Objection 5: appears from what has been said above.
12 Ad quintum patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt.